eprintid: 16559
rev_number: 8
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/01/65/59
datestamp: 2015-03-16 14:49:58
lastmod: 2021-10-27 13:36:41
status_changed: 2015-03-16 14:49:58
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Baik, Kyung Hwan
creators_name: Kim, Jihyun
creators_idrefppn: 241586771
title: Contests with Bilateral Delegation: Unobservable Contracts
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: We study two-player contests in which, in order to win a prize, each player hires a delegate to expend effort on her behalf; neither party's delegation contract is revealed to the rival party when the delegates choose their effort levels. We obtain first the outcomes of this unobservable-contracts case. Next, we perform comparative statics of these outcomes with respect to the higher-valuation player's valuation for the prize. Finally, we compare the outcomes of the unobservable-contracts case with those of the observable-contracts case. We find, among other things, that the unobservability of delegation contracts narrows the gap between the delegates' equilibrium contingent compensation.
date: 2014-09
date_type: published
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28438
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
language: en
has_fulltext: TRUE
subjectsJEL: JEL_D72
view_date_year: 2014
full_text_status: public
publication: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
volume: 170
number: 3
pagerange: 387-405
refereed: TRUE
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:28438
harvester_local_overwrite: oai_set
harvester_local_overwrite: faculty
harvester_local_overwrite: site
harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn
oai_lastmod: 2015-03-05T10:04:26Z
oai_set: tse
oai_set: ut1c
site: ut1
citation:   Baik, Kyung Hwan and Kim, Jihyun <https://www.idref.fr/241586771>  (2014) Contests with Bilateral Delegation: Unobservable Contracts.    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 170 (3).  pp. 387-405.       
document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16559/1/jite.pdf