TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse
ID  - publications21625
UR  - http://iast.fr/pub/28902
A1  - Offerman, Theo
A1  - Schram, Arthur
A1  - Van Leeuwen, Boris
Y1  - 2014/12//
N2  - We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for a competition for status dynamic that predicts when, and if so which, repeated game equilibrium is reached. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that the supergame effects we observe are driven by social motives.
PB  - IAST working paper
T3  - IAST working paper
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Competition for status creates superstars: An experiment on public good provision and network formation
AV  - public
EP  - 61
ER  -