RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Menicucci, Domenico
A1 Hurkens, Sjaak
A1 Jeon, Doh-Shin
T1 On the Optimality of Pure Bundling for a Monopolist
YR 2014
FD 2014-07-07
K1 Monopoly Pricing
K1 Price discrimination
K1 Multi-dimensional mechanism design
K1 Pure Bundling
AB This paper considers a monopolist selling two objects to a single buyer with privately observed valuations. We prove that if each buyer’s type has a non-negative virtual valuation for each object, then the optimal price schedule is such that the objects are sold only in a bundle; weaker conditions suffice if valuations are independently and identically distributed. Under somewhat stronger conditions, pure bundling is the optimal sale mechanism among all individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms.
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16222/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28352