RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Offerman, Theo
A1 Schram, Arthur
A1 Van Leeuwen, Boris
T1 Competition for status creates superstars: An experiment on public good provision and network formation
YR 2014
FD 2014-12
VO 14-16
SP 61
AB We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for a competition for status dynamic that predicts when, and if so which, repeated game equilibrium is reached. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that the supergame effects we observe are driven by social motives.
T2 IAST working paper
PB IAST working paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/21625/
UL http://iast.fr/pub/28902