@techreport{publications15420,
           month = {October},
            type = {Working Paper},
           title = {Managerial Turnover in a Changing World},
          author = {Daniel F. Garrett and Alessandro Pavan},
         address = {Toulouse},
            year = {2012},
     institution = {Universit{\'e} Toulouse 1 Capitole},
             url = {https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15420/},
        abstract = {We develop a dynamic theory of managerial turnover in a world where the quality of the
match between a {\"O}rm and its managers changes stochastically over time. Shocks to managerial
productivity are anticipated at the time of contracting but privately observed by the managers.
Our key positive result shows that the {\"O}rm{\'i}s optimal retention decisions become more permissive
with time. Our key normative result shows that, compared to what is e? cient, the {\"O}rm{\'i}s contract
either induces excessive retention at all tenure levels, or excessive {\"O}ring at the early stages of the
relationship, followed by excessive retention after su? ciently long tenure.}
}