eprintid: 16508
rev_number: 11
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/01/65/08
datestamp: 2015-03-16 14:45:17
lastmod: 2021-04-02 15:49:21
status_changed: 2020-04-16 08:39:10
type: article
succeeds: 15706
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Goulão, Catarina
creators_name: Panaccione, Luca
creators_idrefppn: 232891354
creators_affiliation: TSE (GREMAQ, INRA)
creators_affiliation: DEDI and CEIS
title: Pooling and redistribution with moral hazard
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: In this paper, we extend the framework of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) to the case 6 of moral hazard. Risk-averse consumers, who can in uence the likelihood of states of 7 nature by undertaking a hidden action, receive insurance by voluntarily participating 8 in a pool of promises of deliveries of future uncertain endowments. In exchange, they 9 gain the right to receive a share of the total return of the pool, in proportion to their 10 promises. We first analyze the equilibrium properties of the model and then illustrate 11 how an aggregate pool of promises of heterogenous consumers, differing in expected 12 endowment, results in a welfare improvement over the two segregated pools.
date: 2015
date_type: published
publisher: Economics Bulletin
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/27986
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
keywords: moral hazard
keywords: pool of promises
keywords: heterogeneous consumers
language: en
has_fulltext: FALSE
subjectsJEL: JEL_D3
subjectsJEL: JEL_D8
subjectsJEL: JEL_G2
view_date_year: 2015
full_text_status: none
publication: Economics Bulletin
volume: 35
number: 1
refereed: TRUE
issn: 1545-2921
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:27986
harvester_local_overwrite: oai_set
harvester_local_overwrite: faculty
harvester_local_overwrite: site
harvester_local_overwrite: issn
harvester_local_overwrite: pending
harvester_local_overwrite: publisher
harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn
oai_lastmod: 2019-12-10T10:24:35Z
oai_set: tse
oai_set: ut1c
site: ut1
citation:   Goulão, Catarina <https://www.idref.fr/232891354> and Panaccione, Luca  (2015) Pooling and redistribution with moral hazard.    Economics Bulletin, 35 (1).