TY  - JOUR
ID  - publications20315
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30379
A1  - Cremer, Helmuth
A1  - Pestieau, Pierre
A1  - Roeder, Kerstin
Y1  - 2016///
N2  - This paper studies the design of a social long-term care (LTC) insurance when altruism is two-sided. The laissez-faire solution is not efficient, unless there is perfect altruism. Under full information, the rst-best can be decentralized by a linear subsidy on informal aid, a linear tax on bequests when the parent is dependent and state specic lump-sum transfers which provide insurance. We also study a second-best scheme comprising a LTC benet, a payroll tax on childrens earnings and an inheritance tax. This scheme redistributes resources across individuals and between the states of nature and the tax on childrens labor enhances informal care to compensate for the childrens possible less than full altruism.
PB  - Elsevier
JF  - Research in Economics
VL  - vol.70
KW  - Long-term care
KW  - Two-sided altruism
SN  - 1090-9443
TI  - Social long-term care insurance with two-sided altruism
SP  - 101
AV  - public
EP  - 109
ER  -