RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1007/s11127-011-9801-3
A1 Auriol, Emmanuelle
A1 Gary-Bobo, Robert J.
T1 On the Optimal Number of Representatives
JF Public Choice
YR 2012
FD 2012-12
VO 153
SP 419
OP 445
K1 Representative democracy – Number of representatives – Constitution design – Incentives
AB We propose a normative theory of the number of representatives based on a model of a representative democracy. We derive a formula giving the number of representatives as proportional to the square root of total population. Simple tests of the formula on a sample of a 100 countries yield good results. We then discuss the appropriateness of the number of representatives in some countries. It seems that the United States has too few representatives, while France and Italy have too many. The excess number of representatives matters: it is positively correlated with indicators of red tape and barriers to entrepreneurship.
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15124/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/24305