TY  - RPRT
ID  - publications15036
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/22665
A1  - Li, Sanxi
A1  - Peitz, Martin
A1  - Zhao, Xiaojian
Y1  - 2010/05/12/
N2  - Whether consumers are aware of potentially adverse product effects,
is key for private and social incentives to disclose information.
To obtain a better understanding of this issue we propose a simple
monopoly model that highlights the conceptual difference between
consumer unawareness and consumer uncertainty. We show that total
surplus may be larger in an environment in which consumers are unaware of the potentially adverse effect. We also show that disclosing information whether a particular ingredient is harmful or not increases consumer surplus, but mandatory disclosure of the level of this ingredient may make consumers worse off.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - Information disclosure
KW  - informative advertising
KW  - consumer awareness
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Worried about Adverse Product Effects? Information Disclosure and Consumer Awareness
AV  - public
ER  -