eprintid: 15874
rev_number: 7
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/01/58/74
datestamp: 2014-07-09 17:43:25
lastmod: 2018-03-07 13:22:56
status_changed: 2014-07-09 17:43:25
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Roig, Guillem
title: Competition and the Hold‐U p Problem: a Setting with Non‐exclusive Contracts
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: This work studies how the introduction of competition to the side of the market offering trading contracts affects the equilibrium investment profile in a bilateral investment game. By using a common agency framework, where contracts are not exclusive, we find that the equilibrium investment profile depends on the competitiveness of the equilibrium outcome. Full efficiency can only be implemented when the trading outcome is the most competitive. Moreover, lowering the outcome competitiveness is not always Pareto dominant for the parties offering the contracts, and larger social welfare can be obtained with low competitive equilibria.
date: 2014-03-26
date_type: published
publisher: TSE Working Paper
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28042
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
keywords: bilateral investment
keywords: hold-up
keywords: competition
keywords: Pareto dominance
keywords: social surplus
language: en
has_fulltext: TRUE
subjectsJEL: JEL_D44
subjectsJEL: JEL_L11
view_date_year: 2014
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
series: TSE Working Paper
volume: 14-481
book_title: TSE Working Paper
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:28042
harvester_local_overwrite: oai_set
harvester_local_overwrite: faculty
harvester_local_overwrite: site
oai_lastmod: 2015-07-31T18:00:02Z
oai_set: tse
oai_set: ut1c
site: ut1
citation:   Roig, Guillem  (2014) Competition and the Hold‐U p Problem: a Setting with Non‐exclusive Contracts.  TSE Working Paper, n. 14-481     
document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15874/1/wp_tse_481.pdf