?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.relation=https%3A%2F%2Fpublications.ut-capitole.fr%2Fid%2Feprint%2F16578%2F&rft.title=Evolutionarily+stable+strategies%2C+preferences+and+moral+values%2C+in+n-player+Interactions&rft.creator=Alger%2C+Ingela&rft.creator=Weibull%2C+J%C3%B6rgen+W.&rft.subject=B-+ECONOMIE+ET+FINANCE&rft.description=We+provide+a+generalized+definition+of+evolutionary+stability+of+heritable+types+in+arbitrarily+large+symmetric+interactions+under+random+matching+that+may+be+assortative.+We+establish+stability+results+when+these+types+are+strategies+in+games%2C+and+when+they+are+preferences+or+moral+values+in+games+under+incomplete+information.+We+show+that+a+class+of+moral+preferences%2C+with+degree+of+morality+equal+to+the+index+of+assortativity+are+evolutionarily+stable.+In+particular%2C+selfishness+is+evolutionarily+unstable+when+there+is+positive+assortativity+in+the+matching+process.+We+establish+that+evolutionarily+stable+strategies+are+the+same+as+those+played+in+equilibrium+by+rational+but+partly+morally+motivated+individuals%2C+individuals+with+evolutionarily+stable+preferences.+We+provide+simple+and+operational+criteria+for+evolutionary+stability+and+apply+these+to+canonical+examples.&rft.publisher=LERNA+Working+Paper&rft.date=2014-06&rft.type=Monograph&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.format=text&rft.language=en&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fpublications.ut-capitole.fr%2Fid%2Feprint%2F16578%2F1%2F14.07.408.pdf&rft.identifier=++Alger%2C+Ingela+%3Chttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.idref.fr%2F234173319%3E+and+Weibull%2C+J%C3%B6rgen+W.+%3Chttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.idref.fr%2F034181938%3E++(2014)+Evolutionarily+stable+strategies%2C+preferences+and+moral+values%2C+in+n-player+Interactions.++LERNA+Working+Paper%2C+n.+14-07-408+++++&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Ftse-fr.eu%2Fpub%2F28495&rft.language=en