eprintid: 15519 rev_number: 18 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/01/55/19 datestamp: 2014-07-09 17:33:21 lastmod: 2023-07-18 08:33:00 status_changed: 2023-07-18 08:33:00 type: article metadata_visibility: show creators_name: Alger, Ingela creators_name: Ching-to-Albert, Ma creators_idrefppn: 234173319 creators_affiliation: Toulouse School of Economics creators_affiliation: Boston University title: Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO date: 2003-02 date_type: published official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26844 faculty: tse divisions: tse language: en has_fulltext: TRUE view_date_year: 2003 full_text_status: public publication: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization volume: 50 number: 2 pagerange: 225-247 refereed: TRUE oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:26844 harvester_local_overwrite: oai_set harvester_local_overwrite: faculty harvester_local_overwrite: site harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn oai_lastmod: 2023-05-26T09:34:36Z oai_set: tse oai_set: ut1c site: ut1 citation: Alger, Ingela and Ching-to-Albert, Ma (2003) Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 50 (2). pp. 225-247. document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15519/1/alger_ma2003.pdf