eprintid: 15501
rev_number: 15
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/01/55/01
datestamp: 2014-07-09 17:32:54
lastmod: 2021-10-27 13:36:40
status_changed: 2017-06-15 15:39:01
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Attar, Andrea
creators_name: Campioni, Eloisa
creators_name: Piaser, Gwenaël
creators_idrefppn: 241586534
creators_idrefppn: 243521448
title: Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. We identify a class of two-way communication mechanisms which mirror those considered in the single principal analysis of Myerson (1982). In such mechanisms, every agent truthfully reveals her type to all principals, and obeys the private recommendations she receives from each of them. We show that there is a rationale in restricting attention to this class of mechanisms: if principals use these mechanisms, there is no unilateral incentive to deviate towards more sophisticated ones. We develop three examples to analyze possible extensions and limits of our approach. The first two examples show that the restriction to direct and incentive compatible mechanisms is not sufficient to provide a complete characterization of all pure strategy equilibria. The third one shows that private recommendations play a fundamental role in competing mechanism games, suggesting that one cannot safely restrict to one-sided communication mechanisms.
date: 2013-01
date_type: published
publisher: Elsevier
id_number: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.09.009
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26763
faculty: tse
divisions: CRM
divisions: tse
keywords: Incomplete information
keywords: Competing mechanisms
keywords: Information revelation
language: en
has_fulltext: FALSE
doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.09.009
view_date_year: 2013
full_text_status: none
publication: Journal of Mathematical Economics
volume: 49
number: 1
pagerange: 62-70
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0304-4068
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:26763
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citation:   Attar, Andrea <https://www.idref.fr/241586534>, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël <https://www.idref.fr/243521448>  (2013) Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games.    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49 (1).  pp. 62-70.