%0 Journal Article
%@ 0167-2681
%A Kübler, Dorothea
%A Weibull, Jörgen W.
%A Huck, Steffen
%D 2012
%F publications:22219
%I Elsevier
%J Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
%N N° 2
%P 173-185
%R 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.05.005
%T Social norms and economic incentives in firms
%U https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22219/
%V vol. 83
%X This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents’ desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team  production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the contract. Multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper  incentives can arise.