@article{publications15951,
          volume = {65},
          number = {4},
           title = {Accords environnementaux : le march{\'e} peut-il r{\'e}ussir l?arbitrage entre incitations et participation ?},
          author = {David Martimort and Wilfried Sand-Zantman},
            year = {2014},
           pages = {481--197},
         journal = {Revue {\'E}conomique},
             url = {https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15951/},
        abstract = {This article proposes a perspective on international climate agreements, based on mechanism design. We exhibit a trade-off between incentives and participation. We derive a general condition under which the first-best allocation can be implemented. We then discuss how this condition is affected by the assumptions on the status quo, in particular whether a non-cooperative or a grandfathering solution prevails when the negotiation fails. We show that, when the feasibility condition is satisfied, a market-based solution can indeed implement the first best allocation. At last, when the condition does not hold, we characterize the main properties of the second-best solution.}
}