?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.relation=https%3A%2F%2Fpublications.ut-capitole.fr%2Fid%2Feprint%2F15187%2F&rft.title=An+Experiment+on+Prisoner%E2%80%99s+Dilemma+with+Confirmed+Proposals&rft.creator=Attanasi%2C+Giuseppe+Marco&rft.creator=Garcia-Gallego%2C+Aurora&rft.creator=Georgantzis%2C+Nikolaos&rft.creator=Montesano%2C+Aldo&rft.subject=B-+ECONOMIE+ET+FINANCE&rft.description=We+apply+an+alternating+proposals+protocol+with+a+confirmation+stage+as+a+way+of+solving+a+Prisoner%E2%80%99s+Dilemma+game.+We+interpret+players%E2%80%99+proposals+and+(no)+confirmation+of+outcomes+of+the+game+as+a+tacit+communication+device.+The+protocol+leads+to+unprecedented+high+levels+of+cooperation+in+the+laboratory.+Assigning+the+power+of+confirmation+to+one+of+the+two+players+alone%2C+rather+than+alternating+the+role+of+a+leader+significantly+increases+the+probability+of+signing+a%0D%0Acooperative+agreement+in+the+first+bargaining+period.+We+interpret+pre-agreement+strategies+as+tacit+messages+on+players%E2%80%99+willingness+to+cooperate+and+on+their+beliefs+about+the+others%E2%80%99+type.&rft.publisher=TSE+Working+Paper&rft.date=2011-12&rft.type=Monograph&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.format=text&rft.language=en&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fpublications.ut-capitole.fr%2Fid%2Feprint%2F15187%2F1%2F11.23.357.pdf&rft.identifier=++Attanasi%2C+Giuseppe+Marco+%3Chttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.idref.fr%2F186270321%3E%2C+Garcia-Gallego%2C+Aurora%2C+Georgantzis%2C+Nikolaos+%3Chttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.idref.fr%2F236286501%3E+and+Montesano%2C+Aldo+%3Chttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.idref.fr%2F080479170%3E++(2011)+An+Experiment+on+Prisoner%E2%80%99s+Dilemma+with+Confirmed+Proposals.++TSE+Working+Paper%2C+n.+11-274+++++&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Ftse-fr.eu%2Fpub%2F25463