RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Attanasi, Giuseppe Marco
A1 Garcia-Gallego, Aurora
A1 Georgantzis, Nikolaos
A1 Montesano, Aldo
T1 An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals
YR 2011
FD 2011-12
VO 11-274
K1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
K1 Bargaining
K1 Confirmed Proposals
K1 Confirmed Agreement
K1 Tacit Communication
AB We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a  cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the others’ type.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15187/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/25463