?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.relation=https%3A%2F%2Fpublications.ut-capitole.fr%2Fid%2Feprint%2F15827%2F&rft.title=Signaling+quality+in+vertical+relationships&rft.creator=Bontems%2C+Philippe&rft.creator=Mahenc%2C+Philippe&rft.subject=B-+ECONOMIE+ET+FINANCE&rft.description=This+paper+addresses+the+issue+of+price+signaling+in+a+model+of+vertical+relationship+between+a+manufacturer+and+a+retailer+who+share+the+same+information+about+quality%2C+unlike+consumers+who+do+not+observe+it+a+priori.+We+show+that+delegating+the+price+setting+task+to+a+retailer+and+controlling+it+through+a+vertical+contract+(two-part+tariff)+helps+drastically+reduce+the+number+of+price+signaling+equilibria+available+to+the+retailer.+The+outcome+of+a+unique+price+charged+to+consumers+obtains+without+invoking+the+consumer+sophistication+usually+required+by+selection+criterions.+The+vertical+contract+turns+to+be+the+most+e%C2%A2+cient+way+for+the+vertical+chain+to+tie+its+hands+on+a+unique+%3Fnal+price.+This+price+may+disclose+or+not+information+to+consumers+depending+on+their+initial+optimism+about+quality.+We+prove+that+there+also+exists+circumstances+where+consumers+prefer+ex+ante+not+to+learn+the+true+quality+through+price.&rft.publisher=TSE+Working+Paper&rft.date=2014-01&rft.type=Monograph&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.format=text&rft.language=en&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fpublications.ut-capitole.fr%2Fid%2Feprint%2F15827%2F1%2Fwp_tse_467.pdf&rft.identifier=++Bontems%2C+Philippe+%3Chttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.idref.fr%2F035800003%3E+and+Mahenc%2C+Philippe+%3Chttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.idref.fr%2F057096317%3E++(2014)+Signaling+quality+in+vertical+relationships.++TSE+Working+Paper%2C+n.+14-467%2C+Toulouse+++++&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Ftse-fr.eu%2Fpub%2F27909&rft.language=en