RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Halaburda, Hanna
A1 Jullien, Bruno
A1 Yehezkel, Yaron
T1 Dynamic competition with network externalities: why history matters
YR 2016
FD 2016-03
VO 16-636
SP 65
K1 network externalities
K1 dynamic competition
K1 coordination
AB We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network  externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period be-  comes \focal" in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which  they join the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet when faced  with higher-quality competition, can a low-quality platform remain focal? In the  nite-horizon case, the unique equilibrium is ecient for \patient" platforms;  with an innite time horizon, however, there are multiple equilibria where ei-  ther the low- or high-quality platform dominates. If qualities are stochastic,  the platform with a better average quality wins with a higher probability, even  when its realized quality is lower, and this probability increases as platforms  become more patient. Hence social welfare may decline as platforms become  more forward looking.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/20417/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30384