@techreport{publications15506,
          volume = {13-377},
           month = {September},
          author = {Catherine Bobtcheff and J{\'e}r{\^o}me Bolte and Thomas Mariotti},
          series = {TSE Working Paper},
       booktitle = {TSE Working Paper},
            type = {Working Paper},
         address = {Toulouse},
           title = {Researcher's Dilemma},
       publisher = {TSE Working Paper},
            year = {2015},
     institution = {Universit{\'e} Toulouse 1 Capitole},
        keywords = {Academic Competition, Preemption Games, Private Information},
             url = {https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15506/},
        abstract = {We model academic competition as a game in which researchers ?ght for priority.
Researchers privately experience breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas
mature before making them public, thereby establishing priority. In a two-researcher,
symmetric environment, the resulting preemption game has a unique equilibrium. We
study how the shape of the breakthrough distribution affects equilibrium maturation
delays. Making researchers better at discovering new ideas or at developing them has
contrasted effects on the quality of research outputs. Finally, when researchers have
different innovative abilities, speed of discovery and maturation of ideas are positively
correlated in equilibrium.}
}