RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Cremer, Helmuth
A1 Gahvari, Firouz
A1 Pestieau, Pierre
T1 Endogenous altruism, redistribution, and long term care
YR 2013
FD 2013-03
VO 13-386
SP 30
AB This paper studies public provision of long term care insurance in a world in which  family assistance is (i) uncertain and (ii) endogenous depending on the time parents  spend raising their children. Public benefits will be paid in case of disability but cannot  be combined with self-insurance or family aid. The benefits are provided equally to  all recipients and financed by a proportional payroll tax. The paper shows that tax  distortions imply that full insurance is undesirable. It characterizes the optimal tax and  identifies the elements that determine its size. Of crucial importance are the extent of  under-insurance, the effect of the tax on the probability of altruism, the distortionary  effect of the tax, and, with wage heterogeneity, the covariance between the social mar-  ginal utility of lifetime income and (i) earnings (positive effect) and (ii) the probability  of altruism default (negative effect).
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15547/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26996