"Peacebuilding Strategy: Lessons from Some Misconceived Interventions"

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Peacebuilding Strategy: Lessons from Some Misconceived Interventions,
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Abstract: This chapter tries to bridge the gap between peace and conflict theory, on the one hand, and the practice of professional Peacebuilders in post-conflicts settings, on the other hand. It first highlights some of the main insights brought about by the theorists, linking the latter to standard bargaining theory, institutional economics, as well as to the theory of voting. This brief overview shows that the key issue in peace theory is how credible commitments can be made by the negotiators. This is not the way the main peacebuilding institutions understand their mission, and international bureaucracies tend to implement fairly different protocols. The chapter then discusses two prominent themes in the standard peacebuilding strategy that call for second thoughts, namely disarmament and the jump to democracy, as embedded in elections organized as soon as possible. Three fairly successful post-conflict cases are then presented, showing that their successes were based on innovative solutions aimed at enabling the new governments to make credible commitments about their policies, sidestepping the standard protocols.

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1. Introduction

Armed conflicts do not break out like hail storms, i.e., out of reach for human control: most of their human-made causes have been usefully brought out by many pieces of research in political economics[1]. This literature thus provides a toolkit for the applied peace builder, which could be used to draw a neat diagnosis in conflict- or post-conflict cases, and to devise appropriate remedies for a lasting peace. This potential source of useful information seems to have been neglected by practitioners, in part because of the rigid protocols imposed by the UN, and a "crisis" occurred in the peacebuilding profession, well described by Chandler (2017). Autesserre (2021), who's been an insider, calls these protocols "automatic, thoughtless use of templated, technocratic, top-down measures", although "in certain circumstances, such tactics can actually worsen the situation" (p.105). Bellamy (2022) provides a more balanced judgement that mitigates a bit the sense of "crisis", without denying it entirely. The present chapter aims at advocating a wider- and subtle use of these tools and thus to contribute some arguments to overcome that "crisis".

The next section presents a broad-brush account of some of the key mechanisms brought out by the economic theory of peace and conflict. The subsequent one will discuss how these insights can help us to point out the key determinants of peacebuilding successes or failures, in the cases of various African countries.

2. Some Insights from the Economic Theory of Peace and Conflict

A major theoretical breakthrough in peace-and-conflict theory was performed independently by Azam (1995) and by Fearon (1995). Their key contributions were to show first that armed conflict between two groups[2] is inefficient, as it entails a massive loss of human and material resources, which could be used productively otherwise, while the engagement of more forces by one side has a negligible impact on the probability of winning the fight as the other side is probably also engaging a similar amount of additional forces at the same time. Hence, a simultaneous cut in the sizes of the forces engaged by each side would not change much the chances of success by either side, while enlarging at the same time the size of the pie to be shared by re-allocating productively these resources.

Bargaining for Peace

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[1] Bates (2008) provides a rich analysis for the different sources of conflict in Africa, including a literature review and some statistical support. Among others, Chandler (2017) provides a global overview.

[2] Most of this literature focuses on the relationships between groups, assuming implicitly that each one of the latter have an effective way to overcome collective-action problems.

In fact, with the benefit of hindsight, one can see that this kind of inefficiency has been the focus of the debates in bargaining theory ever since its inception. For example, in their presentation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution, Mas-Colell, et al. (1995, p.844) justify the sharing rule that K&S use, i.e., allocating the pieces of the pie equally between the two players in the peaceful equilibrium, as a consequence of the assumption that a violent conflict between them would give each player a ½ chance of catching the whole lot in an open conflict, regarded then as equivalent to the tossing of a fair coin. Then, each player's gain in the bargained solution is in fact equal to the expected value of the random gains from the conflict, making the players indifferent between the two options. They then assume that a minute difference will lead them to choose peace rather than conflict. This minute difference could simply be a pinch of risk aversion, tilting the balance toward peace. However, another tie-breaking mechanism could be imagined, like some reputation effect such that if they establish the peace, the two players would expect to be hailed as peace-makers by the civilian population, and to remain so in the future if praise singers, so common in West Africa, or historians were to take that story in charge from generation to generation.

In standard conflict models, a similar approach is sometimes applied, *mutatis mutandis*, using the standard contest-success function where each player's probability of winning the fight, say p_1 and p_2, is determined by the forces engaged by each contender, say F_1 and F_2, respectively, with each player's probability of winning the war given by the relative strength of each one's forces compared to the other one's: $p_1 = F_1 / (F_1 + F_2)$ and $p_2 = F_2 / (F_1 + F_2) = 1 - p_1$. Notice that the latter expression is only valid if the fight never ends with a draw. However, it is very easy to generalize the model by introducing the possibility of a stalemate, where nobody gets anything, with a known probability. In this case, assuming that the probability of a stalemate is $\sigma \in [0,1]$, the previous specifications become : $p_1 = (1-\sigma) F_1 / (F_1 + F_2)$ and $p_2 = (1-\sigma) F_2 / (F_1 + F_2) = 1 - \sigma - p_1$. This can be neglected in many cases, and that's what is done in the following. Then, denoting W the value of the "pot" accruing to the winner of the fight, and using again the Kalai-Smorodinsky-Mas-Colell argument sketched above, the players would be indifferent between peace and conflict if the former could offer credibly to each player an allocation $w_1 = p_1 W$ and $w_2 = p_2 W$, respectively. Then, just a pinch of risk aversion, as mentioned above, or some trust in future praise singers' or historians' memories, would make peace the equilibrium outcome, and the

peace agreement would simply offer the sharing of the "pot" in the proportions computed above.

The Quest for Credibility

However, they both add a second key argument by pointing out that an efficient solution, possibly based on some promised redistribution[3], would be possible only if the players were in a position to make credible commitments, i.e., to make promises that the other side would trust to be kept in case of agreement[3]. For example, a deal like "if you give up your weapons now, I will make a gift to you afterwards" is absolutely out of the question, as the beneficiary of that gift could simply shoot the naïve guy afterwards, and forget about the promised gift. As shown below, this is in fact what some international institutions try to achieve, in the name of "disarmament" in particular, often resulting in the resumption of the conflict. Imperfect credibility of promises is thus the main obstacle on the path to peace, as credibility cannot just be based on blind faith but requires the presence of incentives that will deter cheating with a high probability. Credibility is a fairly difficult attribute to convey between former enemies, for whom defiance is the most natural attitude to adopt, and it often requires some subtle institutional arrangements. It follows that economic efficiency, as measured by the reduction of useless destruction of human and material resources due to armed conflicts, would be enhanced by strengthening the contenders' ability to make credible commitments to deliver on the peace agreements. In fact, this finding meets a basic tenet of institutional economics. For example, North (1990) shows that the key point in institutional development is the provision of commitment devices helping to make property rights and human security credible.

This insight provides the basic tool to devise a peacebuilding strategy in a post-conflict situation, which should focus on strengthening the credibility of the commitments made by the former enemies. Azam and Mesnard (2004) and Azam (2010) present some extensions of this basic theoretical framework to bring out some ways to overcome imperfect credibility, within a certain range, as well as some other sources of inefficiency, including some institutional deficiency, by combining deterrence and redistribution[4]. In particular, they show how a form of "armed peace", keeping the defeated side in a position to resume fighting

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[3] This is the key difference with standard contract theory, which assumes implicitly that there is a judiciary authority that can enforce the agreements.
[4] Azam (2001) discusses at length the case for redistribution to buy the peace, while Azam *et al*. (1996) provide some empirical evidence supporting this claim using African data.

in case of a breach of the agreement, may be a useful credibility-enhancing device[5], as discussed in section 4 below. More generally, Azam (2010) presents a contract-theoretic model that brings out the basic determinants of the optimal policy-mix for conflict prevention, for a government committed to peace.

Azam (2010) also discusses how the institutional inefficiency of the state may work like a heavy transaction cost that might preclude the two sides from striking an efficient deal in a Coasian fashion. For example, some corruption might increase the cost of transferring an agreed sum of money from the government to the former rebels, as some intermediary agents might take a cut in passing. This raises in fact the amount of money that the government has to engage via this intermediary to make sure that the agreed amount actually reaches its intended beneficiary, increasing thus the cost of peace. Besley and Persson (2011) dig much deeper into that line of research, using the concept of "state capacity" as an aggregate to capture how these different tools can be combined effectively, while Blattman (2022) provides an exhaustive survey of this literature and further extensions. Laffont and Tirole (1993) capture this type of issues by using the broader concept of "the social cost of public funds", which plays a key part in the modern theory of economic policy. Such a cost might make redistribution more expensive, shifting the emphasis onto deterrence, or on the resumption of armed violence in the worst case.

Diagnosing the Cause of Armed Conflicts

The basic policy insight from the economic theory of peace and conflict was summarized by Azam (1995) as follows: "The outbreak of a civil war is the worst failure of a peace-keeping policy, or the dreadful result of the lack of it. Most countries in the world are made of a heterogeneous population, divided by ethnicity, religion, language, ideology, etc. It generally takes some conscious effort by the government for a state of peace to be maintained, with some clear impact on public finances" (p.173). A direct corollary of this fact is that the cost of peace precludes the adoption of a costly "groping" approach by trial and error and the peacebuilding strategy to be implemented in a post-conflict setting must be based on a proper diagnosis of the causes of the outbreak of violence. In particular, that strategy must avoid blindly returning to the pre-conflict setting that triggered that armed conflict in the first place, with a view to create a more satisfactory one. The outbreak of an armed conflict may be viewed as a quest for a solution to a pressing problem faced by one side of the polity or the

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[5] Many of my insights about peacebuilding in a post-conflict setting, including this one, come from a lengthy personal discussion I had at the Ministry of Defence in Addis Ababa in March 1992, a few months after the fall of the *Derg* regime in June 1991, with the Chief of Staff of the (victorious) Tigrayan army (whose name I have unfortunately forgotten). We had about the same age, about 40.

other, and the peace negotiations as the search for a better solution. Failing to diagnose that pressing problem is an obvious cause of the resumption of violence that often occurs in a post-conflict setting. From a practical point of view, the immediate implication of this simple insight is that there is no "one-size fits all" peacebuilding strategy, while the proper one must be tailored to solve the initial pressing problem at hand. This obviously raises a challenge for the international bureaucracy involved in peace-keeping, which Autesserre (2021) describes vividly, branding it with the nickname "Peace Inc.". Instead, she advocates the inclusion of the local population in the peacebuilding discussions, as well as some clever anthropologists when appropriate.

3. Can the International Bureaucracy Foster Credible Peace Agreements?

The "crisis" in peacebuilding that Chandler (2017), mentioned above, and many other authors have described involves most of the time some foreign intervention beside the local contenders. As mentioned above, the rigidity of the protocols imposed by the UN has been the target of harsh criticism by Autesserre (2021), among others, and some components of it have also been singled out by different authors. Twenty years before, Paris (2001) had put his own criticism in milder terms as follows: "[…] transforming war-shattered states into stable market democracies is basically sound, but […] pushing this process too quickly can have damaging and destabilizing effects" (p.ix). This suggests that not much progress has been made during these two decades on the peacebuilding-strategy front. Two main issues seem to dominate the debates about the impacts of foreign intervention in post-conflict settings: (i) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), often understood as the most urgent issue, and (ii) the rushed organization of elections, what Chandler calls "The 'Hubris' of Liberal Peacebuilding" (Chandler (2017), p.9). According to Autesserre (2021), the international bureaucrats in charge of these two major objectives see their careers evaluated by their hierarchy by looking first at the speed at which they have disbursed the funds allocated for that[6], without any weight given to the implications for the credibility of the peace process in which they are embedded, let alone for any measure of success or failure.

Elections, Credibility, and Political Violence

Paradoxically, the international community insists on organizing elections as soon as technically possible, despite a long track of evidence of disastrous consequences, resulting mostly in a resumption of violence. As shown by Ferejohn (1986), elections can create

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[6] This hasty behavior might be interpreted as an implicit understanding that the conflict will resume, and the program money has to be spent before that, from a bureaucratic point of view.

credibility for the elected government when voters are committed credibly to vote retrospectively, basing their judgments on their appreciation of its past performances. In this case, the voters' credible commitment capacity gives the incumbents a clear incentive to achieve what they promised to do if they plan to run for re-election. Quite obviously, the resulting reputational asset can only exist in long-established democracies where voters have a track record of past voting patterns, which cannot be the case in post-conflict settings, viewed as the starting point of a new electoral cycle. However, it might fail to prevail even after a fairly long history of voting if voters have a prospective voting behavior, determining their votes on the basis of the candidates' promises for the future. There is a huge literature that tries to test the pacifying effect of elections, or otherwise, resulting in a large crop of very diverse conclusions. For example, Azam and Salmon (2004) show that in the case of Bangladesh the prospect of forthcoming elections opens the time when trade unions mobilize their members to go on strike in order to try and influence the incumbent government to give in on their demands. This reveals a break in the latter's credibility to stick firmly to its ongoing policies. In that country, a large part of the urban population is actually unionized, and the unions organize massive demonstrations, called *hartals*, which can turn violent at times. The authors base their analysis on a theoretical model to explain the cause and the impact of this type of commitment failure. They then bring out empirically the political cycle involved in the timing of strikes using data on the national and local elections over the period 1988-1993, during which eight elections took place at the national or local levels. Their findings support the view that the loss of government's credibility occurs during the three to four months preceding the elections and is exploited by the unions to obtain concessions, while this timing gives the government some time to respond. Beaulieu (2014) also provides some empirical analyzes of the links between protest and election, that distinguishes different types of protest mobilization. Birch (2020) focuses on the role of electoral violence as a kind of smoke screen created to mask other electoral unlawful manipulations, using both case studies and empirical evidence. Von Borzyskowski and Saunders (2022) discuss the issue of elections credibility and analyze why post-conflict elections tend to re-start the conflict most of the time, unless some violence-mitigating institutional device is put in place. They strongly support power-sharing systems for that.

Another source of election-related violence is brought out by Klaus (2020) in the case of Kenya, who shows that post-election violence is very common, as voters' low trust in polling honesty is such that political elites do not hesitate to exploit their lack of trust to trigger violent uprisings aimed at pre-empting the implementation of their opponent's

policies. Magu (2018) also discusses electoral violence in Kenya, emphasizing the ethnic divisions prevailing in this country, and he discusses the impact of devolution on electoral and other forms of violence. Boone (2003) tackles the same type of issues in three West African countries, emphasizing also the fact that the sub-national level is where the action takes place, and how some form of indirect rule respecting local institutions can go a long way to appease political tensions.

Homegrown Democracy and Peace in Somaliland

However, this literature does not rule out the possibility of using elections as a tool to select a legitimate and credible government. It simply points out that in this field as well "one size does not fit all", thus calling for some fine anthropological analysis in many cases. A particularly illuminating example of a successful path to democracy is provided by Somaliland, "the country that does not exist", as Prunier (2021) calls it[7]. Somaliland was a British colony that got its independence in 1961. It tried to create a unified country with (formerly) Italian Somalia soon after that, but gave up this hopeless project, as the political-culture gap between the two sides was much too large, and moved back to its original borders existing at the time of independence in 1991. The UN normally regards the borders at independence as the sacrosansanct reference to define each country's borderlines. However in this case, surprisingly, the UN did not recognize independent Somaliland, and the rest of the world sheepishly followed suit. It follows that it is nowadays a sort of clandestine independent country. Autesserre (2021) points this country's experience as a test case for the role of foreign interventions. She claims: "[…] Somaliland benefited from sustained grassroots peacebuilding initiatives, while the 'Peace, Inc.' approach prevailed and failed in the rest of Somalia" (p128). Eubank (2010) regards the resulting exclusion from the standard foreign aid mechanism as a blessing, allowing them to choose a homegrown path to democracy and development without external interference or any temptation to give in to standard aid programs with their often inappropriate conditionality. Nevertheless, they benefitted largely from the external intervention of their Diaspora in the gulf countries, as shown by Bradbury (2008), Lewis (2008) and Prunier (2021).

Azam (2014) provides a more analytical analysis of this success story, using the fundamental insights that a simple game-theoretic framework can offer. Beside the nomadic herdsmen's livestock, mainly camels, sheep and goats, grazing back and forth across the

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[7] Bradbury (2008), Lewis (2008) and Prunier (2021) are the main references about Somaliland's history.

borders with Ethiopia[8], Somaliland's main assets are the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden and the road that links it to the large market of the Ethiopian capital-city Addis Ababa. The main obstacle to the rational exploitation of these infrastructural assets is the traditional division of the population into clans, themselves subdivided into kinship groups. The nomadic herdsmen necessarily carry guns to protect their livestock from predators, and they sometimes use them as well to raid merchants traveling on that road. Some people from the Diaspora understood that these raids were a hindrance from an economic point of view. The level of traders' security must be high to attract more traffic on that road from Addis Ababa and the port of Berbera, from which it can reach the wealthy markets of the gulf countries. In particular, a lot of livestock is exported to Saudi Arabia and its neighbors for meat consumption.

From a contract-theoretic point of view[9], it was obvious that to convince these raiders to give up this activity, they had to be compensated for the foregone income collected via these attacks. Similarly, it was also obvious that disarming the herdsmen was not an option, as the number of predators would then multiply and they would decimate the livestock, which in turn forms the largest share of the traffic to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries. A classic principal-agent problem thus arises, as the potential raiders' participation constraints must be fulfilled for the government to collect taxes at the port on the resulting increased import-export traffic. This entails that some redistribution of this tax money in favor of the herdsmen must be used to fulfill their participation constraint. How to make this redistribution credible? There is no chiefdom in the Somali culture, and the Elders provide the traditional authority within the kinship groups and the clans. Given their age and wisdom, they are trusted to care for the long-run interest and integrity of their clans and their kinships. This is where democracy sets in, as it was understood that some of them had to be selected to represent at a higher level the different groups from which the raiding herdsmen came from. Bradbury (2008) describes in great detail how the members of the Diaspora used a pyramidal approach to select some "representative" herdsmen. Starting at the lowest level, they convened meetings where they would explain the framework that they had in mind and manage the consensual selection of some delegates to represent the groups at a higher level,

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[8] See Doornbos (1993) on pastoralism on both sides of the border of the then unified Somalia and Ethiopia, mainly involving the most favorable *Haud* Pastures located in the Ethiopian *Ogaden* province.
[9] See Salanié (1997) for a very clear introduction to the theory of contracts.

and so on[10]. In the end, the *Gurti* or assembly of the Elders was created at the highest level, to be convened in the capital city Hargeysa. This kind of unelected upper house of representative people has a very long pedigree in History. Athens had the Aeropagus, Rome had the Senate, and in modern times, Britain has the House of Lords, to represent traditional authorities. The US Senate is also representing local interests, but is not related to any long local traditions. The Gurti became a fundamental pillar of Somaliland, allowing some Elders to meet others, to solve some problems between their clans, like rivalry or disputes, etc.. In particular, they played a key role in making fair elections possible for representatives at the other layers of political power, like the Presidency and the lower chamber in Hargeysa, as well as the local district councils. The main challenge was to establish acceptable lists of voters in a country where the population is mostly comprised of nomadic herdsmen who recurrently cross the borders back and forth with neighboring Ethiopia in search of the best pastures. The Elders went through a lot of negotiation between the different clans to build a consensus. At long last, this process produced a series of smooth elections: a constitutional referendum on May 31, 2001, district council elections in December 2002, a Presidential election in April 2003, and parliamentary elections in September 2005. This homegrown bicameral system turned out to be robust, as a new Presidential election took place in June 2010, two years behind schedule, where Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo representing the opposition party was elected, and the incumbent left office without any violence erupting.

At the time when this paper of mine was published, I got a phone call from a lady from the UN office for the Horn of Africa, based in Nairobi (Kenya). She was looking for explanations on many of the details of the paper. The key obstacle that she felt was the key role played by the redistribution of tax money from the harbor to the regional councils, which seemed to run counter to the sacrosanct IMF doctrine of fiscal decentralization, supported by Eubank (2010), among others. The UN was in this respect under the influence of a sociologist who had no intuition about game theory and principal-agent problems. I believe that she nevertheless understood and appreciated the problem of the herdsmen-raiders participation constraint, and thus the crucial part played by this redistribution under the Elders' gentle supervision via the *Gurti* for securing an expansion of trade. You can't have thriving traffic on that road without it.

How Senghor Built a Paragon of Democracy and Peace in Senegal

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[10] See Bradbury (2008, p.80) for a striking photograph of elders sitting on a large *kilim* in the sand to deliberate.

Another cute example of the proper use of elections on the path to democracy is provided by Senegal until 1993. The political setting was crucially determined by the domination of the Muslim Mouride brotherhood over most of the population, and especially so in the rural sector. They controlled in particular the trading of groundnuts, the main cash crop in Senegal. However, this country had another political asset that could be used for governing the country efficiently, namely its president Leopold Senghor. The latter was Christian, in a country where 93% of the population was Muslim, and a *Serer*, a minority ethnic group including less than 20% of the population, predominantly comprised of *Wolofs*. Nobody could contest his superior ability to govern the country, and to represent it on the international scene, being the only experienced one who had been a cabinet minister in France before independence. He was first trained at the prestigious William Ponty School in Senegal before independence, where most of the future leaders of French West Africa like Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire were trained. Moreover, he went on to join the most prestigious *Ecole normale supérieure* of the *rue d'Ulm*, in Paris, after succeeding at the most selective competitive exam in the French education system. He ended up being one of the most prestigious representatives of the French West-African leaders, and became a cabinet Minister in Paris before independence, along with other West-African leaders like Félix Houphouët-Boigny, among others. It was difficult to find a contender with credentials that could compete with him in Senegal. He was not only a prestigious poet, author in particular of a book on *La négritude* (Niggerhood), but also a fine strategist.

On the first hand, he clearly understood that he needed the support of the Mouride Brotherhood, and that he could not get it without providing a mechanism to make his promises to fulfill their participation constraint credible. On the other hand, he realized that the international community would not supply the foreign aid required for his country's development if a credible democracy was not created and he managed to convince the Mouride leadership of this obligation as well. They agreed to go for that, creating a voting system similar to the French one, at a superficial level, but also to play it cleverly: they did not enforce the secrecy of the ballot wherever there were no international observers (Boone, 2003, Schaffer, 1998). The voting tickets were of brightly different colors for the different candidates, and some Mouride observers sitting around the booth could easily tell who's voting for whom. This soft pressure resulted in massive votes in favor of Léopold Senghor's socialist party, as he was trusted by all to implement scrupulously the program negotiated before hand between him and the Mouride leaders. He would be kicked out otherwise at the next election. He ruled the country for more than 18 years in the same framework, and his

successor was the Mouride Abdou Diouf, who was a former minister under Senghor, and a member of the same socialist party. The secret ballot was eventually enforced, starting in 1993, when peaceful elections were hard-wired in the Senegalese DNA and the Ferejohn (1986) effect was working in full gear.

Then, despite his successful management of the economy in difficult circumstances (Azam, 2007), Diouf was beaten in April 2000 by the free-market liberal Abdoulaye Wade. I was there at the time and I felt that many people, especially the academics I was interacting with the most, voted for Wade as a way to test whether the elections were truly free and fair, as they suspected that the same party had been ruling for too long to be honest.

Disarmament or Armed Peace?

The case study of Somaliland just presented above provides a clear example of how a functioning democracy can be established without disarming the potential opponents. It just requires a *modicum* of contract theory, and a normal dose of common sense to understand how this came about. After reading the above developments, anybody can see that a complete disarmament of the former rebels, before any credible solution has been put in place to the original problems that triggered the rebellion in the first place, is a conman's stratagem. However, this is what the UN often advocates, and most of their bureaucrats sheepishly try to implement to boost their careers, as explained by Autesserre (2021). Azam and Djimtoïngar (2008) provide a neat example of the armed peace strategy that worked in the harsh case of Chad under Idriss Déby as president.

Chad was a French colony, and it got its independence on August 11, 1960. The French created in fact this country by sticking together two pieces of territory differing massively both by geography and culture. The southern part, a savanna zone then dubbed the "useful Chad", was cut off from the Ubangi-Chari colony[11], with a view to open some possibility for the new country to develop some agriculture like cotton and other cash crops in that part of the country, the main possible source of fiscal revenues for the Chadian government. The northern part has instead a Sahelian climate and is mainly devoted to livestock, together with a poor village-agriculture producing some food crops for the villagers. For centuries, the main source of cash in the North was slave-raiding in neighboring countries, including that part of the Ubangi-Chari colony that was transferred to the Chadian colony by the French. Moreover, the Northerners were Muslim, while the Southerners were mostly Christian or Animist. As a result, most Northerners were boycotting the French

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[11] Now Central African Republic.

schools, where the Koran was not taught, and boys and girls were sitting in the same rooms. Then, in a typical French way, the bureaucrats were selected via competitive exams, where literacy in French was a crucial determinant of success. It follows that the government's administrative bureaucracy was almost exclusively comprised of Southerners, what was naturally resented by the Northerners.

It would take too long to describe here in great detail the protracted conflict that dragged on for decades between the two sides[12], with some interference from the Libyan ruler Khadafi, entailing in turn some involvement of the French. In its final years in power, the northerner Hissène Habré engaged in massive massacres, that Buijtenhuijs (1998) called "genocidal". Eventually, the winner was Idriss Déby, a Zarghawa from the East, where this ethnic group straddles both sides of the border with Sudan. He launched a flash-raid onto the capital-city N'Djamena, located in the South, in 1990 with his troops involving some Sudanese-speaking soldiers beside the Chadian ones, that swept Habré away but did not stop the massacres and the burning of villages. The Southerners did not remain passive in front of this brutal violence, and the "*codos*" (shorthand for commandos) rebellion was active first in 1983-1986, and then did the same mainly in 1992-99 in opposition to the Déby regime. Eventually, the latter established a fairly stable peace based on some form of power-sharing. The rebel leader General Kamougué was given the position of President of the National Assembly, the second highest position in the State hierarchy, and his men were incorporated in the national army as a military unit, without weakening their ability to restart the war in case of a threat to breach the agreed fulfillment of their participation constraint, e.g., by disbanding them. This is another clear example of armed peace where the government's credibility is backed by this simple way of giving the former rebels a handle to punish the government if it tried to cheat on its own promises[13]. The maintenance of these special soldiers is a form of redistribution that does not raise any credibility problem, as a mutiny would certainly arise if they were not paid as expected[14]. Then, especially after the launch of oil extraction occurred in the South, Idriss Déby only had to face armed opposition from his own family and kin group, which he defeated quite easily in N'djamena, with some discreet help from the French.

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[12] Beside Azam and Djimtoïngar (2008), see Azam *et al.* (1999), Buijtenhuijs (1998), and Lemoine (1997).

[13] The 1991 peace agreement in Ethiopia alluded to in fn 5 had the same property, while a part of both sides' forces were disbanded at the same time.

[14] Lombard (2016) perceptively points out in the case of the Central African Republic that she knows so well from a lot of field work, how important it is to avoid frustrating the former rebels' desire for entitlement, what the enrolment of former rebels in the military is precisely avoiding.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has shown the way for some fundamental insights from peace-and-conflict political economics to percolate into the strategy applied by the international bureaucracy in the field of peacebuilding. As a comprehensive theory with real-world applications, economics is based on revealed-preference theory, i.e., agents' preferences cannot be observed directly, but must be inferred instead from their observed behavior. As fn. 6 above suggests, the hasty behavior of the UN to launch premature elections reveals in fact, under the rational-choice hypothesis, the lack of confidence that they put in their own action to create a lasting peace, or, at worst, a hidden striving to keep the peacebuilding business going. The latter attitude has been dubbed by Autesserre by the nickname 'Peace, Inc.'. By contrast, the three case studies sketched here, of Somaliland, Senegal, and Chad, show that local rulers are sometimes able to conceive the right incentive systems for making lasting peace credible, imagining clever informal institutions to ensure that all the players get a credible compensation that fulfills their participation constraint. Their requirements in this respect would not necessarily include just income, but also values like self-respect, cherished traditions, and desire for diverse entitlements.

Some serious doubts are raised above about two of the mainstays of the 'Peace, Inc.' business, namely premature elections and disarmament. Probably, the international institutions' revealed lack of confidence in their own medicine could be cured by a campaign aimed at training their staff and top brass in Anthropological Political Economics, which could be called 'the A.P.E' training program.

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