eprintid: 21653
rev_number: 17
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/02/16/53
datestamp: 2016-05-13 12:57:17
lastmod: 2021-04-02 15:53:28
status_changed: 2016-06-30 10:47:17
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: no_search
creators_name: Cheikbossian, Guillaume
creators_idrefppn: 066955815
title: The Political Economy of (De)centralization with Complementary Public Goods
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: This paper provides a political economy analysis of (de)centralization when local public goods -- with spillovers effects -- can be substitutes or complements. Depending on the degree of complementarity between local public goods, median voters strategically delegate policy to either `conservative' or to `liberal' representatives under decentralized decision-making. In the first case, it accentuates the free-rider problem in public good provision, while it mitigates it in the second case. Under centralized decision-making, the process of strategic delegation results in either too low or too much public spending, with the outcome crucially depending on the sharing of the costs of local public spending relative to the size of the spillover effects. Hence, with a common financing rule, centralization is welfare improving if and only if both public good externalities and the degree of complementarity between local public goods are both relatively large.
date: 2016-05
date_type: published
publisher: TSE Working Paper
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30433
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
keywords: (De)centralization
keywords: Local Public Goods
keywords: Complements
keywords: Strategic Delegation
keywords: Spillovers
language: en
has_fulltext: TRUE
subjectsJEL: JEL_D72
subjectsJEL: JEL_H41
subjectsJEL: JEL_H77
view_date_year: 2016
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
series: TSE Working Paper
volume: 16-644
place_of_pub: Toulouse
pages: 49
institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
department: Toulouse school of economics
book_title: TSE Working Paper
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:30433
harvester_local_overwrite: department
harvester_local_overwrite: faculty
harvester_local_overwrite: place_of_pub
harvester_local_overwrite: pages
harvester_local_overwrite: institution
harvester_local_overwrite: id_number
harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn
oai_lastmod: 2016-06-27T07:51:09Z
oai_set: tse
site: ut1
citation:   Cheikbossian, Guillaume <https://www.idref.fr/066955815>  (2016) The Political Economy of (De)centralization with Complementary Public Goods.  TSE Working Paper, n. 16-644, Toulouse     
document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/21653/1/cheikbossian_21653.pdf