TY  - RPRT
ID  - publications15875
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28043
A1  - Roig, Guillem
Y1  - 2014/03/26/
N2  - In a common agency setting, where the common buyer undertakes cooperative investment with her suppliers, we obtain a direct link between the level of ex-post competition and investment which affects the market structure of the supply side of the market. We show that more competitive equilibria are associated with a larger and more homogeneous distribution of investment among active suppliers, and an equilibrium with no investment might occur when competition is mild. In our model, buyer's investment works as a mechanism to incentivize competition, and its effectiveness is positively related to the level of competition ex-post. In general, the equilibrium investment profile is lower than efficiency, and we surprisingly find that higher competitive markets may sustain a larger number of suppliers.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - cooperative investment
KW  - investment distribution
KW  - competition
M1  - working_paper
TI  - What Determines Market Structure? An Explanation from Cooperative Investment with Non‐Exclusive Co
AV  - public
ER  -