@article{publications16720,
          volume = {vol.118},
           month = {July},
          author = {Helmuth Cremer and Philippe De Donder},
           title = {Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities},
       publisher = {Wiley},
         journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
           pages = {594--615},
            year = {2016},
        keywords = {generosity, redistributiveness, pay-as-you-go pensions, collective annuity, longevity, Kramer-Shepsle structure-induced equilibrium},
             url = {https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16720/},
        abstract = {Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker?s past earnings) as opposed to the non- contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.}
}