%0 Journal Article
%@ 0347-0520
%A Cremer, Helmuth
%A De Donder, Philippe
%D 2016
%F publications:16720
%I Wiley
%J Scandinavian Journal of Economics
%K generosity
%K redistributiveness
%K pay-as-you-go pensions
%K collective annuity
%K longevity
%K Kramer-Shepsle structure-induced equilibrium
%P 594-615
%T Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities
%U https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16720/
%V vol.118
%X Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker’s past earnings) as opposed to the non- contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.