eprintid: 2192 rev_number: 30 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/00/21/92 datestamp: 2012-01-18 05:53:06 lastmod: 2021-04-02 15:34:54 status_changed: 2012-01-18 05:53:06 type: article metadata_visibility: show item_issues_count: 0 creators_name: Casamatta, Georges creators_name: De Paoli, Caroline creators_idrefppn: 172244013 title: Inefficient public provision in a repeated elections model ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO date: 2007 date_type: published official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/8897 faculty: tse divisions: tse language: en has_fulltext: TRUE doi: doi/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00332.x view_date_year: 2007 full_text_status: public publication: Journal of Public Economic Theory volume: vol. 9 number: n° 6 pagerange: 1103-1126 refereed: TRUE issn: 1467-9779 oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:8897 harvester_local_overwrite: number harvester_local_overwrite: volume harvester_local_overwrite: creators_name harvester_local_overwrite: oai_set harvester_local_overwrite: faculty harvester_local_overwrite: site harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn oai_lastmod: 2015-07-31T18:00:02Z oai_set: tse oai_set: ut1c site: ut1 citation: Casamatta, Georges and De Paoli, Caroline (2007) Inefficient public provision in a repeated elections model. Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 9 (n° 6). pp. 1103-1126. document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/2192/1/casamatta_depaoli.pdf