TY  - RPRT
ID  - publications16723
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29118
A1  - He, Yinghua
A1  - Li, Sanxi
A1  - Yan, Jianye
Y1  - 2015/03//
N2  - We show that every (random) assignment/allocation without transfers can be considered as a market outcome with personalized prices and an equal income. One can thus evaluate an assignment by investigating the prices and the induced opportunity sets. When prices are proportional across agents, the assignment is efficient; when prices are common, the assignment is both efficient and envy-free. Moreover, this market perspective reveals a weakness of envy-freeness.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - allocation without transfers
KW  - competitive equilibrium
KW  - equal incomes
KW  - market perspective
KW  - envy-free
KW  - Pareto efficient
KW  - coalitional-envy-free
KW  - random assignment
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective
AV  - public
ER  -