eprintid: 15271 rev_number: 9 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/01/52/71 datestamp: 2014-07-09 17:25:26 lastmod: 2021-04-02 15:47:38 status_changed: 2014-07-09 17:25:26 type: monograph metadata_visibility: no_search creators_name: Le Breton, Michel creators_name: Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. creators_name: Savvateev, Alexei creators_name: Weber, Shlomo creators_idrefppn: 031275621 creators_idrefppn: 158651642 title: Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO abstract: This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are in-divisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness on metric environments with indivisible projects. To do so, we explore, among other things, the performance of several well-known solutions (such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus, or the Dutta-Ray value) in these environments. date: 2012-05 date_type: published publisher: TSE Working Paper official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/25806 faculty: tse divisions: tse language: en has_fulltext: TRUE subjectsJEL: JEL_C71 view_date_year: 2012 full_text_status: public monograph_type: working_paper series: TSE Working Paper volume: 12-300 book_title: TSE Working Paper oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:25806 harvester_local_overwrite: oai_set harvester_local_overwrite: faculty harvester_local_overwrite: site harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn oai_lastmod: 2015-07-31T18:00:02Z oai_set: tse oai_set: ut1c site: ut1 citation: Le Breton, Michel , Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., Savvateev, Alexei and Weber, Shlomo (2012) Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-300 document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15271/1/wp_tse_300.pdf