eprintid: 15827 rev_number: 15 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/01/58/27 datestamp: 2014-07-09 17:41:51 lastmod: 2021-04-02 15:48:27 status_changed: 2018-03-20 15:20:14 type: monograph metadata_visibility: show creators_name: Bontems, Philippe creators_name: Mahenc, Philippe creators_idrefppn: 035800003 creators_idrefppn: 057096317 creators_affiliation: Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ, INRA, IDEI) title: Signaling quality in vertical relationships ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO abstract: This paper addresses the issue of price signaling in a model of vertical relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer who share the same information about quality, unlike consumers who do not observe it a priori. We show that delegating the price setting task to a retailer and controlling it through a vertical contract (two-part tariff) helps drastically reduce the number of price signaling equilibria available to the retailer. The outcome of a unique price charged to consumers obtains without invoking the consumer sophistication usually required by selection criterions. The vertical contract turns to be the most e¢ cient way for the vertical chain to tie its hands on a unique ?nal price. This price may disclose or not information to consumers depending on their initial optimism about quality. We prove that there also exists circumstances where consumers prefer ex ante not to learn the true quality through price. date: 2014-01 date_type: published publisher: TSE Working Paper official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/27909 faculty: tse divisions: tse keywords: quality signalling keywords: vertical relationship keywords: information disclosure language: en has_fulltext: TRUE subjectsJEL: JEL_D82 subjectsJEL: JEL_L12 subjectsJEL: JEL_L15 view_date_year: 2014 full_text_status: public monograph_type: working_paper series: TSE Working Paper volume: 14-467 place_of_pub: Toulouse pages: 37 institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole department: Toulouse School of Economics book_title: TSE Working Paper oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:27909 harvester_local_overwrite: oai_set harvester_local_overwrite: faculty harvester_local_overwrite: site harvester_local_overwrite: department harvester_local_overwrite: creators_affiliation harvester_local_overwrite: institution harvester_local_overwrite: place_of_pub harvester_local_overwrite: pages harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn oai_lastmod: 2017-07-05T18:00:02Z oai_set: tse oai_set: ut1c site: ut1 citation: Bontems, Philippe and Mahenc, Philippe (2014) Signaling quality in vertical relationships. TSE Working Paper, n. 14-467, Toulouse document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15827/1/wp_tse_467.pdf