TY  - JOUR
ID  - publications22219
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26389
IS  - N° 2
A1  - Kübler, Dorothea
A1  - Weibull, Jörgen W.
A1  - Huck, Steffen
Y1  - 2012/07//
N2  - This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents’ desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team
production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the contract. Multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper
incentives can arise.
PB  - Elsevier
JF  - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
VL  - vol. 83
SN  - 0167-2681
TI  - Social norms and economic incentives in firms
SP  - 173
AV  - none
EP  - 185
ER  -