eprintid: 16723
rev_number: 6
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/01/67/23
datestamp: 2015-03-16 14:56:33
lastmod: 2018-03-07 13:23:27
status_changed: 2015-03-16 14:56:33
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: no_search
creators_name: He, Yinghua
creators_name: Li, Sanxi
creators_name: Yan, Jianye
title: Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: We show that every (random) assignment/allocation without transfers can be considered as a market outcome with personalized prices and an equal income. One can thus evaluate an assignment by investigating the prices and the induced opportunity sets. When prices are proportional across agents, the assignment is efficient; when prices are common, the assignment is both efficient and envy-free. Moreover, this market perspective reveals a weakness of envy-freeness.
date: 2015-03
date_type: published
publisher: TSE Working Paper
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29118
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
keywords: allocation without transfers
keywords: competitive equilibrium
keywords: equal incomes
keywords: market perspective
keywords: envy-free
keywords: Pareto efficient
keywords: coalitional-envy-free
keywords: random assignment
language: en
has_fulltext: TRUE
subjectsJEL: JEL_C78
subjectsJEL: JEL_D61
subjectsJEL: JEL_D63
view_date_year: 2015
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
series: TSE Working Paper
volume: 15-559
book_title: TSE Working Paper
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:29118
harvester_local_overwrite: faculty
harvester_local_overwrite: site
oai_lastmod: 2015-07-16T10:57:13Z
oai_set: tse
site: ut1
citation:   He, Yinghua, Li, Sanxi and Yan, Jianye  (2015) Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective.  TSE Working Paper, n. 15-559     
document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16723/1/wp_tse_559.pdf