TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse
ID  - publications16546
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28370
A1  - Yamashita, Takuro
Y1  - 2014/07/20/
N2  - We study the mechanism-design problem of guaranteeing desirable performances whenever agents are rational in the sense of not playing weakly dominated strategies. We first provide an upper bound for the best performance we can guarantee among all feasible mechanisms. We then prove the bound to be tight under certain conditions in auction and bilateral-trade applications. In particular, we find that a second-price auction is optimal in revenue with interdependent values, which is neither dominant-strategy nor ex post incentive compatible, but satisfies the novel incentive compatibility introduced in this analysis.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - Robust mechanism design
KW  - Robust implementation
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies, with Applications to Auctions and Bilateral Trade
AV  - public
EP  - 34
ER  -