RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Ivaldi, Marc
A1 Lagos, Vicente
T1 Assessment of Post-merger Coordinated Effects: Characterization by Simulations
YR 2016
FD 2016-03
VO 16-631
SP 43
K1 Assessment
K1 Collusion
K1 Coordinated effects
K1 Critical Discount Factor
K1 Merger Simulation
AB This paper aims to evaluate the coordinated effects of horizontal mergers by simulating its impact on firms’ critical discount factors. The simulation setting considers a model with a random coefficient discrete choice demand and heterogeneous price-setting firms on the supply side. The results suggest that mergers strengthen the incentives to collude among merging parties, but weaken the incentives of non-merging parties. In addition, while the magnitude of this impact is moderate for the latter, it can be substantial for merging parties. Finally, general policy lessons regarding the assessment of the magnitude of these effects can be drawn from the results.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/19986/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30295