@article{publications18614,
          volume = {vol. 8},
          number = {n? 3},
           month = {August},
          author = {Alexandre de Corni{\`e}re},
         address = {Nashville},
           title = {Search advertising},
       publisher = {American Economic Association},
            year = {2016},
         journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
           pages = {156--188},
        keywords = {search engine, targeted advertising, consumer search},
             url = {https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/18614/},
        abstract = {Search engines enable advertisers to target consumers based on the query they have entered. In a framework in which consumers search sequentially after having entered a query, I show that targeting reduces search costs, improves matches and intensifies price competition. However, a profit-maximizing monopolistic search engine imposes a distortion by charging too high an advertising fee, which may negate the benefits of targeting. The search engine also has incentives to provide a suboptimal quality of sponsored links. Competition among search engines can increase or decrease welfare, depending on the extent of multi-homing by advertisers.}
}