%S TSE Working Paper
%A Helmuth Cremer
%A Philippe De Donder
%T Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities
%X Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker's past earnings) as opposed to the non-contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.
%K generosity
%K redistributiveness
%K pay-as-you-go pensions
%K collective annuity
%K longevity
%K Kramer-Shepsle structure-induced equilibrium
%B TSE Working Paper
%V 14-496
%D 2014
%I TSE Working Paper
%L publications16202