RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1111/joie.12115
A1 Lopez, Angel
A1 Rey, Patrick
T1 Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination
JF Journal of Industrial Economics
YR 2016
FD 2016-09
VO vol. 64
IS n° 3
SP 436
OP 465
AB This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tarifs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. When access charges are high, this allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way if switching costs are sufficiently large. In the absence of termination-based price discrimination, however, such foreclosure strategies are not profitable.
PB Blackwell
SN 0022-1821
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16873/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29201