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“Penalties for Particularism and Partisanship?  
Citizens’ Preferences for Legal Punishment of Clientelism”

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# Penalties for Particularism and Partisanship? Citizens' Preferences for Legal Punishment of Clientelism\*

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## **Abstract**

In weak-state settings, clientelism is persistent yet normatively fraught, constituting a “legal gray area”. This study examines two key features of commonplace clientelism that may govern whether and to what extent citizens deem it punishable by the law. We posit a “particularism penalty,” by which citizens desire greater punishment for actions targeting narrower social groups, and an “outgroup actor penalty”, by which preferred punishment is greater for ethnic-political opponents. A survey experiment with Kikuyu and Luo respondents in Kenya reveals that respondents prefer more punishment for explicitly targeting supporters — coethnics or copartisans — versus general people, with little difference between coethnics and copartisans, regardless of the perpetrator’s partisanship. At the same time, they systematically prefer more punishment for partisan outgroup actors. These findings underscore that public opinion would support a legal evolution away from clientelism towards supporters, even as citizens remain more lenient towards ingroup members.

Clientelism, the granting of favorable access to state resources, often persists as a credible and attractive method to distribute resources to supporters in weak-state settings (Wantchekon 2003). Yet, clientelism is normatively fraught, constituting a “legal gray area” (VandeWalle 2007). While targeted citizens or groups can derive material benefits from it (Gottlieb and Larreguy 2020; Ejde-myrt et al. 2018) or improved connection with the government (Klaus et al. 2023), clientelism distorts universal, needs-based, or merit-based access to state resources and undermines the rule of law and economic development (Hicken 2011; Canen and Wantchekon 2022). In multi-ethnic democracies, clientelistic distribution along ethnic lines is believed to exacerbate intergroup tension and violence (Michelitch 2015; Fjelde and Höglund 2016).

Despite an extensive literature on clientelism (Hicken 2011; Hicken and Nathan 2020), we know relatively little about how citizens perceive its various forms, as well as the factors that determine their attitudes (Pellicer and Wegner 2023; Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2014; Isaksson and Bigsten 2017). Investigating citizens’ normative views of clientelism is important to understand the drivers of its persistence on the side of voters, and how it might evolve in the future, as politicians adjust their strategies to optimize political courtship (Opalo 2022; Cheeseman et al. 2021).

In this study, set in Kenya, we examine the role of two prominent factors that may explain citizens’ legal punishment preferences for a range of commonplace clientelistic behaviors. The first factor is the degree of particularism, or the narrowness of the group category used to be eligible for targeting. Since parties nest ethnic groups (as is the case in many multi-ethnic democracies), we investigate whether the desire for legal punishment of clientelism increases as targeting shifts from the general public, to copartisan supporters, to coethnic supporters — what we call a “particularism penalty”. Targeting increasingly particular groups increases perceptions of distortion and unfairness in distribution, which we argue leads citizens to support stronger punishment. However, we also expect citizens to wish to punish coethnic targeting more than copartisan targeting. For one, it might be seen as a normal part of democracy for parties to be responsive to supporters, while coethnic targeting excludes non-coethnic copartisans. Further, coethnic targeting involves targeting a descent-based category, which may be seen as unjust. Finally, coethnic-targeting hearkens

back to authoritarian rule and is seen as fomenting ethnic strife.

Second, we question whether citizens are normative relativists, assigning different levels of legal punishment based on whether the clientelism is perpetrated by their own group or an opposing group. We expect, due to a few different mechanisms, an “outgroup actor penalty” for actors who do not share the identity of the respondent. First, individuals may temper their disdain for clientelism if their group is on the side benefiting. Second, individuals may hold other-regarding preferences that are stronger for ingroup members, leading (perhaps implicitly) to reducing punishment for ingroup members. Third, psychological biases exist such as motivated reasoning or attribution error that can lead individuals to process information differently in ways that disadvantage outgroup members. Finally, we also posit an interactive effect — the particularism penalty may be exacerbated for outgroup actors, as the evaluation of group targeting may be conditional on whether a citizen expects their ingroup to be on the receiving side.

To investigate these hypotheses, we implemented a survey experiment before the 2017 Kenyan elections, in which two main party coalitions competed for national office. The survey sampled members of the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups (N=1,946), who have classically held the leadership of the two main party coalitions – Jubilee and NASA, respectively. Subjects were presented with hypothetical actions committed by six different actors - President, Member of Parliament, Bureaucrat, Judge, Police Officer, and ordinary citizen. Actions involved some form of clientelistic targeting, such as access to jobs or contracts, individual electoral handouts, influencing the distribution of public resources, or appeals for future favoritism. We thus consider a broader set of clientelist activities than previously studied, expanding from the context of election campaigning (often vote buying). The experiment had a cross-cutting 3x2 design. In one arm, the actors were randomly assigned to target coethnics, copartisans, or unspecified general people. In the other arm, actors were assigned the identity of either a Kikuyu member of Jubilee or a Luo member of NASA. Respondents were asked to assess whether the actions should be legally punished, and if so, point to the degree of legal punishment on a scale.

The data reveal several patterns of interest. First, citizens generally award harsher punish-

ment for targeting supporters — coethnics or copartisans — versus unspecified people, but there is no consistent difference between penalties for coethnic versus copartisan targeting. To illustrate the particularism penalty, the average punishment awarded to an MP candidate using constituency funds to give university scholarships to unspecified constituents corresponds, on our scale, to something between a small monetary fine and less than 1 year in prison. When the scholarships are given to MP's coethnics or copartisans, punishment increases to 3-5 years in prison (1.1  $SD_c$ ). A notable exception is the President, who receives an additional penalty for favoring coethnics relative to copartisans. For instance, the average preferred punishment for the generic promise of favoritism 'if I win, it is your time to eat' corresponds, on our scale, to about 2 years in prison, which increases to 3-5 years in prison (0.5  $SD_c$ ) when the appeal is directed to the president's copartisans, and to 5-10 years (0.7  $SD_c$ ) when it is directed to the president's coethnics.

Second, citizens consistently award harsher punishment to opposing ethnopartisan actors. However, the penalty for outgroup actors does not reinforce the particularism penalty. For instance, a bureaucrat from the respondents' ingroup, favoring unspecified constituency residents for electric grid connectivity, is awarded an average punishment between a small fine and less than 1 year in jail; the punishment increases to 1-2 years in jail (0.3  $SD_c$ ) when the favor is done to coethnics or copartisans of the bureaucrat (and thus of the respondent). If the bureaucrat belongs to the outgroup, the particularism penalty is still observed (on average, 0.4  $SD_c$ ), but it is not statistically different from the ingroup case. In other words, the particularism penalty and the outgroup actor penalty are largely independent effects. Finally, we find that stronger partisan attachments significantly increase the partisan outgroup penalty, while an analogous measure of ethnic attachments does not.

This study has important implications for the future of clientelism's evolution. Public opinion, at least as revealed in our data, supports making clientelism toward political supporters legally punishable, regardless of who is benefiting. Simultaneously, citizens systematically discount actions committed by their own party members. These findings help explain why clientelism persists despite being disliked. Of course, these results are consistent with citizens engaging in clientelism

or preferring candidates who offer it (Kramon 2016). Even if citizens would prefer that political courtship were different, they could find themselves “trapped” in a political system where it is advantageous to engage in clientelism or seek its benefits, lest they be shut out of access to the state (Posner 2005). Given that politicians’ efforts to win elections evolve to meet citizen expectations, however, these results point to the idea that change could be possible, even if slow-moving and tied additionally to bureaucratic capacity to ensure impartiality (Opalo 2022; Cheeseman et al. 2021).

This study adds to a growing literature emphasizing citizens’ role or perspectives in sustaining or evolving clientelism (Auerbach and Thachil 2018; Nichter 2018), especially regarding public opinion. Citizens in the Global South are much more tolerant of clientelism than academics, and large variation exists in public opinion (Pellicer and Wegner 2023; Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). By positing two new factors that might explain variation in this public opinion - the particularism penalty for supporters and the outgroup actor penalty for perpetrating actors in the opposing party, this study complements most directly existing studies examining public opinion depending on the nature of the clientelism.<sup>1</sup> Pellicer and Wegner (2023) finds that citizens view local public goods targeting as more acceptable than individual-level targeting in Tunisia and South Africa. By contrast to varying the number of beneficiaries, we hold the number constant and examine variation in the *category for eligibility of the targeting*. Gonzalez Ocantos et al. (2014) show that citizens in Latin America find turnout-buying within parties more acceptable than vote-buying across party lines, presumably because of moral distaste for financial persuasion from ideological preferences. We examine partisanship through angles that are salient in the valence politics of Africa. Finally, Isaksson and Bigsten (2017) finds using cross-national Afrobarometer data that citizens in regions dominated by the president’s coethnic-copartisans tend to be more tolerant of general clientelism, with the reasoning that they are likely to benefit more. Our study shows evidence for this proposed mechanism - citizens are more lenient towards the partisan ingroup. At the same time, our study shows the particularism penalty exists regardless of the perpetrating actor’s party - a more nuanced picture to be painted regarding citizens’ taste for future clientelism.

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<sup>1</sup>Yet other studies posit that the individual-level attributes shape tolerance for clientelism, such as low socioeconomic status (Weitz-Shapiro 2014).

# 1 Public Opinion Towards Clientelism

Research on the success and persistence of clientelism shows that it can be more effective and credible as a strategy to deliver resources to voters, especially in weak-state settings, where the lack of bureaucratic capacity impedes programmatic policies (Opalo 2022). The problem of credibility may explain why targeted appeals are often more effective than public good promises (Wantchekon 2003) and clientelist courtship is more attractive (Lindberg 2010; Kramon 2016).

Beyond candidate evaluation, relatively little empirical research addresses voters' normative attitudes and views of clientelism in society. Recent work suggests that their attitudes are shaped by the nature of targeting and how the beneficiary group is defined.<sup>2</sup> Drawing on survey experimental evidence, Pellicer and Wegner (2023) show that citizens are more critical of exchanges where politicians allocate goods to individuals rather than communities, suggesting that they apply basic norms of fairness. They also find that more equality (less hierarchy) in the exchange between politicians and citizens and higher value goods increase acceptability. Isaksson and Bigsten (2017) show that citizens express more positive views when they expect to be on the receiving end using cross-national Afrobarometer data. The role of targeting strategies is also emphasized by Gonzalez Ocantos et al. (2014), who find that citizens are less critical of vote buying targeted at copartisans rather than non-copartisans, as it respects the voters' ideological preferences. They also find that clientelism is more tolerable towards more needy citizens.

An important point made by Opalo (2022) is that clientelism evolves over time in response to factors such as changing costs and benefits to political actors, bureaucratic capacity, and citizens' expectations. To advance the agenda on public opinion on clientelism, it therefore makes sense to study citizens' views on different modes of clientelism, reflecting different strategies of parties and elites.

Following this approach, in this study, we build on prior works to investigate citizens' norma-

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<sup>2</sup>Individual characteristics have also been studied as factors governing views of clientelism. For example, those with increasing socioeconomic status may weigh the potential material or psychological benefits of being targeted less, and weigh the normative harms to society more than those for whom the benefits represent a larger relative sum (Weitz-Shapiro 2012).

tive preferences for legal punishment of various commonplace clientelistic behaviors by a range of actors, but we expand them in a few ways. For one, we focus on a larger range of clientelistic activities that occur in quotidian life, expanding away from clientelism in the context of election campaigning (often called vote-buying) between citizen and elected representative. We consider actions taken in redistributive politics, for example, by bureaucrats and front-line service providers. For two, we consider different variations in the mode of clientelism than have been previously explored — factors salient in the politics of many multiethnic democracies, such as our case, Kenya. First, we examine particularism based on the *category of eligibility* to be targeted as coethnic versus copartisan versus the general public — the “particularism penalty.” Second, we examine moral relativism - whether individuals factor in whether their own partisan team stands to benefit versus the opposing partisan team — the “outgroup actor penalty.”

## 1.1 The Particularism Penalty

We first consider how citizens respond to clientelist targeting when we vary the category of eligibility of the beneficiary. We posit a “particularism penalty”: the more particular the criteria of eligibility for targeting, the greater citizens’ desired level of legal punishment. Specifically, we are interested in whether citizens view the legality of clientelism differently if the target for eligibility is coethnics, copartisans (a broader group including non-coethnics), or members of the general public.

We expect that citizens disdain targeting smaller versus larger groups. Generally speaking, clientelism targeting groups of supporters should be opposed, as it skews the distribution of available resources, departs from more universal, needs-based, or merit-based allocation principles, possibly violating the rule of law and distorting development goals (Hicken 2011; Canen and Wantchekon 2022). Therefore, citizens should support stronger punishment for clientelistic targeting when it becomes more explicitly particular to group membership.

Moreover, given the choice of conditioning on group membership for distribution, we expect that a stronger “particularism penalty” should be applied to targeting coethnics relative to targeting

copartisans. The distinction between ethnicity and partisanship is increasingly relevant for targeting strategies to multiethnic democracies in Africa, as parties tend to build cross-ethnic coalitions (e.g., Horowitz 2019; Jablonski 2014). Citizens may perceive targeting copartisans as more defensible under a logic of democratic representation (Cheeseman et al. 2020), while seeing ethnicity as inherently exclusionary and unfair. Coethnic targeting may be seen as especially pernicious for harkening back to the era of authoritarian politics after independence in many diverse societies in sub-Saharan Africa, when ethnic favoritism raised fears about the “permanent exclusion” of some groups, heightening inter-group tensions and conflict (VandeWalle 2007; Horowitz 1985; Posner 2007). Indeed, some recent studies show that voters can disdain overt appeals to coethnic interests (e.g., Kim and Horowitz 2022; Horowitz and Klaus 2020).

Taken together, these arguments suggest the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1 (Particularism Penalty):** Punishment will be greater if an action more narrowly targets supporters versus unspecified people, and the punishment will be even greater for coethnics over copartisans.

## 1.2 The Outgroup Actor Penalty

Our second hypothesis focuses on the identity of the political actor engaging in clientelism. We propose that citizens will be more forgiving of actors from their own ethnopartisan groups, and as a result will penalize out-group actors more severely. First, we expect a “self-interest” mechanism, by which citizens may expect to be on the receiving side of clientelism when the actor perpetuating it is an ingroup member (Kramon 2016; Chandra 2012). Thus, even if citizens disdain clientelism in general, their evaluations of specific acts may be tempered when they come from an ingroup leader.

Second, social identity theory suggests that individuals may hold stronger other-regarding preferences toward ingroup members (e.g., Cikara and Van Bavel 2014; Paluck and Green 2009), potentially leading them to adopt more lenient attitudes towards transgressive behavior by ingroup leaders than for outgroup ones.

Third, psychological biases including attribution error and motivated reasoning could also produce systematic differences in evaluations: for instance, people may interpret negative behavior by outgroup members as “dispositional” while interpreting the same behavior by ingroup members as “situational” (Jones and Harris 1967), influencing their preferred level of punishment (Trahan and Laird 2018). Forms of motivated reasoning — where citizens overlook information that conflicts with their priors — can also influence retrospective evaluation of elite behavior (Adida et al. 2017). Citizens can ignore or dismiss negative information about their partisan ingroup, while readily accepting it to reinforce negative views about the partisan outgroup.

We thus generate the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2 (Outgroup Actor Penalty):** punishment is greater if an action is committed by an actor with unshared ethnopartisanship.

### **1.3 Is The Particularism Penalty Conditional on Actor Identity?**

Our final hypothesis asks whether the particularism penalty is conditional on the identity of the political actor engaging in clientelism. When ethnopartisanship is shared, we have stated that citizens perceive a benefit, if not personally, than to their ethnic community or ethnopartisan group, that offsets perceived negative aspects of unfair distortion and broader social harms. Conditional on sharing ethnopartisanship with the actor, citizens who are coethnics with leadership may then see a larger benefit when coethnics are targeted, versus copartisans or members of the general public. Benefits become diluted when coethnic leaders target copartisans more generally, and even more so when they are diluted to society at large. Conversely, when the actor engaging in clientelism is from the opposing ethnopartisan group, there is no change in benefit to the citizen or her ethnic or partisan group if the actor more narrowly targets coethnics versus copartisans. For instance, Carlson (2015) shows that legislative candidates’ performance and quality only matter to voters conditional on sharing partisanship. The performance and quality of candidates within one’s party could affect the citizens’ material interests. However, given the assumption that candidates from opposing parties would not target citizens in the outgroup, their quality or performance is

irrelevant.

Our final hypothesis is thus interactive:

**Hypothesis 3 (Interaction):** the particularism penalty *is greater if the action is committed by an actor with unshared ethnopartisanship.*

## 2 Context of the Study

Kenya is well-suited for examining normative perceptions of clientelism for several reasons. First and foremost, Kenya is often described as a context where clientelism has been especially prominent throughout the post-independence era (e.g., Miguel 2004). Politics in Kenya are commonly viewed as a zero-sum game between these rival ethnic factions. Voters support coethnic candidates and the parties that best incorporate them out of the belief that ethnic patrons serve as more faithful representatives of their clientele (Horowitz 2022; Kramon 2016; Opalo 2022; Cheeseman et al. 2021; Oyugi 1997). A growing number of empirical studies document favoritism along ethnic lines but also toward broader partisan coalitions, in the areas of education (Kramon 2016), road construction (Burgess et al. 2015), and foreign aid funds (Jablonski 2014).

Consistently, research on public opinion finds that citizens view ethnopartisan clientelism as a central feature of Kenyan politics: Horowitz (2022) show that large majorities of citizens believe leaders “favor their own” ethnic groups once in power. Horowitz and Michelitch (2021) show that many Kenyans believe all post-independence administrations have engaged in ethnic favoritism, such beliefs are most intense for contemporary leaders, and are stronger for leaders belonging to other ethnic groups.

Second, a long history of ethnopartisan polarization and conflict in Kenya means that citizens are acutely aware of the negative effects of a political system structured around clientelist mobilization. While inter-communal violence has been relatively rare in Kenya since independence, competition for power and resources by elites representing distinct ethnic factions has sharpened inter-group tensions, undermining social cohesion (e.g., Miguel 2004; Hjort 2014). Moreover,

since the return to multiparty politics in the early 1990s, several elections have been marred by large-scale violence in the lead-up to elections or in their aftermath. While research on the effects of violence on citizen perceptions is limited, several studies suggest a growing wariness toward ethnic political mobilization that could indicate a broader disapproval of ethnic and partisan clientelism (Horowitz and Klaus 2020; Kim and Horowitz 2022; Rosenzweig 2021; Gutiérrez-Romero and LeBas 2020).

Finally, as in many other parts of Africa, parties in Kenya nest ethnic groups. In the period since the reintroduction of multiparty competition, the trend has been toward a “two coalition” model in which two main parties, each drawing their primary support from a different set of ethnic groups, vie for power (Horowitz 2022). We implemented this study just before Kenya’s 2017 national elections. As in other recent elections, the partisan landscape at the time of our investigation was dominated by two main parties, largely drawing support from distinct ethnic bases. The incumbent party, Jubilee, which came to power in 2013, is often viewed as a Kikuyu-Kalenjin alliance owing to the ethnic identities of its two senior leaders, incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) and vice president William Ruto (Kalenjin). The main opposition party, the National Super Alliance (NASA), which emerged in the months leading up to the election, is commonly seen as a Luo-Kamba-Luhya coalition, again owing to the identities of its top leaders, Raila Odinga (Luo), Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba), and Musalia Mudavadi and Moses Wetangula (Luhya).

While both parties draw support from groups other than their core ethnic communities and bloc voting within groups is rarely perfectly uniform, these ethnic associations are well cemented in voters’ minds. As shown in the SI (Figures B.1, B.2, and B.3), our survey respondents are aware of the multi-ethnic composition of party bases, but clearly associate Kikuyus and Luos with Jubilee and NASA. This contextual feature is important since it allows us to test how citizens respond to treatments with more or less narrow targeting criteria in a setting where the distinction between coethnic groups and broader copartisan coalitions is politically salient.

### 3 Research Design

To study citizen perceptions of clientelism, we conducted a survey experiment as part of a large household study conducted in Kenya in June-July 2017. The sample (n=1,946) includes respondents who identify as Kikuyus and Luos and is divided between urban and rural areas (see SI A for sampling details).

In the survey experiment, respondents were presented with a set of hypothetical but common clientelistic actions by six actors coming from across the political and administrative sectors and society: a Member of Parliament candidate (MP), the President, a Bureaucrat, a Judge, a Police Officer, and an average citizen (a Shopkeeper). The set of actors and actions that we analyze are reported in Table 1.

Table 1: Actors and actions presented in the survey experiment

Actor	Action
MP	Giving money at a rally Providing transportation to vote Using CDF funds to give university scholarships
President	Making an appeal about someone's time to eat Using personal funds to provide more BVR kits for registration Influencing parliament to accept a budget for school construction
Bureaucrat	Providing funds to connect houses to the electricity grid Granting a contract to a firm without a competitive bidding process
Judge	Giving a light sentence to someone who was caught vote rigging Giving a light sentence to someone who stole a car Giving a job to someone as a lawyer without a competitive hiring process
Police officer	Letting off someone for a traffic offense
Shopkeeper	Making an appeal about someone's time to eat if a politician wins Requesting a politician for a contract for his firm, without a competitive bidding process

### **3.1 Treatment Conditions and Randomization**

The experiment has a 2×3 cross-cutting design, which creates 6 treatment conditions. The treatment assignment was at the level of the actor: the 6 actors were assigned to the 6 conditions through complete random assignment.

#### **Randomization 1: Actor’s Ethnopolitisan Identity**

In the first arm, we randomly varied the ethnopolitisan identity of the actor. This attribute was communicated by using surnames informative of the ethnicity and specifying party affiliation. There were two conditions:

1. Kikuyu surname + Jubilee party
2. Luo surname + NASA coalition

The surnames were randomly selected from a set of common but easily identifiable surnames, such that each actor had a unique surname. We piloted the list of surnames with convenience samples to ensure that individuals could easily associate the surname with either the Kikuyu or Luo ethnic group. We also avoided the surnames of any known politicians.

#### **Randomization 2: Group Targeted as Coethnic, Copartisan, or “Unspecified”**

In the second arm, we randomly varied the group targeted by the clientelistic action. There were three possible conditions:

1. Unspecified people are targeted
2. Copartisans are targeted
3. Coethnics are targeted


Table 2 shows an example of the 6 treatment conditions of the experiment. Each respondent was presented with all the actors and actions, but the 6 actors were allocated to one of the 6

Table 2: Example of treatment conditions

Ethnopartisan Identity	Targeting			
		Coethnics	Copartisans	Unspecified
Kikuyu from Jubilee	MP [Mr. Ngugi from Jubilee] Giving money to <b>Kikuyus</b> at a rally	MP [Mr. Ngugi from Jubilee] Giving money to <b>Jubilee supporters</b> at a rally	MP [Mr. Ngugi from Jubilee] Giving money to <b>people</b> at a rally	MP [Mr. Ngugi from Jubilee] Giving money to <b>people</b> at a rally
Luo from NASA	MP [Mr. Obiero from NASA] Giving money to <b>Luos</b> at a rally	MP [Mr. Obiero from NASA] Giving money to <b>NASA supporters</b> at a rally	MP [Mr. Obiero from NASA] Giving money to <b>people</b> at a rally	MP [Mr. Obiero from NASA] Giving money to <b>people</b> at a rally

combinations given by randomization 1 and 2, by complete random assignment. Therefore, each respondent experienced all 6 treatment combinations, one combination for each actor. This means that, when we compare punishment for a specific actor across treatment conditions, the variation we use is between subjects, and the analyses of different actors have different treatment and control groups in the sample. The design implies that the variation in shared/unshared identity between actor and respondent is given by the randomization of the actor identity and the fact that the sample is composed of Kikuyus and Luos in equal shares. See Figure 1 for a visual representation of the ethnopartisan match and nested ethnic groups in the survey.

Figure 1: Nested ethnic groups and parties in the survey design



*Note:* The figure represents the logic of ethnopartisan matches in the design. Ethnic groups (the inner circles) are nested into parties (the outer circles). The ethnopartisan identity of the hypothetical clientelistic actor can match or not that of the respondent. The clientelism targets can be coethnics (a narrower base), copartisans (a wider base), or the target can be unspecified.

## 3.2 Outcome Measurement

We asked respondents whether, according to them, an action should be legal or illegal, and the extent of the punishment. Unlike previous work asking how “acceptable” an action is (e.g., Pellicer and Wegner 2023), we built on social psychology work that derives latent measures of “punishability” by asking about the preferred legal punishment, using a context-sensitive scale (e.g., Carlsmith et al. 2002). After extensive pilot testing for the local context, our measure of punishment used the following scale: No punishment/Small fine/1 year or less in jail/About 2 years in jail/About 3 years in jail/About 5 years in jail/About 10 years in jail/About 15 years in jail/About 20 years in jail/About 25 years in jail/Life in jail/Don’t know or no answer. In our main analysis, we transform this 11-point scale variable into a continuous variable. To summarize the results more concisely at the level of the actors, and to reduce the number of statistical tests, we compute actor-specific indexes that summarize the punishment given for all actions committed by a specific actor.<sup>3</sup> Our preferred choice is using an Inverse Covariance Weighted (ICW) index, but in the SI, we also report results using the first Principal Component. For descriptive analyses and plots, we compute the indices by aggregating the raw (unstandardized) punishment variables. For the statistical tests, we first standardize the raw variables using the control mean and standard deviation before aggregating them, and re-standardize the resulting index, so that we can interpret treatment effects in terms of control standard deviations.

Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the raw, action-specific outcome variables used in the analysis. Preferred punishment is quite variable across actions, showing that citizens’ views on the punishability of clientelistic actions are nuanced. On average, respondents support most punishment for group appeals of the President and for the judge’s favoritism. Conversely, MP candidates handing out cash at a rally or providing transport to vote receive very little punishment, consistent with the notion by Kramon (2016) that these behaviors are rather normalized.

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<sup>3</sup>The police officer has only one associated action, and thus the index is simply derived from this action.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables (legal punishment)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
MP: Cash at rally	1.999	2.450	0	10	1784
MP: Transport	1.310	2.332	0	10	1787
MP: CDF	3.498	3.319	0	10	1781
Pres: Appeal	4.342	3.716	0	10	1764
Pres: Funds	3.282	3.400	0	10	1774
Pres: Schools	2.791	3.179	0	10	1771
Buro: Connect	2.403	2.886	0	10	1777
Buro: Contract	3.242	2.765	0	10	1770
Judge: Rig	4.717	3.239	0	10	1782
Judge: Steal	4.245	2.899	0	10	1782
Judge: Job	4.148	2.954	0	10	1779
Police: Traffic	3.692	2.787	0	10	1782
Shop: Appeal	3.730	3.266	0	10	1775
Shop: Contract	3.295	2.628	0	10	1773

### 3.3 Estimation

We estimate treatment effects through linear regression. For conciseness, in the main text, we focus on the first part of HP1, comparing coethnic or copartisan targeting to unspecified targeting. In the notation,  $i$  denotes a respondent,  $a$  denotes an action, and  $g$  denotes an ethnopartisan group (either Kikuyus voting for Jubilee or Luos voting for NASA). We estimate the following models:

$$y_{iag}^* = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \text{AnyTarget}_a + \varepsilon_{1,iag} \quad (1)$$

$$y_{iag}^* = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 \text{UnSharedEP}_{ia} + \varepsilon_{2,iag} \quad (2)$$

$$y_{iag}^* = \alpha_3 + \beta_{3,1} \text{UnSharedEP}_{ia} + \beta_{3,2} \text{AnyTarget}_a + \beta_{3,3} (\text{UnSharedEP}_{ia} \times \text{AnyTarget}_a) + \varepsilon_{3,iag} \quad (3)$$

$y^*$  is the outcome variable for punishment,  $\text{AnyTarget}$  is a treatment variable that takes value 1 if the action targets coethnics or copartisans, and 0 if it targets unspecified people,  $\text{UnsharedEP}$  is a

treatment variable that takes value 1 if the actor is from the opposed ethnopartisan group relative to the respondent and 0 if he is from the same group,  $\varepsilon$  is the error term. In supplementary analyses discussed later, we expand these models to include covariates.<sup>4</sup>

### 3.4 Design Notes

We assigned the treatment at the level of an actor, rather than of the action, because continuously switching the identity of an actor and its target could confuse respondents. Moreover, we allocated actors to conditions using a complete random assignment to make sure that each respondent would be part of all 6 treatment groups and that there would be roughly the same number of respondents in each treatment group for each actor.

The targeting treatment conditions were designed to explicitly distinguish between the two salient group identities (ethnicity and partisanship). A potential risk with this choice is that respondents conflate them; for instance, they could think that the co-partisans of a Kikuyu member of the Jubilee party are other Kikuyus, rather than possibly Jubilee supporters of other ethnicities. While this possibility is present, we find that respondents correctly perceive partisan bases as being composed of different groups (SI B), on average, 4 groups per party.

### 3.5 Response Bias

One concern with our approach is that respondents misreport their attitudes about legal punishment. In particular, respondents may realize that the survey is about intergroup attitudes and try to appear unbiased. In SI C, we investigate the presence of social desirability concerns, using information entered by enumerators on whether other people (bystanders) were present during the interview: observability of the answers increases the risk of response bias. First, we examine whether self-reported measures of outgroup bias, which would likely suffer from social desirability, differ systematically by the presence of bystanders (Figure C.1). Respondents report warmer

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<sup>4</sup>Note that Equations 1 and 2 are “short” models, so they estimate the average effect of one treatment over the values of the excluded treatment (Muralidharan et al. 2025).

feelings for their own ethnic group (relatively to the outgroup) when in the presence of others. After controlling for the pre-registered covariates, this difference disappears, but respondents indicate less affection for their own party (relatively to the outgroup party). Still, beliefs about the other group/party being more violent or tribalist are not affected by bystanders. We also find that bystander presence is generally balanced across treatment arms (Figure C.2). As discussed later in the paper, we also interact the treatment dummies with the bystanders dummy and do not find statistically significant evidence that the presence of other people moderates the treatment effects.

## 4 Results

We first visualize variation in the levels of punishment for each actor across treatments.<sup>5</sup> Figure 2 shows the indexes of punishment across actors and groups. Going from the left to the right of the x-axis increases the degree of particularism (from unspecified, to copartisan, to coethnic). The dots indicate whether respondents and actors share ethnopartisanship (gray) or not (black).


A first inspection of Figure 2 gives an indication of our main results. For almost all actors, average punishment increases in the narrowness of targeting. The largest differences are observed between the unspecified condition and the other two conditions. The differences between copartisan and coethnic targeting are smaller, and, as we discuss below, generally not statistically significant. Further, for almost all actors and levels of targeting, shared ethnopartisanship (gray dots) reduces punishment relative to unshared ethnopartisanship (black dots).

Table 4 reports treatment effect estimates for each actor. Each column corresponds to a different actor. Panel (A) reports the effects of the targeting treatment (coethnic or copartisan vs unspecified), Panel (B) reports the effects of the unshared ethnopartisanship treatment, and Panel (C) reports the effects of both treatments together and their interaction. In addition to the coefficients and standard errors, we report both standard p-values and p-values adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg method (in brackets). We report more disaggregated

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<sup>5</sup>See the online SI for the full set of results indicated in the pre-analysis plan. SI G documents the deviations from the plan.

Figure 2: Average levels of indicated punishment by actor and treatment condition



Note: The figure shows the average level of punishment for an actor by treatment group. The outcome (punishment for an actor) is computed by aggregating the punishment for each action of the same actor in an ICW index.

analyses at the action level in SI D for interested readers, the results are generally consistent with the index-level results.

Table 4: Effects of targeting and ethnopartisanship, actor-specific indexes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP	President	Bureaucrat	Judge	Police officer	Shopkeeper
<i>(A) Targeting</i>						
Any target	0.444*** (0.052)	0.597*** (0.051)	0.276*** (0.051)	-0.070 (0.050)	0.134* (0.051)	0.079 (0.050)
	0.000, [0.000]	0.000, [0.000]	0.000, [0.000]	0.163, [0.163]	0.009, [0.013]	0.115, [0.138]
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.037	0.068	0.015	0.001	0.004	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.037	0.068	0.014	0.001	0.003	0.001
Mean $Y_c$	1.500	1.892	2.425	4.397	3.454	3.296
SD $Y_c$	1.859	2.220	2.271	2.418	2.679	2.609
<i>(B) Unshared EP</i>						
Unshared EP	0.308*** (0.051)	0.490*** (0.051)	0.334*** (0.052)	0.149** (0.048)	0.153** (0.047)	0.181*** (0.048)
	0.000, [0.000]	0.000, [0.000]	0.000, [0.000]	0.002, [0.002]	0.001, [0.001]	0.000, [0.000]
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.020	0.049	0.023	0.005	0.006	0.008
R2 Adj.	0.020	0.048	0.022	0.005	0.005	0.007
Mean $Y_c$	1.661	2.701	2.474	4.152	3.480	3.211
SD $Y_c$	1.813	2.522	2.270	2.354	2.782	2.485
<i>(C) Interaction</i>						
Any target	0.351*** (0.062)	0.420*** (0.067)	0.321*** (0.079)	-0.109+ (0.057)	0.184* (0.076)	0.035 (0.064)
	0.000, [0.000]	0.000, [0.000]	0.000, [0.000]	0.055, [0.099]	0.015, [0.030]	0.583, [0.617]
Unshared EP	0.194* (0.074)	0.255** (0.083)	0.384*** (0.097)	0.065 (0.069)	0.217* (0.086)	0.111 (0.076)
	0.009, [0.023]	0.002, [0.007]	0.000, [0.000]	0.347, [0.446]	0.012, [0.027]	0.147, [0.221]
Any target × Unshared EP	0.154 (0.093)	0.320** (0.103)	0.016 (0.125)	0.092 (0.084)	-0.060 (0.108)	0.077 (0.093)
	0.098, [0.160]	0.002, [0.007]	0.901, [0.901]	0.274, [0.379]	0.577, [0.617]	0.410, [0.491]
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.065	0.115	0.036	0.008	0.010	0.010
R2 Adj.	0.063	0.114	0.035	0.006	0.009	0.008
Mean $Y_c$	1.291	1.633	2.066	4.320	3.159	3.153
SD $Y_c$	1.737	1.988	1.939	2.360	2.522	2.525

*Notes:* Coefficients are expressed in terms of control standard deviations. The raw sample moments reported are computed using non-normalized indexes. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. P-values reported under the standard errors are unadjusted (not bracketed) and adjusted with the Benjamini-Hochberg method (in brackets). The significance stars are based on the adjusted p-value. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001.

Looking at Panel (A), targeting supporters (whether coethnic or copartisan) as opposed to general people generally has a positive and significant effect on preferred punishment. Citizens prefer more punishment for the MP, President, Bureaucrat, and Police Officer when they target supporters, but there is no statistically significant effect for the Judge or Shopkeeper. There is variation

in effect sizes: for the MP and the President, the effects are about  $0.4 SD_c$  and  $0.6 SD_c$ , while for the Bureaucrat and Police Officer, they are considerably smaller, between  $0.1 SD_c$  and  $0.3 SD_c$ . In SI D.2, we show that, while coefficients are signed positively, there is generally no statistically significant difference between targeting coethnics or copartisans, contrary to our hypothesis. An exception is the President, who is punished significantly more for targeting coethnics versus copartisans. Perhaps because the President is the highest-ranking leader in the country, there is more differentiation based on the level of particularism.<sup>6</sup>

Next, are citizens normative relativists when it comes to punishing actors for clientelistic behaviors? Panel (B) confirms that the effect of unshared ethnopartisanship is consistently positive and statistically significant across all actors. The penalty for out-group members ranges, across the actors, from  $0.1 SD_c$  to  $0.5 SD_c$ . Further, the coefficients in Panel (C) indicate that distortion and (un)shared partisanship do not generally jointly affect preferred punishment.<sup>7</sup> The partial exception is, again, the President as was visually suggested in Figure 2. For the President, the interaction is considerable, both substantively and statistically. With this exception, Panel (C) reveals that targeting supporters and unshared ethnopartisanship are generally independent effects. Respondents are willing to punish an actor for targeting benefits to supporters (versus general people) *even when that actor is an ingroup member*.

## 4.1 Action-level Results and Alternative Specifications


In Figure 3 and 4, we show the treatment effects of group targeting and unshared identity for each action separately (the numeric results are reported in SI D.1, D.3, and D.4). The effects are generally in the same direction for each action of the same actor (black coefficients). We also repeat the action-level analyses in Figure 3 and 4 using a binary version of the outcome variable (0 if “no punishment” is selected and 1 otherwise), to assess effects on the “extensive margin” of

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<sup>6</sup>Indeed, the only action that is repeated across actors is making the appeal about whose “turn it is to eat” for both the President and the Shopkeeper. Coethnic targeting is statistically significant and positively signed versus copartisan targeting for this action for both actors, however, the level of punishment is much larger for the President.


<sup>7</sup>In the PAP, we acknowledge that tests of interactive effects have less power.

Figure 3: Effects of targeting versus unspecified targeting, action-level results



Notes: Effects of the group targeting treatment on the supported punishment for each action and actor. The black circles are point estimates of the treatment effect in the base specification where the outcome variable is treated as continuous and standardized with the control mean. The gray triangles are point estimates in a specification where the outcome is transformed into a binary variable (0=no punishment, 1=any punishment). “ICW” indicates the specification with the actor-level ICW index, reported in Table 4. “PC1” indicates the specification with the first principal component of the action-level variables. 95% confidence intervals with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown.

Figure 4: Effects of unshared ethnopartisanship, action-level results



*Notes:* Effects of the group targeting treatment on the supported punishment for each action and actor. The black circles are point estimates of the treatment effect in the base specification, where the outcome variable is treated as continuous and standardized. The gray triangles are point estimates in a specification where the outcome is transformed into a binary variable (0=no punishment, 1=any punishment). “ICW” indicates the specification with the actor-level ICW index, reported in Table 4. “PC1” indicates the specification with the first principal component of the action-level variables. 95% confidence intervals with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown.

punishment preferences. These results (gray coefficients) are generally analogous to those with the continuous punishment variable. For instance, the probability of favoring any legal punishment for a cash handout (a relatively accepted behavior) increases by 8.7 p.p. if the MP candidate is an out-group member. For actors whose corruption is perceived as much more serious, such as the judge, the unshared identity does not affect the probability of punishment, but only the intensity.

Quantile regressions show that the average treatment effects generalize to the quartiles of the distribution (Table E.1). We also estimate regressions of the probability that punishment is above a certain threshold, varying the threshold over the punishment scale (Figures E.1 and E.2). The results confirm that for some actors, like the MP, the treatments shift the distribution more in the “low punishment” area, whereas for others like the President or the judge, the density shifts more at intermediate and high levels of punishment.

In the SI, we also report results from specifications where we control for covariates (age, gender, socio-economic status, urban residency, and ethnopartisanship). Since the randomization was effective, these models give essentially the same results as the unconditional ones.

## 4.2 Moderation from Response Bias

To investigate the possibility that treatment response is influenced by social desirability concerns, in Table C.1 we interact the treatment coefficients with a dummy for the presence of bystanders during the interview, as described previously. If people gave more socially desirable answers, we would see lower or larger effects in cases where bystanders were present. We find that the interaction between treatment and bystanders is never statistically significant; moreover, the coefficients of the non-interacted treatment terms are very similar to the average effects presented in Table 4, suggesting that the average effects are close to what we would have found if every interview was fully private.

### 4.3 Heterogeneous Effects

As an exploratory part of the analysis, we investigate whether the social and personal characteristics of respondents moderate their preferences towards punishment of favoritism or group bias (see SI F). We are particularly interested on whether attitudes vary with the strength of in-group attachment, given that stronger ingroup attachment can lead in some cases to larger ingroup/outgroup bias. We asked respondents how important it is for them that their children marry within their ethnic group or their party base. Interestingly, we find that strong partisan attachment (stating it is “very important” to marry supporters of the same party) significantly increases the punishment given to out-group members, while the analogous measure of ethnic attachment (i.e., it is “very important” to marry within the tribe) does not significantly change the outgroup penalty.

We do not find substantial heterogeneity along group lines: Luo respondents are indistinguishable from Kikuyu respondents in the targeting treatment; they may have a higher bias against out-group members, but the interaction is noisy and not always significant (Table F.5).

In terms of demographics, we find that men tend to display less group bias relative to women when evaluating politicians (MPs and President), but no significant difference exists for other actors (Table F.2). A higher socioeconomic status reduces the bias toward the ethnopartisan outgroup<sup>8</sup>, but not the penalty given to group targeting (Table F.3). Surprisingly, we find virtually no differences along urban/rural lines: the preferences expressed by respondents in Nairobi are the same as those in the rural sub-sample (Table F.4). Aware that a binary categorization of urbanness may mask nuances due to e.g., migration status, we used a battery of questions on the strength and frequency of connections to the country (specific to the urban sub-sample) and to the large towns (specific to the rural sub-sample). We aggregate these measures to compute a continuous index of “ruralness” in each of the two sub-samples. In none of the groups, these ruralness measures consistently moderate the effects of targeting or identity.

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<sup>8</sup>Interestingly, Parreira et al. ([forthcoming](#)) find the opposite heterogeneous effect.

## 5 Discussion and Conclusion

Our experiment advances our understanding of the variation in attitudes towards clientelism. Specifically, this study elicits views on legal punishment for a wider set of actors and actions than previously researched, and examines two previously unexplored factors governing such attitudes: the actors' ethnopartisan identity and the category of eligibility for being targeted. The data reveals several robust patterns.

First, we find evidence for the particularism penalty. While there is variation in the average legal penalty awarded across the range of clientelistic actions towards the general public, explicitly targeting supporters — whether coethnics or copartisans — substantially increases the degree of legal punishment desired. A surprising result is the overall lack of difference between copartisan and coethnic targeting in the evaluation of behavior. Recent literature has highlighted that parties increasingly transcend ethnic lines to build multi-ethnic coalitions (Horowitz 2022), thus contributing to the emergence of partisanship as a salient political identity in sub-Saharan Africa (Michelitch 2015). Our results preliminarily suggest that voters do not generally differentiate between them when evaluating clientelistic behavior. One caveat to this interpretation is that respondents could perhaps implicitly interpret copartisan targeting as more narrowly coethnic targeting. However, an analogous contention could be made that targeting the general public could be implicitly interpreted as copartisan or coethnic targeting, yet we still see robust differences between the general public versus coethnics or copartisans. More research is needed to understand when and how the distinction between party and ethnic identification is meaningful in multi-ethnic democracies. For example, a future design with a significantly larger sample could examine differences in whether non-coethnic copartisans were targeted, versus coethnic copartisans, or even swing voters or opposition voters.

Second, we find evidence for the outgroup actor penalty - respondents indicate lighter sentences for members of their own ethnopartisan group. This result is generally consistent with a growing body of evidence of ingroup/outgroupism across ethnopartisan lines (Michelitch 2015; Adida et al. 2017). However, the lack of an interactive effect between our treatment arms is informative. It sug-

gests that the particularism and outgroup actor penalties are largely independent factors governing public attitudes towards clientelism. By contrast, Carlson (2015) finds that variation in the behavior of partisan outgroup actors is irrelevant to citizens, presumably because such actors' behavior does not matter for citizens associated with an opposing party. In our study, citizens are "equally offended" by increasing particularism to supporters, regardless of which party is doing it.

Despite clientelism being widely seen as a perversion of the democratic process, recent literature suggests that it persists because both leaders and voters find it useful, and voters expect it from their politicians (Wantchekon 2003; Kramon 2016). Our work highlights novel behavioral micro-foundations of this political courtship: voters dislike particularistic favors to supporters, yet are relatively more forgiving of their own group. The coexistence of these two forces may help explain why clientelism persists in settings where people disapprove of it. More research is needed to unpack the root causes of group bias in normative evaluations of clientelism, but the persistent belief that outgroups are discriminatory can be part of the mechanisms (Horowitz and Michelitch 2021).

More broadly, our study is among the first comprehensive attempts at assessing citizens' normative evaluations of clientelism in African democracies, especially outside the electoral domain. These results have implications for settings such as Kenya where parties nest ethnic groups, as in many multiethnic democracies (Chandra 2012). Understanding the behavioral foundations of clientelistic persistence in such contexts in parallel with its institutional determinants (Opalo 2022) is necessary for both scholars and local stakeholders.

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## **Competing Interests Declaration**

The authors declare none.

## **Ethical Statement**

IRB approval was received from Vanderbilt University (#170737) and Dartmouth College (#30291). Kenyan research permit NACOSTI/P/17/7385/17300.

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# Who is Targeted and by Whom?

## Supplemental Information

### A Population and Sampling

The target population for this study are Kenyans identifying as either Kikuyu or Luo and most directly associated with the leading parties at the time of the survey.

Our sample of Luos and Kikuyus endeavored to reach a total of 2,000 respondents, evenly divided between urban and rural locations, and the achieved sample was  $N=1,946$ . The urban sample is from Nairobi, the capital city, and the rural samples are drawn from Nyeri and Kisumu counties for Kikuyus and Luos respectively. Within each rural county, we further divided the sample between those who reside in the main towns (Nyeri Town and Kisumu Town) and smaller towns and villages, with a minimum of 100 respondents in each of the main towns (to achieve this quota, we over-sampled Nyeri Town).

Within each county (Nairobi, Nyeri, and Kisumu), we allocated the sample across parliamentary constituencies using population proportional to size (PPS). Within constituencies, we randomly selected polling stations (typically primary or secondary schools) using PPS based on the number of registered voters (using the Chromy method implemented in Stata with the `ppschromy` command). Enumerators were assigned to work in pairs each day, with the daily pairings assigned randomly. We instructed enumerators to use a random-walk procedure to select households. Within households, we randomly selected respondents from those adults (18+) who were at home at the time of the visit. A small number of sampling points in Nairobi were dropped due to insecurity and we excluded Karen, an affluent neighborhood, after determining that respondents in that area were almost always unwilling to participate.

Because we sought to include only Kikuyu and Luos respondents, we limited the sample for Nairobi Country to polling stations that were majority Kikuyu or Luo, based on data from Andy Harris which estimates ethnic shares using last names from the voter rolls (Harris 2015). In prac-

tice, we found the ethnicity data to be imprecise and dropped localities where the enumerators could not locate the target populations. In rural counties, we did not stratify by local ethnicity since the counties are both fairly homogenous: data from the 2009 census shows that Kikuyus make up 94% of the population in Nyeri County and Luos 89% in Kisumu County (KNBS 2014).

In the rural areas, we sought to ensure the inclusion of some areas that were not connected to the national electricity grid. However, lacking detailed information about local-level electrification, we were not able to stratify on this dimension. Once it became clear that our sampling strategy in the rural counties was producing relatively few respondents from localities without electricity, we consulted local authorities to identify un-electrified areas and added additional sampling points in those places. All interviews were conducted by coethnic enumerators to hold constant any enumerator identity effects (Adida et al. 2016).

We assessed respondents' partisanship by asking them who they would vote between Jubilee and NASA if the election were held tomorrow. We also asked respondents to express their support for each of the two parties on a scale of 0 to 10. If someone did not indicate their intention to vote, we coded them as partisans of the party to which they assigned the highest score. In the analysis sample, we only retain respondents who are partisans of their group's party.

## **B Ethnopartisan Attitudes**

A section of the survey measured respondents' beliefs about the nesting of Kenyan ethnic groups into party bases. The question was "From what you know, which tribes support [party]?", and respondents could freely enumerate groups. From this question we construct a variable defined as the number of ethnic groups each respondent associates to either Jubilee or NASA. Figure B.1 shows that parties are correctly perceived by the vast majority of respondents as coalitions of ethnicities, with the average number of groups being around 4. Figures B.2 and B.3 show the proportion of respondents who associate a given group with a party.

In another part of the survey, we elicit beliefs about the tendency of parties to be "tribalist", or

Figure B.1: Perceptions about how many ethnic groups support each party




Figure B.2: Groups more frequently indicated as supporters of Jubilee party





Figure B.3: Groups more frequently indicated as supporters of NASA coalition



to favor their supporting groups. Respondents could locate each party on a scale between 0 (very nationalist, or caring about all Kenyans) and 10 (very tribalist, or caring about their own tribes). As shown in Figure B.4, the distributions are tri-modal and show polarization at the extremes. This is due to the fact that respondents see their own party as nationalist and the other party as tribalist.

## C Social Desirability Bias

The variables used are: feeling thermometer toward ethnic groups, feeling thermometer toward parties, score of ethnic groups' violence, score of ethnic groups' tribalism, score of parties' violence, and score of parties' tribalism. We compute measures of out-group bias that increase the more the assessment of the own group/party is better than the other group/party. For the feeling thermometers, where larger values are more positive feelings, we take the in-group score and subtract the out-group score. For the violence and tribalism assessment, where larger values are more negative views, we take the out-group score and subtract the in-group score.

Figure B.4: Perceptions about how tribalist versus nationalist a party is




Figure C.1 shows the differences in the mean of these measures according to whether other people (bystanders) were present in the room during the interview.


We then assess whether differences in the presence of bystanders are balanced across randomization arms. Figure C.2 shows the differences in the probability of bystanders between the treated and control group, for each actor-level treatment.

Finally, in Table C.1 we investigate whether the presence of bystanders moderates the effect of the two treatments. The interaction term is small and not significant across actors and treatments.

## D Action-level Results

In this section, we report our complete pre-registered main analysis. Section D.2 reports the results for the first part of HP1, comparing the coethnic targeting condition to the copartisan targeting condition. Here we code “coethnic targeting” as the treatment, “copartisan targeting” as the control, and exclude the unspecified condition. Section D.3 reports the action-level results for HP2 (unshared identity), and Section D.5 reports the results from interacting coethnic targeting (versus

Figure C.1: Differences in relative self-reported group preferences, by other people's presence



Notes: Each point is the difference between the mean of the outcome variable on the y-axis with and without bystanders' presence in the room during the interview. The "Base" specification is the simple difference in mean. The covariates are the same used for the main analysis: age, gender, SES index, urban, and ethnopartisan group.

Figure C.2: Balance in other people's presence in the room, by treatment variable




Table C.1: Heterogeneous effects by presence of bystanders

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP	President	Bureaucrat	Judge	Police officer	Shopkeeper
<i>(A) Targeting</i>						
Any target	0.469*** (0.064)	0.613*** (0.065)	0.264*** (0.064)	-0.024 (0.065)	0.079 (0.064)	0.039 (0.061)
Bystanders	0.000, [0.000] 0.096 (0.087)	0.000, [0.000] 0.080 (0.083)	0.000, [0.000] 0.026 (0.084)	0.711, [0.781] 0.125 (0.083)	0.218, [0.556] -0.026 (0.086)	0.527, [0.771] -0.083 (0.087)
Any target × Bystanders	0.272, [0.556] -0.064 (0.108)	0.338, [0.556] -0.037 (0.106)	0.758, [0.781] 0.030 (0.108)	0.133, [0.556] -0.103 (0.103)	0.757, [0.781] 0.142 (0.107)	0.340, [0.556] 0.107 (0.106)
Num.Obs.	0.557, [0.771] 1795	0.724, [0.781] 1787	0.781, [0.781] 1784	0.314, [0.556] 1788	0.185, [0.556] 1782	0.309, [0.556] 1783
R2	0.038	0.069	0.015	0.002	0.006	0.002
R2 Adj.	0.036	0.067	0.013	0.001	0.004	0.000
Mean $Y_c$	1.500	1.892	2.425	4.397	3.454	3.296
SD $Y_c$	1.859	2.220	2.271	2.418	2.679	2.609
<i>(B) Unshared EP</i>						
Unshared EP	0.336*** (0.064)	0.519*** (0.063)	0.302*** (0.064)	0.095 (0.061)	0.146+ (0.058)	0.104 (0.060)
Bystanders	0.000, [0.000] 0.081 (0.069)	0.000, [0.000] 0.092 (0.070)	0.000, [0.000] 0.010 (0.070)	0.121, [0.272] -0.007 (0.068)	0.013, [0.057] 0.064 (0.070)	0.081, [0.242] -0.117 (0.071)
Unshared EP × Bystanders	0.239, [0.391] -0.068 (0.105)	0.188, [0.339] -0.077 (0.106)	0.883, [0.922] 0.083 (0.108)	0.922, [0.922] 0.140 (0.100)	0.355, [0.532] 0.025 (0.099)	0.100, [0.257] 0.199 (0.101)
Num.Obs.	0.520, [0.624] 1795	0.471, [0.605] 1787	0.442, [0.605] 1784	0.161, [0.322] 1788	0.797, [0.897] 1782	0.050, [0.181] 1783
R2	0.021	0.050	0.024	0.007	0.007	0.010
R2 Adj.	0.019	0.048	0.022	0.006	0.006	0.008
Mean $Y_c$	1.661	2.701	2.474	4.152	3.480	3.211
SD $Y_c$	1.813	2.522	2.270	2.354	2.782	2.485

*Notes:* The table tests whether the effects of the group targeting and unshared identity treatments are moderated by the presence of bystanders during the interview. Treatment coefficients are expressed in terms of control standard deviations. The raw sample moments reported are computed using non-normalized indexes. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. P-values reported under the standard errors are unadjusted (not bracketed) and adjusted with the Benjamini-Hochberg method (in brackets). The significance stars are based on the adjusted p-value. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001.

copartisan targeting) and unshared identity. Also In these analyses, the unspecified targeting group is excluded.

Each table shows the results for the action-specific punishment, the results on the actor-specific ICW index (which, for the unshared identity effects, replicate those of Table 4), and the results on an alternative actor-specific index defined as the first principal component of the action variables.

In every table, we report three specifications. In Panel (A), the base (unconditional) treatment effect estimates. In Panel (B), we report the regression-adjusted estimates. We control for the following covariates: age, gender, an index of socio-economic status, urban residency, ethnicity/partisanship. We use the specification proposed by Lin (2013), where we center all the covariates and interact them with the treatment indicator. When we study the average effect of one treatment in isolation, we add the excluded treatment indicator to the controls, after centering and interacting it. Finally, in Panel (C) we estimate effects using a binary version of the outcomes, that takes value 1 when any punishment is given to an action as opposed to none at all.

In Panel (A) and (B) of the tables, the outcome variable is standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the relevant control group, so that the treatment effects can be interpreted in terms of control standard deviations, and are comparable across columns and tables. For reference, we also report the raw means and standard deviations in the control group or in the full sample.

## **D.1 Any Group Targeting versus Unspecified Targeting**

Table D.1: Effects of group versus unspecified targeting, MP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Handout	Transport	CDF	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Any target	0.044 (0.051)	0.137** (0.053)	1.082*** (0.053)	0.444*** (0.052)	0.468*** (0.052)
Num.Obs.	1784	1787	1781	1795	1766
R2	0.000	0.004	0.172	0.037	0.041
R2 Adj.	0.000	0.003	0.171	0.037	0.041
Mean $Y_c$	1.928	1.110	1.519	1.500	-0.387
SD $Y_c$	2.439	2.197	2.711	1.859	1.213
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Any target	0.058 (0.050)	0.149** (0.052)	1.097*** (0.052)	0.462*** (0.051)	0.485*** (0.052)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.005+ (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)	0.008** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.033 (0.084)	-0.132 (0.083)	-0.141+ (0.084)	-0.087 (0.081)	-0.087 (0.082)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.091 (0.130)	-0.108 (0.121)	-0.143 (0.120)	-0.125 (0.125)	-0.175 (0.126)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.039 (0.085)	0.205* (0.081)	0.129 (0.080)	0.147+ (0.080)	0.161* (0.080)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.048 (0.093)	0.084 (0.091)	-0.055 (0.090)	-0.012 (0.090)	-0.010 (0.090)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.233** (0.082)	0.124 (0.083)	0.078 (0.081)	0.214** (0.082)	0.188* (0.082)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.106 (0.102)	-0.051 (0.105)	-0.029 (0.107)	-0.083 (0.102)	-0.095 (0.103)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.148 (0.157)	0.069 (0.154)	0.235 (0.151)	0.160 (0.153)	0.226 (0.155)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.075 (0.103)	-0.263* (0.104)	0.046 (0.105)	-0.139 (0.102)	-0.137 (0.102)
Any target × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.044 (0.112)	-0.154 (0.114)	0.008 (0.115)	-0.040 (0.111)	-0.041 (0.112)
Any target × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.030 (0.100)	0.152 (0.104)	0.280** (0.105)	0.172+ (0.102)	0.189+ (0.103)
Num.Obs.	1784	1787	1781	1795	1766
R2	0.022	0.028	0.200	0.072	0.076
R2 Adj.	0.015	0.021	0.194	0.066	0.069
Mean $Y_c$	1.928	1.110	1.519	1.500	-0.387
SD $Y_c$	2.439	2.197	2.711	1.859	1.213
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Any target	0.021 (0.023)	0.082*** (0.024)	0.576*** (0.021)		
Num.Obs.	1784	1787	1781		
R2	0.000	0.006	0.385		
R2 Adj.	0.000	0.006	0.384		
Mean $Y_c$	0.680	0.336	0.357		
SD $Y_c$	0.467	0.473	0.479		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.2: Effects of group versus unspecified targeting, President

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Appeal	Funds	Schools	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Any target	0.624*** (0.051)	0.379*** (0.051)	1.263*** (0.059)	0.597*** (0.051)	0.908*** (0.055)
Num.Obs.	1764	1774	1771	1787	1747
R2	0.075	0.030	0.169	0.068	0.121
R2 Adj.	0.074	0.029	0.169	0.068	0.121
Mean $Y_c$	2.909	2.453	0.955	1.892	-0.695
SD $Y_c$	3.429	3.315	2.209	2.220	1.158
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Any target	0.607*** (0.050)	0.365*** (0.050)	1.266*** (0.058)	0.578*** (0.050)	0.895*** (0.053)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.012*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.011** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.004)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.153+ (0.081)	0.158+ (0.082)	-0.068 (0.083)	0.175* (0.080)	0.130 (0.081)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.217* (0.110)	0.078 (0.105)	-0.067 (0.133)	0.170+ (0.103)	0.110 (0.111)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.151+ (0.081)	-0.046 (0.082)	-0.216** (0.081)	0.050 (0.081)	-0.032 (0.081)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.009 (0.087)	0.078 (0.089)	-0.013 (0.085)	0.051 (0.087)	0.025 (0.089)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.289*** (0.080)	0.146+ (0.081)	0.117 (0.081)	0.251** (0.079)	0.245** (0.080)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.005)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.219* (0.101)	-0.264** (0.101)	-0.102 (0.119)	-0.281** (0.101)	-0.278* (0.108)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.081 (0.140)	-0.198 (0.136)	0.026 (0.180)	-0.160 (0.134)	-0.149 (0.150)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.177+ (0.101)	0.148 (0.101)	0.168 (0.118)	0.004 (0.101)	0.056 (0.107)
Any target × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.075 (0.109)	-0.055 (0.109)	-0.011 (0.123)	-0.075 (0.109)	-0.076 (0.116)
Any target × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.229* (0.100)	0.311** (0.099)	0.433*** (0.116)	0.317** (0.099)	0.417*** (0.106)
Num.Obs.	1764	1774	1771	1787	1747
R2	0.136	0.084	0.202	0.135	0.186
R2 Adj.	0.130	0.078	0.196	0.129	0.180
Mean $Y_c$	2.909	2.453	0.955	1.892	-0.695
SD $Y_c$	3.429	3.315	2.209	2.220	1.158
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Any target	0.262*** (0.022)	0.276*** (0.024)	0.585*** (0.021)		
Num.Obs.	1764	1774	1771		
R2	0.095	0.082	0.333		
R2 Adj.	0.094	0.081	0.333		
Mean $Y_c$	0.623	0.525	0.255		
SD $Y_c$	0.485	0.500	0.436		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.3: Effects of group versus unspecified targeting, Bureaucrat

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Connect	Contract	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>				
Any target	0.319*** (0.052)	0.171*** (0.050)	0.276*** (0.051)	0.280*** (0.052)
Num.Obs.	1777	1770	1784	1763
R2	0.020	0.006	0.015	0.015
R2 Adj.	0.019	0.006	0.014	0.014
Mean $Y_c$	1.836	2.937	2.425	-0.226
SD $Y_c$	2.651	2.577	2.271	1.120
<i>(B): Covariates</i>				
Any target	0.316*** (0.051)	0.172*** (0.050)	0.275*** (0.051)	0.278*** (0.051)
Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.000 (0.003)	0.008* (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.159* (0.080)	-0.004 (0.080)	-0.078 (0.080)	-0.102 (0.081)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.092 (0.129)	0.031 (0.107)	-0.030 (0.120)	-0.029 (0.125)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.155+ (0.081)	0.052 (0.079)	-0.044 (0.079)	-0.064 (0.080)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.088 (0.086)	-0.072 (0.083)	-0.005 (0.085)	0.015 (0.086)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.293*** (0.080)	0.264*** (0.079)	0.321*** (0.079)	0.322*** (0.080)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.007 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.034 (0.102)	0.039 (0.101)	0.035 (0.103)	0.051 (0.104)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.018 (0.158)	0.100 (0.137)	0.072 (0.150)	0.069 (0.154)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.278** (0.103)	0.088 (0.100)	0.193+ (0.102)	0.220* (0.103)
Any target × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.077 (0.110)	0.087 (0.106)	0.013 (0.110)	0.006 (0.111)
Any target × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.074 (0.102)	-0.036 (0.100)	0.008 (0.102)	0.027 (0.103)
Num.Obs.	1777	1770	1784	1763
R2	0.058	0.028	0.043	0.047
R2 Adj.	0.051	0.021	0.036	0.040
Mean $Y_c$	1.836	2.937	2.425	-0.226
SD $Y_c$	2.651	2.577	2.271	1.120
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>				
Any target	0.163*** (0.024)	-0.028+ (0.014)		
Num.Obs.	1777	1770		
R2	0.026	0.002		
R2 Adj.	0.025	0.001		
Mean $Y_c$	0.529	0.920		
SD $Y_c$	0.500	0.271		

*Notes*

All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + < 0.1, \* < 0.05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001

Table D.4: Effects of group versus unspecified targeting, Judge

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Rig	Steal	Give job	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Any target	-0.130** (0.050)	0.013 (0.051)	-0.038 (0.050)	-0.070 (0.050)	-0.060 (0.050)
Num.Obs.	1782	1782	1779	1788	1771
R2	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.003	-0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000
Mean $Y_c$	5.002	4.221	4.222	4.397	0.058
SD $Y_c$	3.269	2.885	2.925	2.418	1.392
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Any target	-0.136** (0.050)	0.009 (0.050)	-0.044 (0.051)	-0.076 (0.050)	-0.066 (0.050)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.002 (0.004)	0.008* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.102 (0.084)	-0.122 (0.084)	-0.052 (0.084)	-0.110 (0.084)	-0.117 (0.084)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.077 (0.122)	0.138 (0.124)	0.092 (0.123)	0.113 (0.121)	0.132 (0.123)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.081 (0.084)	-0.022 (0.085)	-0.003 (0.084)	0.021 (0.084)	0.026 (0.085)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.079 (0.087)	0.155+ (0.089)	-0.102 (0.088)	0.050 (0.086)	0.058 (0.086)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.098 (0.083)	0.035 (0.084)	0.028 (0.083)	0.071 (0.083)	0.066 (0.084)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.022 (0.101)	0.011 (0.102)	0.003 (0.103)	-0.009 (0.102)	-0.001 (0.102)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.108 (0.146)	-0.192 (0.149)	-0.008 (0.147)	-0.118 (0.146)	-0.125 (0.147)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.049 (0.102)	0.109 (0.103)	0.050 (0.103)	0.053 (0.103)	0.036 (0.103)
Any target × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.019 (0.108)	-0.137 (0.109)	0.022 (0.109)	-0.052 (0.106)	-0.054 (0.106)
Any target × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.118 (0.100)	0.043 (0.102)	0.097 (0.102)	0.107 (0.101)	0.102 (0.101)
Num.Obs.	1782	1782	1779	1788	1771
R2	0.021	0.020	0.009	0.017	0.017
R2 Adj.	0.013	0.013	0.001	0.010	0.010
Mean $Y_c$	5.002	4.221	4.222	4.397	0.058
SD $Y_c$	3.269	2.885	2.925	2.418	1.392
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Any target	-0.019 (0.013)	0.007 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.011)		
Num.Obs.	1782	1782	1779		
R2	0.001	0.000	0.000		
R2 Adj.	0.001	0.000	0.000		
Mean $Y_c$	0.931	0.924	0.956		
SD $Y_c$	0.255	0.266	0.205		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.5: Effects of group versus unspecified targeting, Police officer

	(1)
	Traffic
<i>(A): Base</i>	
Any target	0.134** (0.051)
Num.Obs.	1782
R2	0.004
R2 Adj.	0.003
Mean $Y_c$	3.454
SD $Y_c$	2.679
<i>(B): Covariates</i>	
Any target	0.143** (0.051)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.000 (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.183* (0.082)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.229+ (0.121)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.053 (0.084)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.105 (0.086)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.212* (0.082)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.003 (0.004)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.108 (0.103)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.236 (0.150)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.173 (0.105)
Any target × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.045 (0.109)
Any target × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	-0.063 (0.103)
Num.Obs.	1782
R2	0.020
R2 Adj.	0.013
Mean $Y_c$	3.454
SD $Y_c$	2.679
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>	
Any target	-0.004 (0.008)
Num.Obs.	1782
R2	0.000
R2 Adj.	0.000
Mean $Y_c$	0.973
SD $Y_c$	0.162

*Notes* All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.6: Effects of group versus unspecified targeting, Shopkeeper

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Appeal	Contract	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>				
Any target	0.122* (0.051)	0.036 (0.050)	0.079 (0.050)	0.092+ (0.050)
Num.Obs.	1775	1773	1783	1765
R2	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.002
R2 Adj.	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.001
Mean $Y_c$	3.469	3.232	3.296	-0.082
SD $Y_c$	3.272	2.685	2.609	1.284
<i>(B): Covariates</i>				
Any target	0.117* (0.050)	0.030 (0.050)	0.073 (0.050)	0.086+ (0.050)
Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.114 (0.084)	-0.120 (0.083)	-0.125 (0.083)	-0.135 (0.083)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.085 (0.117)	0.047 (0.112)	-0.026 (0.114)	-0.012 (0.115)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.080 (0.084)	0.046 (0.086)	0.073 (0.084)	0.065 (0.084)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.064 (0.090)	-0.097 (0.093)	-0.090 (0.092)	-0.090 (0.092)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.110 (0.082)	0.084 (0.082)	0.111 (0.082)	0.104 (0.082)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.000 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.208* (0.102)	0.201* (0.101)	0.215* (0.101)	0.238* (0.101)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.268+ (0.142)	0.035 (0.137)	0.167 (0.139)	0.160 (0.140)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.030 (0.102)	0.060 (0.103)	0.008 (0.102)	0.027 (0.102)
Any target × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.020 (0.110)	-0.011 (0.110)	-0.002 (0.110)	0.011 (0.111)
Any target × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.162 (0.101)	0.016 (0.100)	0.092 (0.100)	0.098 (0.100)
Num.Obs.	1775	1773	1783	1765
R2	0.025	0.012	0.019	0.021
R2 Adj.	0.018	0.005	0.012	0.013
Mean $Y_c$	3.469	3.232	3.296	-0.082
SD $Y_c$	3.272	2.685	2.609	1.284
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>				
Any target	0.044* (0.019)	0.008 (0.014)		
Num.Obs.	1775	1773		
R2	0.003	0.000		
R2 Adj.	0.003	0.000		
Mean $Y_c$	0.802	0.913		
SD $Y_c$	0.399	0.282		

*Notes* All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

## **D.2 Coethnic versus Copartisan Targeting**

Table D.7: Effects of coethnic targeting versus copartisan targeting, MP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Handout	Transport	CDF	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Target coethnic	0.033 (0.058)	0.195** (0.060)	0.022 (0.057)	0.094 (0.058)	0.114+ (0.059)
Num.Obs.	1203	1204	1201	1212	1188
R2	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.002	0.003
R2 Adj.	-0.001	0.008	-0.001	0.001	0.002
Mean $Y_c$	1.991	1.175	4.417	2.033	0.103
SD $Y_c$	2.491	2.249	3.197	1.970	1.308
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Target coethnic	0.026 (0.057)	0.192** (0.059)	0.015 (0.056)	0.088 (0.057)	0.107+ (0.058)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.006+ (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.160+ (0.084)	-0.271*** (0.077)	-0.153+ (0.081)	-0.253** (0.080)	-0.254** (0.081)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.041 (0.129)	-0.072 (0.118)	0.009 (0.114)	-0.015 (0.117)	0.000 (0.120)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.044 (0.084)	-0.072 (0.081)	0.113 (0.082)	0.041 (0.081)	0.035 (0.083)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.009 (0.090)	-0.010 (0.088)	-0.007 (0.089)	-0.009 (0.087)	-0.007 (0.089)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.241** (0.085)	0.268** (0.082)	0.391*** (0.081)	0.404*** (0.082)	0.380*** (0.083)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.168 (0.115)	0.177 (0.118)	0.015 (0.112)	0.162 (0.113)	0.156 (0.115)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.032 (0.176)	0.058 (0.176)	0.132 (0.155)	0.109 (0.162)	0.086 (0.167)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.157 (0.115)	0.021 (0.122)	0.049 (0.114)	-0.043 (0.115)	-0.037 (0.118)
Target coethnic × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.033 (0.125)	-0.098 (0.128)	-0.057 (0.123)	-0.076 (0.121)	-0.075 (0.124)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.030 (0.115)	-0.022 (0.119)	-0.173 (0.112)	-0.083 (0.114)	-0.062 (0.116)
Num.Obs.	1203	1204	1201	1212	1188
R2	0.026	0.037	0.040	0.047	0.045
R2 Adj.	0.015	0.026	0.029	0.037	0.034
Mean $Y_c$	1.991	1.175	4.417	2.033	0.103
SD $Y_c$	2.491	2.249	3.197	1.970	1.308
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Target coethnic	0.015 (0.026)	0.130*** (0.028)	0.035* (0.015)		
Num.Obs.	1203	1204	1201		
R2	0.000	0.017	0.005		
R2 Adj.	-0.001	0.016	0.004		
Mean $Y_c$	0.693	0.351	0.915		
SD $Y_c$	0.462	0.478	0.279		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.8: Effects of coethnic targeting versus copartisan targeting, President

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Appeal	Funds	Schools	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Target coethnic	0.148*	0.062	0.246***	0.190**	0.186**
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.061)
Num.Obs.	1173	1180	1175	1189	1158
R2	0.005	0.001	0.015	0.008	0.008
R2 Adj.	0.004	0.000	0.014	0.008	0.007
Mean $Y_c$	4.785	3.594	3.315	3.731	0.218
SD $Y_c$	3.579	3.297	3.158	2.708	1.363
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Target coethnic	0.162**	0.083	0.259***	0.211***	0.207***
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.004	-0.000	0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.022	-0.038	-0.103	-0.062	-0.077
	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.087)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.127	-0.087	0.077	0.070	0.018
	(0.125)	(0.130)	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.127)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.007	0.174*	-0.048	0.044	0.072
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.023	0.083	0.060	0.050	0.042
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.459***	0.454***	0.384***	0.522***	0.544***
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.083)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.003	0.006	-0.002	0.000	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.078	-0.142	-0.036	-0.107	-0.097
	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.011	-0.075	-0.205	-0.129	-0.104
	(0.166)	(0.175)	(0.167)	(0.169)	(0.173)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.033	-0.116	0.060	-0.018	-0.069
	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.118)
Target coethnic × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.107	-0.112	-0.142	-0.142	-0.157
	(0.126)	(0.128)	(0.124)	(0.127)	(0.128)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.089	0.011	0.016	0.057	0.044
	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.117)
Num.Obs.	1173	1180	1175	1189	1158
R2	0.080	0.063	0.058	0.086	0.090
R2 Adj.	0.069	0.053	0.047	0.075	0.079
Mean $Y_c$	4.785	3.594	3.315	3.731	0.218
SD $Y_c$	3.579	3.297	3.158	2.708	1.363
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Target coethnic	0.026	0.016	0.108***		
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.021)		
Num.Obs.	1173	1180	1175		
R2	0.002	0.000	0.022		
R2 Adj.	0.001	0.000	0.021		
Mean $Y_c$	0.871	0.793	0.783		
SD $Y_c$	0.335	0.406	0.412		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.9: Effects of coethnic targeting versus copartisan targeting, Bureaucrat

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Connect	Contract	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>				
Target coethnic	-0.134*	0.024	-0.061	-0.062
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Num.Obs.	1180	1180	1185	1175
R2	0.005	0.000	0.001	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.004	-0.001	0.000	0.000
Mean $Y_c$	2.898	3.359	3.147	0.138
SD $Y_c$	2.959	2.822	2.605	1.293
<i>(B): Covariates</i>				
Target coethnic	-0.131*	0.027	-0.059	-0.059
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.119	0.131	0.006	0.003
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.083)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.047	0.046	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.130)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.125)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.097	0.065	0.092	0.090
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.085)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.094	-0.028	-0.071	-0.064
	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.326***	0.257**	0.322***	0.326***
	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.001	-0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.009	-0.186	-0.100	-0.095
	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.039	0.135	0.044	0.061
	(0.166)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.163)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.016	0.132	0.071	0.090
	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.117)
Target coethnic × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.200	0.074	0.147	0.157
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.126)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.014	-0.076	-0.044	-0.026
	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Num.Obs.	1180	1180	1185	1175
R2	0.046	0.023	0.032	0.035
R2 Adj.	0.036	0.012	0.021	0.024
Mean $Y_c$	2.898	3.359	3.147	0.138
SD $Y_c$	2.959	2.822	2.605	1.293
<i>(C): Binary outcome (<math>y &gt; 0</math>)</i>				
Target coethnic	-0.126***	0.018		
	(0.027)	(0.018)		
Num.Obs.	1180	1180		
R2	0.019	0.001		
R2 Adj.	0.018	0.000		
Mean $Y_c$	0.758	0.883		
SD $Y_c$	0.429	0.321		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.10: Effects of coethnic targeting versus copartisan targeting, Judge

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Rig	Steal	Give job	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Target coethnic	0.011 (0.058)	0.002 (0.057)	0.055 (0.058)	0.032 (0.059)	0.024 (0.059)
Num.Obs.	1192	1193	1189	1196	1184
R2	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000
R2 Adj.	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
Mean $Y_c$	4.560	4.254	4.035	4.228	-0.040
SD $Y_c$	3.208	2.941	2.952	2.388	1.371
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Target coethnic	0.002 (0.057)	-0.012 (0.057)	0.054 (0.058)	0.021 (0.058)	0.014 (0.058)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.006+ (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)	0.010** (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.179* (0.080)	-0.131 (0.080)	-0.038 (0.081)	-0.144+ (0.080)	-0.152+ (0.081)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.213+ (0.114)	-0.098 (0.114)	0.024 (0.107)	-0.122 (0.108)	-0.110 (0.110)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.002 (0.082)	0.048 (0.082)	0.097 (0.083)	0.076 (0.082)	0.048 (0.082)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.060 (0.089)	-0.102 (0.086)	-0.171* (0.087)	-0.142+ (0.085)	-0.136 (0.086)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.086 (0.079)	0.167* (0.079)	0.019 (0.080)	0.114 (0.078)	0.113 (0.079)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.125 (0.116)	0.029 (0.116)	-0.015 (0.118)	0.053 (0.118)	0.069 (0.118)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.353* (0.164)	0.098 (0.164)	0.102 (0.160)	0.230 (0.164)	0.227 (0.165)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.077 (0.118)	0.083 (0.117)	-0.107 (0.119)	0.006 (0.120)	0.037 (0.120)
Target coethnic × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.238+ (0.127)	0.254* (0.123)	0.183 (0.129)	0.280* (0.127)	0.284* (0.127)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.278* (0.115)	-0.197+ (0.114)	0.216+ (0.116)	0.125 (0.116)	0.114 (0.116)
Num.Obs.	1192	1193	1189	1196	1184
R2	0.034	0.029	0.016	0.026	0.027
R2 Adj.	0.023	0.019	0.005	0.016	0.016
Mean $Y_c$	4.560	4.254	4.035	4.228	-0.040
SD $Y_c$	3.208	2.941	2.952	2.388	1.371
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Target coethnic	-0.011 (0.017)	0.010 (0.015)	0.004 (0.013)		
Num.Obs.	1192	1193	1189		
R2	0.000	0.000	0.000		
R2 Adj.	0.000	0.000	-0.001		
Mean $Y_c$	0.916	0.926	0.946		
SD $Y_c$	0.277	0.262	0.226		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.11: Effects of coethnic targeting versus copartisan targeting, Police officer

	(1)
	Traffic
<i>(A): Base</i>	
Target coethnic	0.045 (0.059)
Num.Obs.	1185
R2	0.000
R2 Adj.	0.000
Mean $Y_c$	3.752
SD $Y_c$	2.787
<i>(B): Covariates</i>	
Target coethnic	0.044 (0.059)
Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.001 (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.050 (0.082)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.010 (0.117)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.098 (0.083)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.101 (0.086)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.109 (0.082)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.003 (0.005)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.044 (0.119)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.008 (0.170)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.043 (0.122)
Target coethnic × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.095 (0.130)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.079 (0.119)
Num.Obs.	1185
R2	0.012
R2 Adj.	0.001
Mean $Y_c$	3.752
SD $Y_c$	2.787
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>	
Target coethnic	-0.010 (0.010)
Num.Obs.	1185
R2	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.000
Mean $Y_c$	0.974
SD $Y_c$	0.160

*Notes* All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.12: Effects of coethnic targeting versus copartisan targeting, Shopkeeper

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Appeal	Contract	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>				
Target coethnic	0.113+	-0.014	0.052	0.053
	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Num.Obs.	1174	1174	1182	1166
R2	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.002	-0.001	0.000	0.000
Mean $Y_c$	3.692	3.344	3.409	0.003
SD $Y_c$	3.180	2.615	2.520	1.240
<i>(B): Covariates</i>				
Target coethnic	0.111+	-0.016	0.051	0.051
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.003	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.101	0.119	0.122	0.125
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.081)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.160	0.105	0.139	0.155
	(0.109)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.019	0.120	0.052	0.066
	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.029	-0.123	-0.096	-0.078
	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.086)
Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.187*	0.053	0.130	0.134+
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.005	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.019	-0.076	-0.063	-0.044
	(0.120)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.042	-0.037	0.012	-0.013
	(0.164)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.167)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.143	-0.030	0.063	0.058
	(0.120)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.120)
Target coethnic × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.045	0.023	-0.006	-0.016
	(0.129)	(0.122)	(0.126)	(0.127)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP <sub>c</sub>	0.186	0.098	0.161	0.152
	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.118)
Num.Obs.	1174	1174	1182	1166
R2	0.035	0.016	0.025	0.026
R2 Adj.	0.024	0.005	0.014	0.015
Mean $Y_c$	3.692	3.344	3.409	0.003
SD $Y_c$	3.180	2.615	2.520	1.240
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>				
Target coethnic	0.005	0.006		
	(0.021)	(0.016)		
Num.Obs.	1174	1174		
R2	0.000	0.000		
R2 Adj.	-0.001	-0.001		
Mean $Y_c$	0.843	0.918		
SD $Y_c$	0.364	0.275		

*Notes*

All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. † < 0.1, \* < 0.05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001

### **D.3 Unshared versus Shared Identity**

Table D.13: Effects of unshared ethnopartisanship, MP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Handout	Transport	CDF	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Unshared EP	0.280*** (0.053)	0.229*** (0.052)	0.199*** (0.050)	0.308*** (0.051)	0.300*** (0.051)
Num.Obs.	1784	1787	1781	1795	1766
R2	0.016	0.011	0.009	0.020	0.019
R2 Adj.	0.015	0.010	0.008	0.020	0.019
Mean $Y_c$	1.695	1.071	3.186	1.661	-0.187
SD $Y_c$	2.182	2.096	3.141	1.813	1.213
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Unshared EP	0.281*** (0.053)	0.230*** (0.052)	0.232*** (0.045)	0.328*** (0.049)	0.313*** (0.050)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.005+ (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005+ (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.061 (0.067)	-0.042 (0.068)	-0.090 (0.062)	-0.040 (0.065)	-0.027 (0.067)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.103 (0.101)	0.053 (0.095)	0.070 (0.096)	0.097 (0.096)	0.096 (0.098)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.039 (0.068)	0.003 (0.067)	0.099 (0.062)	0.033 (0.065)	0.031 (0.067)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.064 (0.074)	-0.001 (0.072)	-0.074 (0.068)	-0.067 (0.070)	-0.062 (0.071)
(Target2) <sub>c</sub>	0.042 (0.082)	-0.036 (0.077)	0.776*** (0.073)	0.429*** (0.078)	0.318*** (0.079)
(Target3) <sub>c</sub>	0.049 (0.083)	0.181* (0.086)	0.879*** (0.074)	0.564*** (0.080)	0.460*** (0.082)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.002 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.216* (0.106)	-0.268* (0.104)	-0.112 (0.091)	-0.247* (0.097)	-0.260** (0.099)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.170 (0.161)	-0.218 (0.152)	-0.089 (0.128)	-0.200 (0.140)	-0.211 (0.145)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.052 (0.107)	0.042 (0.105)	0.067 (0.090)	0.076 (0.098)	0.067 (0.100)
Unshared EP × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.101 (0.116)	-0.021 (0.113)	0.072 (0.099)	0.066 (0.104)	0.067 (0.107)
Unshared EP × (Target2) <sub>c</sub>	0.012 (0.133)	0.155 (0.124)	0.325** (0.109)	0.247* (0.119)	0.210+ (0.121)
Unshared EP × (Target3) <sub>c</sub>	0.061 (0.127)	0.148 (0.128)	0.150 (0.106)	0.164 (0.117)	0.159 (0.120)
Num.Obs.	1784	1787	1781	1795	1766
R2	0.025	0.035	0.200	0.105	0.081
R2 Adj.	0.017	0.027	0.193	0.098	0.074
Mean $Y_c$	1.695	1.071	3.186	1.661	-0.187
SD $Y_c$	2.182	2.096	3.141	1.813	1.213
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Unshared EP	0.087*** (0.022)	0.081*** (0.023)	0.008 (0.021)		
Num.Obs.	1784	1787	1781		
R2	0.009	0.007	0.000		
R2 Adj.	0.008	0.006	0.000		
Mean $Y_c$	0.651	0.351	0.742		
SD $Y_c$	0.477	0.478	0.438		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.14: Effects of unshared ethnopartisanship, President

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Appeal	Funds	Schools	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Unshared EP	0.459*** (0.050)	0.387*** (0.052)	0.337*** (0.052)	0.490*** (0.051)	0.492*** (0.052)
Num.Obs.	1764	1774	1771	1787	1747
R2	0.045	0.031	0.023	0.049	0.049
R2 Adj.	0.045	0.030	0.023	0.048	0.049
Mean $Y_c$	3.533	2.673	2.293	2.701	-0.324
SD $Y_c$	3.454	3.072	2.887	2.522	1.278
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Unshared EP	0.448*** (0.048)	0.383*** (0.051)	0.317*** (0.046)	0.476*** (0.048)	0.479*** (0.048)
Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.001 (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.145* (0.068)	0.097 (0.069)	0.010 (0.065)	0.111+ (0.066)	0.101 (0.067)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.163+ (0.096)	-0.014 (0.095)	-0.016 (0.096)	0.069 (0.091)	0.050 (0.093)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.141* (0.066)	0.049 (0.068)	0.011 (0.063)	0.089 (0.065)	0.083 (0.065)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.153* (0.071)	-0.053 (0.073)	-0.011 (0.066)	-0.088 (0.069)	-0.099 (0.070)
(Target2) <sub>c</sub>	0.426*** (0.081)	0.183* (0.084)	0.640*** (0.075)	0.512*** (0.079)	0.509*** (0.080)
(Target3) <sub>c</sub>	0.553*** (0.077)	0.267*** (0.080)	0.916*** (0.072)	0.703*** (0.074)	0.710*** (0.075)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.003 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.275** (0.098)	-0.225* (0.103)	-0.223* (0.095)	-0.302** (0.097)	-0.296** (0.098)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.011 (0.137)	-0.112 (0.145)	-0.045 (0.138)	-0.047 (0.136)	-0.097 (0.138)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.211* (0.097)	0.009 (0.103)	-0.160+ (0.094)	-0.151 (0.096)	-0.148 (0.097)
Unshared EP × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.189+ (0.105)	0.181 (0.111)	0.001 (0.100)	0.158 (0.105)	0.150 (0.106)
Unshared EP × (Target2) <sub>c</sub>	0.210+ (0.118)	0.332** (0.125)	0.345** (0.110)	0.342** (0.115)	0.379** (0.115)
Unshared EP × (Target3) <sub>c</sub>	0.296* (0.116)	0.333** (0.124)	0.349** (0.107)	0.394*** (0.114)	0.413*** (0.115)
Num.Obs.	1764	1774	1771	1787	1747
R2	0.139	0.078	0.213	0.184	0.189
R2 Adj.	0.131	0.070	0.206	0.177	0.182
Mean $Y_c$	3.533	2.673	2.293	2.701	-0.324
SD $Y_c$	3.454	3.072	2.887	2.522	1.278
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Unshared EP	0.079*** (0.019)	0.074*** (0.022)	0.076*** (0.023)		
Num.Obs.	1764	1774	1771		
R2	0.010	0.007	0.006		
R2 Adj.	0.009	0.006	0.006		
Mean $Y_c$	0.757	0.671	0.604		
SD $Y_c$	0.429	0.470	0.489		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.15: Effects of unshared ethnopartisanship, Bureaucrat

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Connect	Contract	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>				
Unshared EP	0.363*** (0.053)	0.247*** (0.050)	0.334*** (0.052)	0.352*** (0.052)
Num.Obs.	1777	1770	1784	1763
R2	0.026	0.013	0.023	0.025
R2 Adj.	0.025	0.013	0.022	0.024
Mean $Y_c$	1.935	2.920	2.474	-0.210
SD $Y_c$	2.556	2.591	2.270	1.119
<i>(B): Covariates</i>				
Unshared EP	0.360*** (0.052)	0.246*** (0.050)	0.332*** (0.051)	0.349*** (0.052)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.004 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.084 (0.067)	0.037 (0.067)	-0.022 (0.067)	-0.023 (0.067)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.020 (0.090)	0.333*** (0.085)	0.197* (0.086)	0.192* (0.088)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.004 (0.067)	0.099 (0.068)	0.060 (0.067)	0.064 (0.068)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.085 (0.074)	0.005 (0.071)	-0.039 (0.072)	-0.045 (0.072)
(Target2) <sub>c</sub>	0.380*** (0.079)	0.163* (0.078)	0.297*** (0.079)	0.304*** (0.079)
(Target3) <sub>c</sub>	0.215** (0.079)	0.237** (0.081)	0.267*** (0.079)	0.249** (0.080)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.114 (0.105)	-0.008 (0.102)	-0.048 (0.104)	-0.081 (0.105)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.124 (0.154)	-0.485*** (0.138)	-0.370* (0.146)	-0.358* (0.149)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.045 (0.105)	0.029 (0.101)	0.050 (0.104)	0.035 (0.105)
Unshared EP × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.229* (0.114)	-0.052 (0.107)	0.067 (0.111)	0.112 (0.112)
Unshared EP × (Target2) <sub>c</sub>	0.066 (0.128)	0.005 (0.122)	0.033 (0.125)	0.042 (0.127)
Unshared EP × (Target3) <sub>c</sub>	0.085 (0.124)	-0.087 (0.120)	-0.025 (0.121)	0.010 (0.122)
Num.Obs.	1777	1770	1784	1763
R2	0.061	0.033	0.047	0.051
R2 Adj.	0.053	0.025	0.039	0.043
Mean $Y_c$	1.935	2.920	2.474	-0.210
SD $Y_c$	2.556	2.591	2.270	1.119
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>				
Unshared EP	0.094*** (0.023)	0.012 (0.014)		
Num.Obs.	1777	1770		
R2	0.010	0.000		
R2 Adj.	0.009	0.000		
Mean $Y_c$	0.590	0.895		
SD $Y_c$	0.492	0.306		

*Notes*

All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.16: Effects of unshared ethnopartisanship, Judge

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Rig	Steal	Give job	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Unshared EP	0.180*** (0.048)	0.073 (0.049)	0.100* (0.049)	0.149** (0.048)	0.142** (0.049)
Num.Obs.	1782	1782	1779	1788	1771
R2	0.008	0.001	0.002	0.005	0.005
R2 Adj.	0.007	0.001	0.002	0.005	0.004
Mean $Y_c$	4.440	4.146	4.011	4.152	-0.091
SD $Y_c$	3.181	2.822	2.838	2.354	1.358
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Unshared EP	0.182*** (0.048)	0.067 (0.049)	0.097* (0.049)	0.147** (0.048)	0.138** (0.048)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.004 (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.007* (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.076 (0.067)	-0.097 (0.067)	-0.001 (0.067)	-0.070 (0.067)	-0.075 (0.068)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.121 (0.096)	0.055 (0.094)	0.104 (0.091)	0.108 (0.094)	0.130 (0.094)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.049 (0.068)	0.040 (0.068)	0.107 (0.068)	0.085 (0.068)	0.075 (0.068)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.033 (0.072)	0.015 (0.071)	-0.151* (0.073)	-0.048 (0.070)	-0.032 (0.071)
(Target2) <sub>c</sub>	-0.141+ (0.082)	-0.061 (0.079)	-0.070 (0.080)	-0.116 (0.080)	-0.106 (0.080)
(Target3) <sub>c</sub>	-0.270*** (0.080)	0.036 (0.081)	-0.126 (0.080)	-0.155+ (0.081)	-0.141+ (0.081)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.077 (0.097)	-0.046 (0.098)	-0.088 (0.101)	-0.091 (0.097)	-0.087 (0.098)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.285* (0.137)	-0.091 (0.142)	-0.051 (0.140)	-0.176 (0.137)	-0.192 (0.139)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.001 (0.098)	0.025 (0.100)	-0.147 (0.101)	-0.052 (0.099)	-0.043 (0.099)
Unshared EP × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.066 (0.105)	0.114 (0.105)	0.119 (0.108)	0.132 (0.103)	0.113 (0.104)
Unshared EP × (Target2) <sub>c</sub>	-0.003 (0.116)	0.144 (0.118)	0.001 (0.119)	0.055 (0.116)	0.059 (0.117)
Unshared EP × (Target3) <sub>c</sub>	0.269* (0.120)	-0.074 (0.120)	0.225+ (0.123)	0.179 (0.121)	0.162 (0.122)
Num.Obs.	1782	1782	1779	1788	1771
R2	0.027	0.022	0.014	0.021	0.020
R2 Adj.	0.019	0.014	0.005	0.012	0.012
Mean $Y_c$	4.440	4.146	4.011	4.152	-0.091
SD $Y_c$	3.181	2.822	2.838	2.354	1.358
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Unshared EP	0.002 (0.013)	0.009 (0.012)	0.015 (0.010)		
Num.Obs.	1782	1782	1779		
R2	0.000	0.000	0.001		
R2 Adj.	-0.001	0.000	0.001		
Mean $Y_c$	0.916	0.924	0.943		
SD $Y_c$	0.277	0.265	0.231		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.17: Effects of unshared ethnopartisanship, Police officer

	(1)
	Traffic
<i>(A): Base</i>	
Unshared EP	0.153** (0.047)
Num.Obs.	1782
R2	0.006
R2 Adj.	0.005
Mean $Y_c$	3.480
SD $Y_c$	2.782
<i>(B): Covariates</i>	
Unshared EP	0.164*** (0.047)
Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.002 (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.025 (0.067)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.112 (0.098)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.035 (0.068)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.038 (0.072)
(Target2) <sub>c</sub>	0.161* (0.079)
(Target3) <sub>c</sub>	0.175* (0.081)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.002 (0.004)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.165+ (0.095)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.351** (0.136)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.058 (0.097)
Unshared EP × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.059 (0.102)
Unshared EP × (Target2) <sub>c</sub>	-0.099 (0.113)
Unshared EP × (Target3) <sub>c</sub>	-0.035 (0.116)
Num.Obs.	1782
R2	0.023
R2 Adj.	0.015
Mean $Y_c$	3.480
SD $Y_c$	2.782
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>	
Unshared EP	0.003 (0.008)
Num.Obs.	1782
R2	0.000
R2 Adj.	0.000
Mean $Y_c$	0.969
SD $Y_c$	0.174

*Notes* All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.18: Effects of unshared ethnopartisanship, Shopkeeper

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Appeal	Contract	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>				
Unshared EP	0.222*** (0.048)	0.096* (0.049)	0.181*** (0.048)	0.174*** (0.049)
Num.Obs.	1775	1773	1783	1765
R2	0.012	0.002	0.008	0.007
R2 Adj.	0.011	0.002	0.007	0.007
Mean $Y_c$	3.373	3.172	3.211	-0.113
SD $Y_c$	3.184	2.545	2.485	1.238
<i>(B): Covariates</i>				
Unshared EP	0.223*** (0.048)	0.099* (0.049)	0.184*** (0.048)	0.176*** (0.048)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.003 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.005+ (0.003)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.048 (0.069)	0.024 (0.068)	0.037 (0.069)	0.043 (0.069)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.129 (0.095)	0.157+ (0.094)	0.153 (0.094)	0.164+ (0.096)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.050 (0.068)	0.084 (0.068)	0.067 (0.068)	0.081 (0.068)
Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	-0.109 (0.073)	-0.100 (0.073)	-0.121+ (0.073)	-0.111 (0.073)
(Target2) <sub>c</sub>	0.029 (0.082)	0.063 (0.083)	0.047 (0.082)	0.055 (0.082)
(Target3) <sub>c</sub>	0.045 (0.084)	-0.013 (0.081)	0.012 (0.083)	0.024 (0.083)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.007+ (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.053 (0.098)	-0.015 (0.099)	-0.034 (0.098)	-0.041 (0.098)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.105 (0.136)	-0.194 (0.137)	-0.162 (0.136)	-0.171 (0.137)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.029 (0.099)	0.010 (0.100)	0.029 (0.099)	0.014 (0.099)
Unshared EP × Luo/NASA <sub>c</sub>	0.094 (0.105)	-0.035 (0.106)	0.036 (0.105)	0.030 (0.106)
Unshared EP × (Target2) <sub>c</sub>	0.069 (0.116)	-0.045 (0.120)	0.011 (0.117)	0.018 (0.117)
Unshared EP × (Target3) <sub>c</sub>	0.263* (0.121)	0.080 (0.121)	0.193 (0.120)	0.189 (0.121)
Num.Obs.	1775	1773	1783	1765
R2	0.027	0.014	0.022	0.022
R2 Adj.	0.018	0.005	0.013	0.013
Mean $Y_c$	3.373	3.172	3.211	-0.113
SD $Y_c$	3.184	2.545	2.485	1.238
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>				
Unshared EP	0.069*** (0.018)	0.009 (0.013)		
Num.Obs.	1775	1773		
R2	0.008	0.000		
R2 Adj.	0.008	0.000		
Mean $Y_c$	0.796	0.914		
SD $Y_c$	0.403	0.281		

*Notes*

All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + < 0.1, \* < 0.05, \*\* < 0.01, \*\*\* < 0.001

## **D.4 Interaction of Any Group Targeting and Unshared Identity**

Table D.19: Interactive effects of group targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, MP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Handout	Transport	CDF	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Any target	0.048 (0.073)	0.076 (0.073)	1.026*** (0.077)	0.351*** (0.062)	0.504*** (0.090)
Unshared EP	0.269** (0.093)	0.135 (0.088)	0.098 (0.088)	0.194** (0.074)	0.255* (0.107)
Any target × Unshared EP	0.025 (0.113)	0.153 (0.110)	0.280* (0.114)	0.154+ (0.093)	0.226+ (0.134)
Num.Obs.	1784	1787	1781	1795	1766
R2	0.016	0.016	0.186	0.065	0.064
R2 Adj.	0.015	0.014	0.185	0.063	0.062
Mean $Y_c$	1.625	0.964	1.389	1.291	-0.513
SD $Y_c$	2.154	2.059	2.533	1.737	1.139
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Any target	0.048 (0.073)	0.078 (0.072)	1.026*** (0.077)	0.352*** (0.062)	0.506*** (0.090)
Unshared EP	0.259** (0.093)	0.126 (0.087)	0.080 (0.087)	0.183* (0.074)	0.236* (0.106)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)	0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.121 (0.122)	-0.039 (0.122)	-0.177 (0.123)	-0.017 (0.103)	-0.034 (0.149)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.046 (0.156)	-0.119 (0.137)	-0.144 (0.186)	-0.061 (0.131)	-0.124 (0.192)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.061 (0.126)	0.217+ (0.118)	0.154 (0.116)	0.152 (0.100)	0.224 (0.145)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.122 (0.138)	0.044 (0.123)	-0.050 (0.133)	-0.047 (0.107)	-0.069 (0.155)
Any target × Unshared EP	0.039 (0.114)	0.163 (0.110)	0.302** (0.112)	0.169+ (0.093)	0.249+ (0.133)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.007)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.095 (0.147)	-0.004 (0.148)	0.101 (0.157)	-0.011 (0.126)	-0.004 (0.183)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.082 (0.205)	0.244 (0.188)	0.338 (0.239)	0.215 (0.172)	0.362 (0.251)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.147 (0.150)	-0.295* (0.145)	-0.031 (0.152)	-0.188 (0.124)	-0.254 (0.179)
Any target × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.087 (0.164)	-0.067 (0.153)	-0.064 (0.171)	-0.012 (0.133)	-0.019 (0.192)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.008 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	0.010 (0.008)	0.008 (0.005)	0.012 (0.008)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.179 (0.190)	-0.206 (0.177)	0.043 (0.182)	-0.148 (0.148)	-0.170 (0.213)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.295 (0.290)	0.010 (0.258)	-0.032 (0.260)	-0.118 (0.226)	-0.199 (0.325)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.039 (0.191)	-0.002 (0.171)	-0.024 (0.171)	-0.021 (0.144)	-0.032 (0.207)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.141 (0.212)	0.103 (0.193)	-0.023 (0.196)	0.090 (0.163)	0.117 (0.233)
Any target × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.019+ (0.010)	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.020+ (0.011)
Any target × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.049 (0.231)	-0.112 (0.223)	-0.268 (0.232)	-0.128 (0.186)	-0.247 (0.267)
Any target × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.170 (0.352)	-0.324 (0.324)	-0.151 (0.328)	-0.122 (0.276)	-0.126 (0.399)
Any target × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.127 (0.232)	0.024 (0.220)	0.148 (0.224)	0.106 (0.184)	0.143 (0.264)
Any target × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.067 (0.256)	-0.193 (0.240)	0.164 (0.250)	-0.056 (0.201)	-0.056 (0.289)
Num.Obs.	1784	1787	1781	1795	1766
R2	0.027	0.035	0.205	0.084	0.085
R2 Adj.	0.015	0.022	0.195	0.072	0.073
Mean $Y_c$	1.625	0.964	1.389	1.291	-0.513
SD $Y_c$	2.154	2.059	2.533	1.737	1.139
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Any target	0.022 (0.035)	0.064+ (0.034)	0.573*** (0.031)		
Unshared EP	0.085* (0.039)	0.056 (0.039)	0.022 (0.040)		
Any target × Unshared EP	0.004 (0.047)	0.042 (0.048)	0.008 (0.042)		
Num.Obs.	1784	1787	1781		
R2	0.010	0.014	0.386		
R2 Adj.	0.008	0.012	0.385		
Mean $Y_c$	0.635	0.307	0.345		
SD $Y_c$	0.482	0.462	0.476		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.20: Interactive effects of group targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, President

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Appeal	Funds	Schools	ICW	PCI
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Any target	0.543*** (0.075)	0.237*** (0.071)	1.150*** (0.085)	0.420*** (0.067)	0.883*** (0.091)
Unshared EP	0.311*** (0.090)	0.168+ (0.089)	0.153+ (0.091)	0.255** (0.083)	0.325** (0.106)
Any target × Unshared EP	0.274* (0.112)	0.313** (0.108)	0.449*** (0.129)	0.320** (0.103)	0.522*** (0.138)
Num.Obs.	1764	1774	1771	1787	1747
R2	0.120	0.063	0.194	0.115	0.172
R2 Adj.	0.119	0.062	0.192	0.114	0.171
Mean $Y_c$	2.433	2.199	0.805	1.633	-0.839
SD $Y_c$	3.106	3.074	1.991	1.988	1.035
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Any target	0.549*** (0.074)	0.226** (0.070)	1.141*** (0.086)	0.417*** (0.066)	0.876*** (0.091)
Unshared EP	0.320*** (0.090)	0.160+ (0.087)	0.105 (0.087)	0.256** (0.082)	0.305** (0.103)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.006 (0.005)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.014* (0.007)	0.014** (0.004)	0.020** (0.006)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.229* (0.116)	0.292** (0.112)	0.054 (0.119)	0.283** (0.103)	0.324* (0.131)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.290+ (0.165)	0.137 (0.138)	-0.115 (0.210)	0.232+ (0.126)	0.182 (0.176)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.189 (0.115)	-0.135 (0.114)	-0.059 (0.112)	0.002 (0.106)	-0.008 (0.133)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.095 (0.119)	0.043 (0.121)	0.124 (0.109)	-0.006 (0.109)	0.023 (0.137)
Any target × Unshared EP	0.261* (0.111)	0.329** (0.107)	0.503*** (0.127)	0.322** (0.102)	0.551*** (0.136)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.012+ (0.006)	-0.015* (0.006)	-0.015+ (0.009)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.021** (0.008)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.099 (0.152)	-0.289* (0.142)	-0.052 (0.178)	-0.216 (0.135)	-0.267 (0.185)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.155 (0.214)	-0.202 (0.186)	0.153 (0.278)	-0.214 (0.174)	-0.140 (0.251)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.065 (0.150)	0.270+ (0.142)	0.101 (0.171)	0.142 (0.135)	0.171 (0.182)
Any target × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.115 (0.157)	-0.148 (0.152)	-0.233 (0.173)	-0.150 (0.142)	-0.256 (0.190)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.016* (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.009)	0.009 (0.007)	0.007 (0.010)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.146 (0.181)	-0.247 (0.177)	-0.279 (0.185)	-0.220 (0.165)	-0.337 (0.209)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.078 (0.251)	-0.112 (0.231)	0.078 (0.288)	-0.114 (0.217)	-0.077 (0.289)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.048 (0.181)	0.158 (0.177)	-0.368* (0.178)	0.078 (0.166)	-0.082 (0.209)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.194 (0.197)	0.072 (0.192)	-0.258 (0.191)	0.129 (0.182)	0.035 (0.232)
Any target × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.017+ (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.005 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.012)
Any target × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.248 (0.226)	0.027 (0.217)	-0.086 (0.263)	-0.115 (0.206)	-0.136 (0.278)
Any target × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.126 (0.315)	-0.011 (0.295)	-0.238 (0.393)	0.095 (0.279)	-0.095 (0.388)
Any target × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.255 (0.225)	-0.207 (0.217)	0.184 (0.258)	-0.247 (0.206)	-0.175 (0.275)
Any target × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.033 (0.245)	0.169 (0.235)	0.409 (0.273)	0.130 (0.226)	0.283 (0.302)
Num.Obs.	1764	1774	1771	1787	1747
R2	0.147	0.091	0.208	0.141	0.195
R2 Adj.	0.135	0.079	0.197	0.130	0.184
Mean $Y_c$	2.433	2.199	0.805	1.633	-0.839
SD $Y_c$	3.106	3.074	1.991	1.988	1.035
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Any target	0.230*** (0.032)	0.222*** (0.034)	0.559*** (0.030)		
Unshared EP	0.033 (0.040)	-0.003 (0.041)	0.029 (0.036)		
Any target × Unshared EP	0.060 (0.044)	0.103* (0.047)	0.047 (0.042)		
Num.Obs.	1764	1774	1771		
R2	0.104	0.090	0.337		
R2 Adj.	0.103	0.089	0.336		
Mean $Y_c$	0.607	0.526	0.241		
SD $Y_c$	0.489	0.500	0.428		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.21: Interactive effects of group targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, Bureaucrat

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Connect	Contract	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>				
Any target	0.330*** (0.076)	0.214** (0.076)	0.321*** (0.079)	0.354*** (0.089)
Unshared EP	0.348*** (0.097)	0.302** (0.092)	0.384*** (0.097)	0.433*** (0.109)
Any target × Unshared EP	0.098 (0.123)	-0.038 (0.116)	0.016 (0.125)	0.048 (0.141)
Num.Obs.	1777	1770	1784	1763
R2	0.045	0.019	0.036	0.039
R2 Adj.	0.044	0.018	0.035	0.038
Mean $Y_c$	1.452	2.595	2.066	-0.405
SD $Y_c$	2.228	2.297	1.939	0.962
<i>(B): Covariates</i>				
Any target	0.340*** (0.076)	0.228** (0.075)	0.337*** (0.078)	0.371*** (0.088)
Unshared EP	0.358*** (0.096)	0.311*** (0.092)	0.398*** (0.097)	0.449*** (0.109)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.005 (0.006)	0.014** (0.005)	0.012* (0.005)	0.013* (0.006)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.224+ (0.116)	-0.001 (0.115)	-0.120 (0.119)	-0.142 (0.134)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.006 (0.169)	0.276* (0.137)	0.202 (0.156)	0.179 (0.184)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.243* (0.113)	-0.003 (0.116)	-0.132 (0.118)	-0.155 (0.133)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.005 (0.125)	-0.030 (0.116)	-0.011 (0.124)	-0.023 (0.140)
Any target × Unshared EP	0.083 (0.122)	-0.049 (0.116)	-0.002 (0.125)	0.030 (0.141)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.000 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.008)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.201 (0.153)	0.060 (0.152)	0.145 (0.159)	0.171 (0.178)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.028 (0.216)	0.164 (0.187)	0.074 (0.207)	0.125 (0.238)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.383* (0.151)	0.175 (0.152)	0.317* (0.158)	0.371* (0.177)
Any target × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.150 (0.167)	0.063 (0.157)	-0.043 (0.169)	-0.047 (0.190)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.010)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.080 (0.193)	-0.015 (0.186)	0.060 (0.197)	0.009 (0.222)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.188 (0.306)	-0.480+ (0.245)	-0.462 (0.290)	-0.422 (0.336)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.121 (0.192)	0.144 (0.182)	0.185 (0.193)	0.156 (0.218)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.206 (0.208)	-0.121 (0.195)	-0.007 (0.208)	0.079 (0.237)
Any target × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.016 (0.011)	0.009 (0.010)	0.013 (0.011)	0.018 (0.013)
Any target × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.319 (0.247)	0.006 (0.236)	-0.178 (0.253)	-0.178 (0.285)
Any target × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.079 (0.377)	-0.111 (0.315)	0.017 (0.365)	-0.088 (0.418)
Any target × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.114 (0.246)	-0.168 (0.233)	-0.195 (0.250)	-0.170 (0.282)
Any target × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.096 (0.266)	0.083 (0.248)	0.123 (0.269)	0.104 (0.304)
Num.Obs.	1777	1770	1784	1763
R2	0.064	0.036	0.049	0.055
R2 Adj.	0.052	0.023	0.037	0.042
Mean $Y_c$	1.452	2.595	2.066	-0.405
SD $Y_c$	2.228	2.297	1.939	0.962
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>				
Any target	0.170*** (0.035)	-0.027 (0.021)		
Unshared EP	0.103* (0.041)	0.015 (0.022)		
Any target × Unshared EP	-0.016 (0.049)	-0.003 (0.029)		
Num.Obs.	1777	1770		
R2	0.035	0.002		
R2 Adj.	0.033	0.001		
Mean $Y_c$	0.478	0.913		
SD $Y_c$	0.500	0.282		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.22: Interactive effects of group targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, Judge

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Rig	Steal	Give job	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Any target	-0.194** (0.068)	-0.009 (0.070)	-0.089 (0.069)	-0.109+ (0.057)	-0.160+ (0.096)
Unshared EP	0.095 (0.082)	0.046 (0.085)	0.035 (0.085)	0.065 (0.069)	0.101 (0.118)
Any target × Unshared EP	0.125 (0.100)	0.041 (0.104)	0.099 (0.105)	0.092 (0.084)	0.146 (0.143)
Num.Obs.	1782	1782	1779	1788	1771
R2	0.013	0.001	0.003	0.008	0.006
R2 Adj.	0.011	0.000	0.001	0.006	0.005
Mean $Y_c$	4.858	4.161	4.177	4.320	0.012
SD $Y_c$	3.279	2.810	2.842	2.360	1.366
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Any target	-0.195** (0.068)	-0.014 (0.069)	-0.097 (0.069)	-0.113* (0.057)	-0.168+ (0.096)
Unshared EP	0.099 (0.083)	0.039 (0.086)	0.029 (0.086)	0.062 (0.069)	0.098 (0.119)
Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.000 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.007)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.032 (0.115)	-0.070 (0.114)	0.056 (0.114)	0.010 (0.094)	0.009 (0.161)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.256 (0.175)	0.261 (0.179)	0.160 (0.179)	0.230 (0.144)	0.394 (0.246)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.048 (0.117)	-0.088 (0.119)	0.036 (0.119)	0.004 (0.096)	-0.002 (0.163)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.076 (0.122)	0.197 (0.124)	-0.097 (0.123)	0.056 (0.100)	0.107 (0.169)
Any target × Unshared EP	0.118 (0.100)	0.044 (0.104)	0.103 (0.105)	0.092 (0.084)	0.145 (0.144)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.006 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.005 (0.005)	0.011 (0.008)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.159 (0.140)	-0.038 (0.141)	-0.085 (0.142)	-0.100 (0.116)	-0.166 (0.198)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.185 (0.208)	-0.313 (0.211)	-0.086 (0.208)	-0.204 (0.170)	-0.311 (0.291)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.013 (0.142)	0.205 (0.146)	0.101 (0.145)	0.095 (0.118)	0.154 (0.200)
Any target × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.077 (0.150)	-0.291+ (0.152)	-0.090 (0.152)	-0.153 (0.122)	-0.251 (0.208)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.004 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.010)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.266 (0.167)	-0.100 (0.175)	-0.243 (0.176)	-0.208 (0.141)	-0.362 (0.242)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.342 (0.246)	-0.246 (0.258)	-0.107 (0.257)	-0.258 (0.205)	-0.392 (0.355)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.063 (0.170)	0.127 (0.175)	-0.079 (0.176)	0.030 (0.141)	0.078 (0.241)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.009 (0.178)	-0.093 (0.186)	-0.015 (0.184)	-0.037 (0.146)	-0.065 (0.249)
Any target × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.012)
Any target × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.272 (0.203)	0.085 (0.212)	0.207 (0.215)	0.188 (0.171)	0.341 (0.293)
Any target × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.091 (0.294)	0.224 (0.310)	0.108 (0.308)	0.165 (0.246)	0.199 (0.423)
Any target × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.074 (0.206)	-0.177 (0.214)	-0.093 (0.215)	-0.104 (0.172)	-0.203 (0.294)
Any target × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.128 (0.217)	0.317 (0.227)	0.219 (0.228)	0.230 (0.180)	0.357 (0.306)
Num.Obs.	1782	1782	1779	1788	1771
R2	0.027	0.025	0.013	0.024	0.023
R2 Adj.	0.014	0.012	0.000	0.011	0.011
Mean $Y_c$	4.858	4.161	4.177	4.320	0.012
SD $Y_c$	3.279	2.810	2.842	2.360	1.366
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Any target	-0.031+ (0.018)	-0.000 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.015)		
Unshared EP	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.022)	0.000 (0.017)		
Any target × Unshared EP	0.025 (0.027)	0.014 (0.026)	0.022 (0.021)		
Num.Obs.	1782	1782	1779		
R2	0.002	0.001	0.002		
R2 Adj.	0.000	-0.001	0.000		
Mean $Y_c$	0.937	0.924	0.956		
SD $Y_c$	0.244	0.265	0.206		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.23: Interactive effects of group targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, Police officer

	(1)
	Traffic
<i>(A): Base</i>	
Any target	0.184* (0.076)
Unshared EP	0.217* (0.086)
Any target × Unshared EP	-0.060 (0.108)
Num.Obs.	1782
R2	0.010
R2 Adj.	0.009
Mean $Y_c$	3.159
SD $Y_c$	2.522
<i>(B): Covariates</i>	
Any target	0.180* (0.076)
Unshared EP	0.236** (0.086)
Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.007 (0.005)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.019 (0.120)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.022 (0.174)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.169 (0.125)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.097 (0.133)
Any target × Unshared EP	-0.079 (0.108)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.007 (0.006)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.000 (0.151)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.144 (0.221)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.297+ (0.156)
Any target × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.068 (0.165)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.014+ (0.007)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.310+ (0.171)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.489* (0.244)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.210 (0.177)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.017 (0.182)
Any target × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.018* (0.009)
Any target × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.193 (0.216)
Any target × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.191 (0.308)
Any target × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.210 (0.221)
Any target × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.054 (0.231)
Num.Obs.	1782
R2	0.030
R2 Adj.	0.017
Mean $Y_c$	3.159
SD $Y_c$	2.522
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>	
Any target	0.012 (0.014)
Unshared EP	0.024+ (0.014)
Any target × Unshared EP	-0.032+ (0.017)
Num.Obs.	1782
R2	0.002
R2 Adj.	0.001
Mean $Y_c$	0.960
SD $Y_c$	0.196

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.24: Interactive effects of group targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, Shopkeeper

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Appeal	Contract	ICW	PCI
<i>(A): Base</i>				
Any target	0.044 (0.070)	0.034 (0.070)	0.035 (0.064)	0.060 (0.090)
Unshared EP	0.118 (0.082)	0.092 (0.085)	0.111 (0.076)	0.144 (0.106)
Any target × Unshared EP	0.148 (0.101)	0.003 (0.103)	0.077 (0.093)	0.109 (0.129)
Num.Obs.	1775	1773	1783	1765
R2	0.016	0.002	0.010	0.009
R2 Adj.	0.014	0.001	0.008	0.008
Mean $Y_c$	3.281	3.115	3.153	-0.152
SD $Y_c$	3.244	2.586	2.525	1.261
<i>(B): Covariates</i>				
Any target	0.032 (0.070)	0.020 (0.070)	0.023 (0.064)	0.043 (0.089)
Unshared EP	0.099 (0.081)	0.076 (0.084)	0.092 (0.075)	0.119 (0.105)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.010* (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.009+ (0.005)	0.013+ (0.007)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.193+ (0.116)	-0.261* (0.115)	-0.227* (0.105)	-0.322* (0.147)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.107 (0.162)	0.341* (0.162)	0.221 (0.149)	0.320 (0.210)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.042 (0.113)	-0.001 (0.116)	-0.021 (0.104)	-0.032 (0.145)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.066 (0.123)	0.026 (0.127)	-0.025 (0.115)	-0.026 (0.162)
Any target × Unshared EP	0.174+ (0.100)	0.027 (0.102)	0.103 (0.092)	0.142 (0.128)
Any target × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.010+ (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.008)
Any target × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.370** (0.143)	0.431** (0.142)	0.399** (0.130)	0.575** (0.182)
Any target × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.034 (0.197)	-0.296 (0.196)	-0.133 (0.180)	-0.178 (0.254)
Any target × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.118 (0.139)	0.117 (0.142)	0.108 (0.128)	0.180 (0.178)
Any target × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.057 (0.151)	-0.180 (0.153)	-0.123 (0.139)	-0.162 (0.196)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.019** (0.007)	-0.021** (0.007)	-0.020** (0.006)	-0.028** (0.009)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.160 (0.166)	0.283+ (0.171)	0.229 (0.153)	0.304 (0.214)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.451+ (0.235)	-0.654** (0.229)	-0.569** (0.211)	-0.765** (0.294)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.238 (0.167)	0.090 (0.174)	0.174 (0.155)	0.224 (0.215)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.041 (0.180)	-0.306 (0.191)	-0.170 (0.170)	-0.248 (0.238)
Any target × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.020* (0.008)	0.019* (0.008)	0.020* (0.008)	0.027* (0.011)
Any target × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.326 (0.204)	-0.453* (0.208)	-0.399* (0.187)	-0.542* (0.261)
Any target × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.527+ (0.285)	0.719* (0.281)	0.651* (0.257)	0.847* (0.360)
Any target × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.291 (0.205)	-0.107 (0.211)	-0.204 (0.189)	-0.283 (0.262)
Any target × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.195 (0.219)	0.389+ (0.228)	0.293 (0.204)	0.412 (0.285)
Num.Obs.	1775	1773	1783	1765
R2	0.035	0.023	0.033	0.033
R2 Adj.	0.023	0.011	0.020	0.020
Mean $Y_c$	3.281	3.115	3.153	-0.152
SD $Y_c$	3.244	2.586	2.525	1.261
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>				
Any target	0.039 (0.029)	0.003 (0.020)		
Unshared EP	0.063+ (0.032)	0.003 (0.023)		
Any target × Unshared EP	0.008 (0.039)	0.008 (0.028)		
Num.Obs.	1775	1773		
R2	0.011	0.000		
R2 Adj.	0.010	-0.001		
Mean $Y_c$	0.771	0.911		
SD $Y_c$	0.421	0.285		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

## **D.5 Interaction of Coethnic versus Copartisan Targeting and Unshared Identity**

Table D.25: Interactive effects of coethnic targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, MP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Handout	Transport	CDF	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Target coethnic	0.013 (0.082)	0.247** (0.092)	0.111 (0.082)	0.124 (0.081)	0.154+ (0.084)
Unshared EP	0.272** (0.097)	0.330** (0.103)	0.421*** (0.087)	0.450*** (0.092)	0.423*** (0.094)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.039 (0.131)	-0.025 (0.149)	-0.199+ (0.120)	-0.105 (0.125)	-0.073 (0.130)
Num.Obs.	1203	1204	1201	1212	1188
R2	0.017	0.024	0.025	0.034	0.032
R2 Adj.	0.014	0.021	0.023	0.032	0.030
Mean $Y_c$	1.713	0.889	3.819	1.690	-0.132
SD $Y_c$	2.164	1.837	3.009	1.714	1.165
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Target coethnic	0.011 (0.082)	0.248** (0.091)	0.101 (0.082)	0.119 (0.081)	0.149+ (0.084)
Unshared EP	0.265** (0.095)	0.323** (0.101)	0.414*** (0.087)	0.442*** (0.090)	0.413*** (0.091)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.008 (0.005)	0.011+ (0.006)	0.006 (0.005)	0.009+ (0.006)	0.011+ (0.006)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.015 (0.117)	-0.071 (0.116)	-0.052 (0.116)	-0.040 (0.116)	-0.035 (0.117)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.300 (0.200)	0.129 (0.188)	0.023 (0.183)	0.175 (0.191)	0.215 (0.195)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.049 (0.116)	-0.180 (0.117)	0.039 (0.116)	-0.003 (0.116)	-0.028 (0.118)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.068 (0.123)	0.074 (0.128)	-0.046 (0.127)	0.030 (0.126)	0.028 (0.128)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.045 (0.130)	-0.011 (0.148)	-0.173 (0.120)	-0.085 (0.125)	-0.052 (0.129)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.004 (0.165)	0.037 (0.189)	-0.026 (0.164)	0.003 (0.166)	-0.001 (0.173)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.319 (0.266)	0.012 (0.285)	0.256 (0.256)	0.003 (0.254)	-0.051 (0.264)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.268 (0.166)	0.162 (0.188)	0.115 (0.165)	-0.029 (0.166)	-0.009 (0.172)
Target coethnic × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.207 (0.180)	-0.164 (0.202)	-0.085 (0.182)	-0.193 (0.178)	-0.178 (0.186)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.009)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.439* (0.193)	-0.569** (0.199)	-0.216 (0.176)	-0.481** (0.181)	-0.528** (0.183)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.482+ (0.290)	-0.431 (0.290)	-0.043 (0.248)	-0.371 (0.258)	-0.416 (0.269)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.056 (0.195)	0.124 (0.207)	0.145 (0.179)	0.074 (0.183)	0.073 (0.188)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.121 (0.205)	-0.191 (0.221)	0.080 (0.192)	-0.092 (0.193)	-0.081 (0.197)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.003 (0.011)	0.010 (0.014)	0.011 (0.010)	0.008 (0.011)	0.010 (0.012)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.409 (0.263)	0.397 (0.301)	0.057 (0.243)	0.336 (0.252)	0.365 (0.262)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.653+ (0.393)	0.143 (0.435)	-0.199 (0.339)	0.245 (0.354)	0.283 (0.374)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.251 (0.265)	-0.204 (0.310)	-0.081 (0.246)	0.039 (0.254)	0.014 (0.265)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.347 (0.285)	0.120 (0.321)	0.065 (0.266)	0.264 (0.267)	0.214 (0.277)
Num.Obs.	1203	1204	1201	1212	1188
R2	0.036	0.048	0.049	0.059	0.058
R2 Adj.	0.017	0.030	0.030	0.040	0.040
Mean $Y_c$	1.713	0.889	3.819	1.690	-0.132
SD $Y_c$	2.164	1.837	3.009	1.714	1.165
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Target coethnic	-0.044 (0.038)	0.104** (0.039)	0.061** (0.022)		
Unshared EP	0.027 (0.039)	0.070+ (0.040)	0.057* (0.023)		
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.118* (0.053)	0.048 (0.056)	-0.053+ (0.029)		
Num.Obs.	1203	1204	1201		
R2	0.014	0.027	0.011		
R2 Adj.	0.011	0.025	0.009		
Mean $Y_c$	0.680	0.318	0.888		
SD $Y_c$	0.467	0.466	0.316		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.26: Interactive effects of coethnic targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, President

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Appeal	Funds	Schools	ICW	PCI
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Target coethnic	0.124 (0.084)	0.080 (0.085)	0.273** (0.086)	0.184* (0.084)	0.194* (0.085)
Unshared EP	0.480*** (0.085)	0.489*** (0.089)	0.415*** (0.090)	0.548*** (0.085)	0.569*** (0.086)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.089 (0.118)	0.002 (0.125)	0.021 (0.126)	0.060 (0.120)	0.041 (0.122)
Num.Obs.	1173	1180	1175	1189	1158
R2	0.069	0.050	0.052	0.081	0.083
R2 Adj.	0.067	0.047	0.049	0.079	0.080
Mean $Y_c$	3.884	2.797	2.668	2.989	-0.183
SD $Y_c$	3.491	3.036	2.884	2.567	1.304
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Target coethnic	0.121 (0.085)	0.086 (0.085)	0.273** (0.088)	0.185* (0.085)	0.193* (0.086)
Unshared EP	0.476*** (0.085)	0.496*** (0.089)	0.423*** (0.092)	0.552*** (0.086)	0.573*** (0.087)
Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.199 (0.136)	0.008 (0.133)	-0.061 (0.133)	0.083 (0.135)	0.049 (0.137)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.193 (0.202)	0.037 (0.201)	0.213 (0.193)	0.189 (0.200)	0.162 (0.203)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.102 (0.127)	0.269* (0.126)	0.031 (0.127)	0.154 (0.126)	0.170 (0.127)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.125 (0.143)	0.048 (0.139)	0.051 (0.137)	-0.019 (0.139)	-0.022 (0.139)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.078 (0.118)	0.008 (0.126)	0.011 (0.127)	0.055 (0.121)	0.038 (0.123)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.004 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.000 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.008)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.153 (0.180)	-0.020 (0.180)	0.094 (0.184)	-0.048 (0.181)	-0.030 (0.183)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.156 (0.252)	-0.197 (0.254)	-0.367 (0.252)	-0.296 (0.249)	-0.265 (0.255)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.042 (0.172)	-0.222 (0.172)	0.023 (0.178)	-0.047 (0.171)	-0.076 (0.173)
Target coethnic × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.125 (0.185)	-0.269 (0.185)	-0.219 (0.187)	-0.236 (0.183)	-0.249 (0.184)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.396* (0.179)	-0.083 (0.187)	-0.095 (0.189)	-0.260 (0.181)	-0.232 (0.184)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.119 (0.260)	-0.253 (0.281)	-0.235 (0.273)	-0.201 (0.266)	-0.275 (0.268)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.154 (0.174)	-0.128 (0.184)	-0.137 (0.187)	-0.179 (0.175)	-0.145 (0.177)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.171 (0.192)	0.065 (0.200)	0.030 (0.198)	0.112 (0.192)	0.107 (0.192)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.000 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.011)	0.001 (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.083 (0.245)	-0.268 (0.259)	-0.279 (0.260)	-0.164 (0.250)	-0.179 (0.254)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.330 (0.344)	0.225 (0.376)	0.249 (0.368)	0.330 (0.351)	0.293 (0.362)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.207 (0.240)	0.125 (0.257)	0.030 (0.259)	-0.022 (0.244)	-0.066 (0.248)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.075 (0.259)	0.302 (0.276)	0.126 (0.271)	0.204 (0.264)	0.194 (0.267)
Num.Obs.	1173	1180	1175	1189	1158
R2	0.093	0.072	0.064	0.099	0.102
R2 Adj.	0.075	0.054	0.046	0.081	0.083
Mean $Y_c$	3.884	2.797	2.668	2.989	-0.183
SD $Y_c$	3.491	3.036	2.884	2.567	1.304
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Target coethnic	0.056+ (0.032)	0.059 (0.037)	0.143*** (0.034)		
Unshared EP	0.121*** (0.029)	0.142*** (0.034)	0.112** (0.035)		
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	-0.051 (0.038)	-0.077 (0.047)	-0.061 (0.043)		
Num.Obs.	1173	1180	1175		
R2	0.025	0.019	0.035		
R2 Adj.	0.022	0.016	0.033		
Mean $Y_c$	0.806	0.716	0.723		
SD $Y_c$	0.396	0.452	0.449		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.27: Interactive effects of coethnic targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, Bureaucrat

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Connect	Contract	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>				
Target coethnic	-0.167* (0.084)	0.060 (0.087)	-0.046 (0.085)	-0.064 (0.085)
Unshared EP	0.368*** (0.093)	0.271** (0.091)	0.352*** (0.093)	0.360*** (0.093)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.021 (0.129)	-0.073 (0.127)	-0.041 (0.128)	-0.020 (0.129)
Num.Obs.	1180	1180	1185	1175
R2	0.033	0.012	0.023	0.026
R2 Adj.	0.030	0.009	0.020	0.023
Mean $Y_c$	2.411	3.007	2.737	-0.071
SD $Y_c$	2.632	2.595	2.331	1.156
<i>(B): Covariates</i>				
Target coethnic	-0.156+ (0.084)	0.072 (0.086)	-0.034 (0.085)	-0.053 (0.084)
Unshared EP	0.365*** (0.093)	0.287** (0.092)	0.360*** (0.093)	0.367*** (0.093)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.005 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.022 (0.117)	0.207+ (0.120)	0.112 (0.119)	0.106 (0.119)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.152 (0.178)	0.238 (0.163)	0.062 (0.169)	0.051 (0.169)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.159 (0.115)	0.135 (0.119)	0.164 (0.117)	0.164 (0.117)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.106 (0.129)	0.115 (0.133)	0.012 (0.130)	0.006 (0.129)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.018 (0.128)	-0.093 (0.127)	-0.055 (0.128)	-0.031 (0.128)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.007)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.011 (0.171)	-0.278 (0.173)	-0.166 (0.171)	-0.150 (0.170)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.222 (0.232)	0.229 (0.222)	0.227 (0.224)	0.285 (0.222)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.091 (0.168)	0.059 (0.173)	-0.022 (0.169)	-0.012 (0.169)
Target coethnic × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.025 (0.191)	-0.155 (0.187)	-0.111 (0.186)	-0.100 (0.186)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.001 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.224 (0.187)	-0.111 (0.184)	-0.179 (0.185)	-0.193 (0.185)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.200 (0.293)	-0.374 (0.265)	-0.116 (0.277)	-0.103 (0.278)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.087 (0.189)	-0.117 (0.184)	-0.113 (0.188)	-0.116 (0.188)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.015 (0.206)	-0.289 (0.201)	-0.170 (0.203)	-0.148 (0.203)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.010 (0.011)	0.014 (0.011)	0.013 (0.011)	0.013 (0.011)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.074 (0.261)	0.202 (0.257)	0.162 (0.259)	0.159 (0.260)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.593 (0.380)	-0.247 (0.354)	-0.423 (0.367)	-0.511 (0.367)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.171 (0.259)	0.139 (0.256)	0.173 (0.258)	0.176 (0.259)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.444 (0.284)	0.460+ (0.274)	0.503+ (0.279)	0.512+ (0.279)
Num.Obs.	1180	1180	1185	1175
R2	0.060	0.036	0.044	0.051
R2 Adj.	0.041	0.017	0.026	0.032
Mean $Y_c$	2.411	3.007	2.737	-0.071
SD $Y_c$	2.632	2.595	2.331	1.156
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>				
Target coethnic	-0.153*** (0.039)	0.014 (0.026)		
Unshared EP	0.062+ (0.036)	0.007 (0.027)		
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.051 (0.053)	0.008 (0.036)		
Num.Obs.	1180	1180		
R2	0.029	0.001		
R2 Adj.	0.026	-0.001		
Mean $Y_c$	0.727	0.879		
SD $Y_c$	0.446	0.326		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.28: Interactive effects of coethnic targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, Judge

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Rig	Steal	Give job	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>					
Target coethnic	-0.121 (0.077)	0.112 (0.081)	-0.051 (0.080)	-0.032 (0.080)	-0.026 (0.081)
Unshared EP	0.095 (0.078)	0.189* (0.082)	0.028 (0.081)	0.127 (0.079)	0.129 (0.080)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.270* (0.114)	-0.221+ (0.119)	0.219+ (0.119)	0.132 (0.117)	0.103 (0.118)
Num.Obs.	1192	1193	1189	1196	1184
R2	0.017	0.005	0.008	0.010	0.008
R2 Adj.	0.015	0.002	0.005	0.007	0.006
Mean $Y_c$	4.407	3.987	3.994	4.074	-0.129
SD $Y_c$	3.252	2.832	2.898	2.364	1.370
<i>(B): Covariates</i>					
Target coethnic	-0.129+ (0.078)	0.087 (0.080)	-0.057 (0.080)	-0.049 (0.080)	-0.042 (0.080)
Unshared EP	0.093 (0.078)	0.178* (0.082)	0.012 (0.082)	0.115 (0.080)	0.115 (0.080)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.007 (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.010* (0.005)	0.010* (0.005)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.153 (0.118)	-0.199+ (0.114)	-0.039 (0.117)	-0.152 (0.117)	-0.180 (0.119)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.146 (0.160)	-0.119 (0.155)	-0.094 (0.147)	-0.162 (0.151)	-0.131 (0.155)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.048 (0.118)	-0.023 (0.115)	0.234* (0.117)	0.083 (0.116)	0.042 (0.117)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.155 (0.128)	-0.208+ (0.125)	-0.275* (0.129)	-0.273* (0.120)	-0.254* (0.121)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.277* (0.114)	-0.209+ (0.117)	0.226+ (0.119)	0.143 (0.117)	0.115 (0.117)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.002 (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.072 (0.160)	0.211 (0.165)	0.025 (0.164)	0.106 (0.166)	0.164 (0.166)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.429+ (0.222)	0.159 (0.224)	0.330 (0.208)	0.392+ (0.221)	0.383+ (0.222)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.220 (0.162)	0.295+ (0.164)	-0.193 (0.165)	0.111 (0.166)	0.168 (0.166)
Target coethnic × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.300+ (0.173)	0.235 (0.172)	0.175 (0.179)	0.298+ (0.174)	0.299+ (0.174)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.000 (0.007)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.063 (0.161)	0.116 (0.166)	0.018 (0.167)	0.005 (0.163)	0.051 (0.164)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.173 (0.229)	0.043 (0.243)	0.234 (0.224)	0.047 (0.221)	0.023 (0.224)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.104 (0.163)	0.148 (0.171)	-0.263 (0.170)	-0.011 (0.166)	0.018 (0.167)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.193 (0.177)	0.205 (0.178)	0.180 (0.179)	0.257 (0.171)	0.227 (0.172)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.004 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.157 (0.234)	-0.334 (0.240)	-0.091 (0.245)	-0.067 (0.239)	-0.154 (0.239)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.185 (0.324)	-0.123 (0.342)	-0.476 (0.334)	-0.324 (0.331)	-0.332 (0.332)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.315 (0.235)	-0.389 (0.242)	0.166 (0.245)	-0.209 (0.242)	-0.259 (0.242)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.153 (0.254)	0.067 (0.255)	0.045 (0.266)	-0.029 (0.257)	-0.023 (0.257)
Num.Obs.	1192	1193	1189	1196	1184
R2	0.041	0.038	0.024	0.035	0.035
R2 Adj.	0.022	0.020	0.005	0.016	0.016
Mean $Y_c$	4.407	3.987	3.994	4.074	-0.129
SD $Y_c$	3.252	2.832	2.898	2.364	1.370
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>					
Target coethnic	-0.006 (0.024)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.020)		
Unshared EP	0.015 (0.022)	0.015 (0.021)	0.013 (0.018)		
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	-0.009 (0.033)	-0.003 (0.029)	0.021 (0.026)		
Num.Obs.	1192	1193	1189		
R2	0.001	0.001	0.003		
R2 Adj.	-0.002	-0.001	0.001		
Mean $Y_c$	0.909	0.918	0.940		
SD $Y_c$	0.289	0.274	0.238		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.29: Interactive effects of coethnic targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, Police officer

	(1)
	Traffic
<i>(A): Base</i>	
Target coethnic	0.013 (0.081)
Unshared EP	0.107 (0.079)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.063 (0.115)
Num.Obs.	1185
R2	0.006
R2 Adj.	0.003
Mean $Y_c$	3.606
SD $Y_c$	2.861
<i>(B): Covariates</i>	
Target coethnic	0.011 (0.081)
Unshared EP	0.102 (0.079)
Age <sub>c</sub>	0.002 (0.004)
Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.099 (0.112)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.065 (0.163)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.136 (0.113)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.135 (0.118)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.073 (0.116)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.006 (0.006)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.168 (0.162)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.180 (0.239)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.043 (0.166)
Target coethnic × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.239 (0.176)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.007 (0.006)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.122 (0.160)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.097 (0.228)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.072 (0.159)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.085 (0.167)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.008 (0.009)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.464* (0.231)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.369 (0.330)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.148 (0.235)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.310 (0.252)
Num.Obs.	1185
R2	0.022
R2 Adj.	0.003
Mean $Y_c$	3.606
SD $Y_c$	2.861
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>	
Target coethnic	-0.012 (0.013)
Unshared EP	-0.009 (0.013)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.003 (0.020)
Num.Obs.	1185
R2	0.001
R2 Adj.	-0.001
Mean $Y_c$	0.978
SD $Y_c$	0.147

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table D.30: Interactive effects of coethnic targeting and unshared ethnopartisanship, Shopkeeper

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Appeal	Contract	ICW	PC1
<i>(A): Base</i>				
Target coethnic	0.026 (0.085)	-0.063 (0.081)	-0.026 (0.083)	-0.021 (0.083)
Unshared EP	0.191* (0.082)	0.047 (0.081)	0.125 (0.081)	0.132 (0.081)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.179 (0.121)	0.099 (0.116)	0.153 (0.118)	0.151 (0.119)
Num.Obs.	1174	1174	1182	1166
R2	0.023	0.003	0.012	0.012
R2 Adj.	0.020	0.000	0.009	0.009
Mean $Y_c$	3.384	3.281	3.288	-0.080
SD $Y_c$	3.122	2.607	2.513	1.232
<i>(B): Covariates</i>				
Target coethnic	0.015 (0.085)	-0.070 (0.081)	-0.035 (0.084)	-0.030 (0.084)
Unshared EP	0.191* (0.082)	0.048 (0.081)	0.126 (0.081)	0.132 (0.082)
Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)
Male <sub>c</sub>	0.122 (0.117)	0.179 (0.117)	0.170 (0.117)	0.170 (0.118)
SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.244 (0.158)	0.137 (0.152)	0.198 (0.153)	0.218 (0.154)
Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.067 (0.121)	0.105 (0.119)	0.089 (0.120)	0.104 (0.121)
EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.072 (0.126)	-0.137 (0.122)	-0.132 (0.125)	-0.107 (0.126)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.188 (0.122)	0.102 (0.117)	0.161 (0.119)	0.154 (0.120)
Target coethnic × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.002 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)
Target coethnic × Male <sub>c</sub>	0.137 (0.175)	-0.009 (0.165)	0.055 (0.171)	0.079 (0.172)
Target coethnic × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.217 (0.238)	-0.179 (0.223)	-0.220 (0.230)	-0.221 (0.235)
Target coethnic × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.017 (0.172)	0.012 (0.162)	0.013 (0.168)	0.020 (0.169)
Target coethnic × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	-0.112 (0.183)	-0.024 (0.171)	-0.062 (0.177)	-0.084 (0.179)
Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)
Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.040 (0.165)	-0.115 (0.163)	-0.092 (0.163)	-0.086 (0.164)
Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	-0.167 (0.226)	-0.073 (0.218)	-0.128 (0.220)	-0.133 (0.221)
Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	-0.152 (0.170)	0.037 (0.165)	-0.054 (0.168)	-0.062 (0.169)
Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.075 (0.176)	0.028 (0.171)	0.062 (0.174)	0.050 (0.175)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Age <sub>c</sub>	0.007 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Male <sub>c</sub>	-0.297 (0.247)	-0.137 (0.235)	-0.225 (0.240)	-0.245 (0.242)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × SES Index <sub>c</sub>	0.530 (0.341)	0.288 (0.329)	0.462 (0.332)	0.431 (0.340)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × Urban <sub>c</sub>	0.215 (0.249)	-0.110 (0.237)	0.056 (0.243)	0.041 (0.245)
Target coethnic × Unshared EP × EP Group <sub>c</sub>	0.155 (0.264)	0.103 (0.248)	0.130 (0.255)	0.152 (0.257)
Num.Obs.	1174	1174	1182	1166
R2	0.041	0.019	0.030	0.031
R2 Adj.	0.022	-0.001	0.011	0.011
Mean $Y_c$	3.384	3.281	3.288	-0.080
SD $Y_c$	3.122	2.607	2.513	1.232
<i>(C): Binary outcome (y&gt;0)</i>				
Target coethnic	-0.010 (0.033)	-0.008 (0.023)		
Unshared EP	0.055+ (0.029)	-0.001 (0.022)		
Target coethnic × Unshared EP	0.031 (0.042)	0.027 (0.032)		
Num.Obs.	1174	1174		
R2	0.010	0.001		
R2 Adj.	0.007	-0.001		
Mean $Y_c$	0.815	0.919		
SD $Y_c$	0.389	0.274		

Notes All control variables are centered to their sample mean. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

## E Other Distribution Effects

In this section, we report estimates of treatment effects on other parts of the distribution beyond the average. Table E.1 shows the estimated effects on the 25<sup>th</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup>, and 75<sup>th</sup> quantile. For this analysis, our outcome of interest is the actor-level ICW index of punishment (not standardized using the control group moments). We also run distribution regressions, where we estimate treatment effects on the probability that the outcome variable is greater than a given threshold (Chernozhukov et al. 2013). In Figures E.1 and E.2 we report the pointwise estimates and standard errors of these effects along the distribution of each outcome variable.

Table E.1: Quantile treatment effects

Actor	Any target			Unshared EP		
	0.25	0.5	0.75	0.25	0.5	0.75
MP	0.332*** (0.064)	0.772*** (0.073)	0.938*** (0.142)	0.274*** (0.079)	0.498*** (0.092)	0.950*** (0.171)
Pres	1.419*** (0.122)	2.435*** (0.154)	3.097*** (0.238)	0.566*** (0.113)	1.451*** (0.182)	1.871*** (0.22)
Buro	0.453*** (0.012)	0.547*** (0.104)	1.624*** (0.215)	0.453*** (0.026)	0.906*** (0.136)	1.282*** (0.215)
Judge	-0.295+ (0.152)	-0.126 (0.168)	-0.126 (0.212)	0.344** (0.129)	0.253 (0.165)	0.516* (0.207)
Pol.of	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.008)	0.000 (0.132)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.007)	1.000*** (0.173)
Shop	0.233** (0.088)	0.233 (0.235)	0.138 (0.197)	0.233* (0.098)	0.397* (0.196)	0.534** (0.192)

*Notes:* Quantile regressions estimated at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. Robust standard errors in parentheses, computed via wild bootstrap. +  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Figure E.1: Distribution regression results





Figure E.2: Distribution regression results (continued)



## F Heterogeneity

To explore effect heterogeneity, we consider several moderators.

- Age, gender (Male 0/1), Socio-Economic Status, urban residency (Nairobi), and ethnopartisan group. These are the same variables that we use as controls.
- Ethnic identity intensity. This variable is measured with the question “How important would it be for your children to marry someone from your tribe?” and can take 3 values (Not important, somewhat important, Very important).
- Partisan identity intensity. This variable is measured with the question “How important would it be for your children to marry someone supporting [party name] ?” and can take 3 values (Not important, somewhat important, Very important).
- Strength of rural ties. We use a battery of questions on connections between city and country to compute an ICW index of the strength of rural ties. The questions were different for respondents in Nairobi and those in the rural areas, so we created one index for the urban subsample and one for the rural subsample. Both indexes are larger if a respondent is closer to a rural community than an urban one. For the urban subsample, the index was constructed with these variables (reverse-coded when necessary): share of life spent in a rural area, number of generations since the family moved to Nairobi, self-reported degree of “rural” values, how many relatives live in the city, time spent in home village, frequency of visits to the home village, attention to what happens in the home village. For the rural subsample, the index was constructed with these variables: time spent in Nairobi, frequency of visits to cities, how many relatives live in cities, attention to what happens in the cities, plan to move to an urban area.

Table F.1: Moderation effect of age, actor-specific indexes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP	Pres	Buro	Judge	Pol.of	Shop
<i>Targeting</i>						
Any target	0.542*** (0.137)	1.194*** (0.131)	0.306* (0.138)	-0.177 (0.133)	0.168 (0.136)	0.026 (0.133)
Age	0.007* (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Any target × Age	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.041	0.080	0.017	0.006	0.004	0.002
R2 Adj.	0.039	0.078	0.015	0.005	0.002	0.000
Mean $Y_c$	1.500	1.892	2.425	4.397	3.454	3.296
SD $Y_c$	1.859	2.220	2.271	2.418	2.679	2.609
<i>Unshared EP</i>						
Unshared EP	0.371** (0.137)	0.517*** (0.136)	0.351* (0.139)	0.160 (0.128)	0.046 (0.123)	0.457*** (0.128)
Age	0.005 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.005+ (0.003)
Unshared EP × Age	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.022	0.051	0.025	0.010	0.006	0.010
R2 Adj.	0.020	0.049	0.023	0.008	0.005	0.009
Mean $Y_c$	1.661	2.701	2.474	4.152	3.480	3.211
SD $Y_c$	1.813	2.522	2.270	2.354	2.782	2.485

*Notes* Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table F.2: Moderation effect of gender (male), actor-specific indexes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP	Pres	Buro	Judge	Pol.of	Shop
<i>Targeting</i>						
Any target	0.472*** (0.080)	0.730*** (0.072)	0.276*** (0.076)	-0.059 (0.073)	0.063 (0.076)	-0.037 (0.073)
Male	-0.101 (0.081)	0.189* (0.082)	-0.056 (0.079)	-0.094 (0.082)	-0.210** (0.081)	-0.143+ (0.082)
Any target × Male	-0.059 (0.102)	-0.286** (0.102)	0.003 (0.102)	-0.026 (0.100)	0.145 (0.102)	0.242* (0.100)
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.042	0.072	0.015	0.004	0.008	0.005
R2 Adj.	0.040	0.071	0.014	0.003	0.006	0.003
Mean $Y_c$	1.500	1.892	2.425	4.397	3.454	3.296
SD $Y_c$	1.859	2.220	2.271	2.418	2.679	2.609
<i>Unshared EP</i>						
Unshared EP	0.433*** (0.077)	0.610*** (0.074)	0.379*** (0.076)	0.198** (0.069)	0.250*** (0.069)	0.211** (0.070)
Male	-0.025 (0.066)	0.110 (0.067)	0.001 (0.067)	-0.061 (0.066)	-0.020 (0.067)	0.053 (0.067)
Unshared EP × Male	-0.262** (0.100)	-0.254* (0.101)	-0.097 (0.103)	-0.106 (0.096)	-0.196* (0.094)	-0.064 (0.097)
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.029	0.052	0.024	0.009	0.012	0.008
R2 Adj.	0.027	0.051	0.022	0.007	0.010	0.006
Mean $Y_c$	1.661	2.701	2.474	4.152	3.480	3.211
SD $Y_c$	1.813	2.522	2.270	2.354	2.782	2.485

*Notes* Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table F.3: Moderation effect of Socio-Economic Status, actor-specific indexes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP	Pres	Buro	Judge	Pol.of	Shop
<i>Targeting</i>						
Any target	0.443*** (0.052)	0.596*** (0.051)	0.276*** (0.052)	-0.071 (0.050)	0.134** (0.051)	0.078 (0.050)
SES Index	-0.125 (0.113)	0.113 (0.096)	-0.071 (0.111)	0.076 (0.116)	-0.207+ (0.114)	0.007 (0.103)
Any target × SES Index	0.144 (0.141)	-0.098 (0.125)	0.102 (0.140)	-0.103 (0.137)	0.236+ (0.140)	0.191 (0.127)
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.038	0.069	0.015	0.001	0.006	0.005
R2 Adj.	0.036	0.067	0.013	0.000	0.004	0.004
Mean $Y_c$	1.500	1.892	2.425	4.397	3.454	3.296
SD $Y_c$	1.859	2.220	2.271	2.418	2.679	2.609
<i>Unshared EP</i>						
Unshared EP	0.308*** (0.051)	0.490*** (0.051)	0.333*** (0.052)	0.149** (0.048)	0.153** (0.047)	0.183*** (0.048)
SES Index	0.127 (0.090)	0.116 (0.085)	0.193* (0.083)	0.113 (0.087)	0.128 (0.089)	0.222** (0.086)
Unshared EP × SES Index	-0.281* (0.134)	-0.151 (0.130)	-0.390** (0.136)	-0.255* (0.128)	-0.356** (0.125)	-0.160 (0.123)
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.023	0.050	0.027	0.008	0.011	0.012
R2 Adj.	0.021	0.048	0.026	0.006	0.010	0.010
Mean $Y_c$	1.661	2.701	2.474	4.152	3.480	3.211
SD $Y_c$	1.813	2.522	2.270	2.354	2.782	2.485

*Notes* Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table F.4: Moderation effect of urbanization (Nairobi), actor-specific indexes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP	Pres	Buro	Judge	Pol.of	Shop
<i>Targeting</i>						
Any target	0.496*** (0.073)	0.543*** (0.072)	0.176* (0.075)	-0.090 (0.071)	0.220** (0.075)	0.084 (0.070)
Urban	0.096 (0.082)	-0.044 (0.082)	-0.062 (0.080)	0.007 (0.082)	0.057 (0.082)	0.089 (0.082)
Any target × Urban	-0.098 (0.103)	0.103 (0.102)	0.190+ (0.103)	0.039 (0.100)	-0.162 (0.103)	-0.010 (0.100)
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.038	0.069	0.017	0.001	0.006	0.003
R2 Adj.	0.036	0.067	0.016	0.000	0.004	0.001
Mean $Y_c$	1.500	1.892	2.425	4.397	3.454	3.296
SD $Y_c$	1.859	2.220	2.271	2.418	2.679	2.609
<i>Unshared EP</i>						
Unshared EP	0.270*** (0.073)	0.545*** (0.073)	0.314*** (0.074)	0.176* (0.069)	0.199** (0.068)	0.142* (0.068)
Urban	0.011 (0.067)	0.087 (0.067)	0.043 (0.067)	0.058 (0.066)	-0.014 (0.067)	0.047 (0.067)
Unshared EP × Urban	0.074 (0.102)	-0.102 (0.102)	0.038 (0.104)	-0.050 (0.097)	-0.084 (0.095)	0.070 (0.097)
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.021	0.050	0.024	0.006	0.007	0.010
R2 Adj.	0.019	0.048	0.022	0.004	0.005	0.008
Mean $Y_c$	1.661	2.701	2.474	4.152	3.480	3.211
SD $Y_c$	1.813	2.522	2.270	2.354	2.782	2.485

*Notes* Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table F.5: Moderation effect of ethnopartisan group (Luo+NASA), actor-specific indexes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP	Pres	Buro	Judge	Pol.of	Shop
<i>Targeting</i>						
Any target	0.482*** (0.074)	0.599*** (0.071)	0.282*** (0.071)	-0.058 (0.071)	0.152* (0.072)	0.091 (0.070)
Luo/NASA	0.008 (0.083)	-0.029 (0.082)	-0.008 (0.080)	0.005 (0.082)	-0.036 (0.082)	-0.090 (0.082)
Any target × Luo/NASA	-0.079 (0.104)	-0.003 (0.103)	-0.011 (0.103)	-0.024 (0.101)	-0.035 (0.103)	-0.031 (0.100)
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.038	0.068	0.015	0.001	0.005	0.005
R2 Adj.	0.036	0.067	0.013	-0.001	0.003	0.003
Mean $Y_c$	1.500	1.892	2.425	4.397	3.454	3.296
SD $Y_c$	1.859	2.220	2.271	2.418	2.679	2.609
<i>Unshared EP</i>						
Unshared EP	0.258*** (0.073)	0.420*** (0.072)	0.241*** (0.073)	0.058 (0.068)	0.138* (0.066)	0.130+ (0.067)
Luo/NASA	-0.113+ (0.066)	-0.089 (0.067)	-0.111+ (0.067)	-0.098 (0.066)	-0.061 (0.067)	-0.177** (0.067)
Unshared EP × Luo/NASA	0.105 (0.101)	0.143 (0.102)	0.189+ (0.104)	0.187+ (0.097)	0.026 (0.095)	0.112 (0.097)
Num.Obs.	1795	1787	1784	1788	1782	1783
R2	0.022	0.050	0.025	0.007	0.006	0.012
R2 Adj.	0.020	0.048	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.010
Mean $Y_c$	1.661	2.701	2.474	4.152	3.480	3.211
SD $Y_c$	1.813	2.522	2.270	2.354	2.782	2.485

*Notes* Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table F.6: Moderation effect of group identity (inter-ethnic marriage), actor-specific indexes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP	Pres	Buro	Judge	Pol.of	Shop
<i>Targeting</i>						
Any target	0.345*** (0.081)	0.679*** (0.081)	0.452*** (0.078)	-0.161+ (0.082)	0.247** (0.077)	-0.002 (0.082)
Coethn. marriage s.w. important	-0.107 (0.102)	-0.093 (0.101)	0.082 (0.099)	-0.234* (0.104)	0.073 (0.099)	-0.129 (0.105)
Coethn. marriage very important	-0.032 (0.096)	0.094 (0.098)	0.124 (0.092)	-0.120 (0.097)	0.241* (0.098)	-0.161+ (0.096)
Any target × Coethn. marriage s.w. important	0.107 (0.125)	-0.128 (0.126)	-0.330** (0.127)	0.157 (0.127)	-0.186 (0.126)	0.013 (0.127)
Any target × Coethn. marriage very important	0.238+ (0.122)	-0.162 (0.122)	-0.260* (0.120)	0.150 (0.118)	-0.196 (0.122)	0.196+ (0.118)
Num.Obs.	1778	1771	1770	1771	1765	1767
R2	0.046	0.073	0.021	0.005	0.010	0.005
R2 Adj.	0.043	0.070	0.018	0.002	0.007	0.003
Mean $Y_c$	1.500	1.892	2.425	4.397	3.454	3.296
SD $Y_c$	1.859	2.220	2.271	2.418	2.679	2.609
<i>Unshared EP</i>						
Unshared EP	0.271*** (0.077)	0.424*** (0.084)	0.301*** (0.082)	0.129+ (0.078)	0.180* (0.073)	0.155* (0.077)
Coethn. marriage s.w. important	-0.058 (0.080)	-0.199* (0.083)	-0.127 (0.084)	-0.151+ (0.082)	-0.034 (0.084)	-0.102 (0.083)
Coethn. marriage very important	0.079 (0.080)	-0.084 (0.080)	-0.100 (0.079)	-0.019 (0.078)	0.141+ (0.078)	-0.085 (0.080)
Unshared EP × Coethn. marriage s.w. important	0.056 (0.121)	0.048 (0.127)	-0.024 (0.129)	0.047 (0.123)	-0.021 (0.117)	-0.047 (0.121)
Unshared EP × Coethn. marriage very important	0.064 (0.121)	0.164 (0.120)	0.071 (0.122)	0.004 (0.113)	-0.047 (0.112)	0.097 (0.114)
Num.Obs.	1778	1771	1770	1771	1765	1767
R2	0.023	0.055	0.024	0.008	0.010	0.011
R2 Adj.	0.021	0.052	0.021	0.005	0.008	0.008
Mean $Y_c$	1.661	2.701	2.474	4.152	3.480	3.211
SD $Y_c$	1.813	2.522	2.270	2.354	2.782	2.485

Notes Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table F.7: Moderation effect of group identity (inter-partisan marriage), actor-specific indexes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP	Pres	Buro	Judge	Pol.of	Shop
<i>Targeting</i>						
Any target	0.394*** (0.077)	0.597*** (0.073)	0.363*** (0.072)	-0.040 (0.077)	0.275*** (0.074)	0.002 (0.078)
Copart. marriage s.w. important	-0.046 (0.111)	-0.053 (0.116)	0.120 (0.102)	-0.166 (0.108)	0.004 (0.104)	-0.226* (0.104)
Copart. marriage very important	0.030 (0.099)	-0.062 (0.096)	0.105 (0.097)	-0.001 (0.097)	0.235* (0.099)	-0.176+ (0.097)
Any target × Copart. marriage s.w. important	-0.017 (0.134)	-0.084 (0.140)	-0.289* (0.131)	-0.031 (0.132)	-0.151 (0.131)	0.115 (0.128)
Any target × Copart. marriage very important	0.151 (0.125)	0.065 (0.121)	-0.111 (0.125)	-0.031 (0.118)	-0.283* (0.123)	0.140 (0.118)
Num.Obs.	1723	1718	1717	1719	1714	1715
R2	0.042	0.071	0.017	0.006	0.010	0.006
R2 Adj.	0.039	0.068	0.014	0.003	0.007	0.003
Mean $Y_c$	1.500	1.892	2.425	4.397	3.454	3.296
SD $Y_c$	1.859	2.220	2.271	2.418	2.679	2.609
<i>Unshared EP</i>						
Unshared EP	0.248*** (0.073)	0.344*** (0.076)	0.249*** (0.075)	-0.029 (0.073)	0.084 (0.070)	0.099 (0.073)
Copart. marriage s.w. important	-0.070 (0.080)	-0.177* (0.086)	-0.012 (0.090)	-0.343*** (0.087)	-0.109 (0.088)	-0.069 (0.090)
Copart. marriage very important	-0.028 (0.083)	-0.190* (0.079)	-0.081 (0.079)	-0.183* (0.076)	-0.029 (0.079)	-0.294*** (0.077)
Unshared EP × Copart. marriage s.w. important	-0.009 (0.130)	0.203 (0.135)	-0.098 (0.132)	0.316* (0.127)	0.038 (0.123)	-0.178 (0.126)
Unshared EP × Copart. marriage very important	0.238+ (0.123)	0.347** (0.118)	0.265* (0.124)	0.335** (0.113)	0.166 (0.113)	0.406*** (0.113)
Num.Obs.	1723	1718	1717	1719	1714	1715
R2	0.029	0.056	0.026	0.017	0.009	0.025
R2 Adj.	0.026	0.054	0.023	0.014	0.006	0.022
Mean $Y_c$	1.661	2.701	2.474	4.152	3.480	3.211
SD $Y_c$	1.813	2.522	2.270	2.354	2.782	2.485

Notes Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table F.8: Moderation effect of rural ties (Nairobi sample), actor-specific indexes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP	Pres	Buro	Judge	Pol.of	Shop
<i>Targeting</i>						
Any target	0.402*** (0.074)	0.654*** (0.074)	0.362*** (0.073)	-0.050 (0.071)	0.064 (0.072)	0.081 (0.071)
Rural ties Index (Nairobi)	-0.119 (0.095)	0.006 (0.108)	-0.220* (0.097)	-0.201+ (0.103)	-0.140 (0.096)	-0.241* (0.101)
Any target × Rural ties Index (Nairobi)	-0.004 (0.115)	-0.127 (0.129)	-0.026 (0.123)	0.006 (0.123)	-0.128 (0.121)	0.061 (0.121)
Num.Obs.	941	941	938	939	937	937
R2	0.034	0.078	0.040	0.013	0.017	0.014
R2 Adj.	0.031	0.075	0.037	0.010	0.014	0.011
Mean $Y_c$	1.500	1.892	2.425	4.397	3.454	3.296
SD $Y_c$	1.859	2.220	2.271	2.418	2.679	2.609
<i>Unshared EP</i>						
Unshared EP	0.345*** (0.070)	0.448*** (0.072)	0.352*** (0.073)	0.124+ (0.068)	0.102 (0.067)	0.218** (0.069)
Rural ties Index (Nairobi)	-0.084 (0.075)	-0.146+ (0.081)	-0.312*** (0.081)	-0.191** (0.074)	-0.305*** (0.083)	-0.107 (0.080)
Unshared EP × Rural ties Index (Nairobi)	-0.063 (0.109)	-0.016 (0.123)	0.105 (0.124)	-0.017 (0.116)	0.172 (0.113)	-0.179 (0.115)
Num.Obs.	941	941	938	939	937	937
R2	0.028	0.046	0.042	0.016	0.021	0.024
R2 Adj.	0.025	0.043	0.039	0.013	0.017	0.021
Mean $Y_c$	1.661	2.701	2.474	4.152	3.480	3.211
SD $Y_c$	1.813	2.522	2.270	2.354	2.782	2.485

Notes Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

Table F.9: Moderation effect of rural ties (country sample), actor-specific indexes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MP	Pres	Buro	Judge	Pol.of	Shop
<i>Targeting</i>						
Any target	0.495*** (0.073)	0.542*** (0.072)	0.179* (0.075)	-0.088 (0.072)	0.220** (0.075)	0.087 (0.070)
Rural ties Index (Rural)	-0.108 (0.105)	-0.143 (0.105)	0.084 (0.100)	0.057 (0.113)	-0.058 (0.112)	-0.049 (0.116)
Any target × Rural ties Index (Rural)	0.220 (0.136)	0.013 (0.135)	-0.119 (0.135)	-0.042 (0.135)	0.094 (0.139)	-0.123 (0.137)
Num.Obs.	851	844	843	846	842	843
R2	0.049	0.065	0.007	0.002	0.010	0.008
R2 Adj.	0.046	0.062	0.003	-0.001	0.007	0.005
Mean $Y_c$	1.500	1.892	2.425	4.397	3.454	3.296
SD $Y_c$	1.859	2.220	2.271	2.418	2.679	2.609
<i>Unshared EP</i>						
Unshared EP	0.269*** (0.073)	0.541*** (0.073)	0.314*** (0.074)	0.176* (0.069)	0.199** (0.068)	0.147* (0.068)
Rural ties Index (Rural)	-0.177* (0.088)	-0.050 (0.088)	0.125 (0.089)	-0.019 (0.084)	0.002 (0.091)	-0.122 (0.085)
Unshared EP × Rural ties Index (Rural)	0.367** (0.136)	-0.051 (0.134)	-0.206 (0.138)	0.113 (0.125)	0.005 (0.127)	-0.028 (0.129)
Num.Obs.	851	844	843	846	842	843
R2	0.024	0.063	0.023	0.009	0.010	0.011
R2 Adj.	0.021	0.059	0.020	0.005	0.006	0.007
Mean $Y_c$	1.661	2.701	2.474	4.152	3.480	3.211
SD $Y_c$	1.813	2.522	2.270	2.354	2.782	2.485

Notes Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. + <0.1, \* <0.05, \*\* <0.01, \*\*\* <0.001

## G Updates to Pre-analysis Plan

We made minor modifications to the analysis relative to our pre-registered plan.

1. As stated in our pre-registration, we were primarily interested in comparing punishment under the coethnic and copartisan targeting conditions, and planned to compare the group targeting to unspecified targeting as an exploratory exercise. The reason is that in the unspecified condition, respondents may form “uncontrolled” beliefs about who the beneficiaries of clientelism are; for instance, they could believe that coethnics or copartisans are targeted even if not specified in the survey question. However, we found that the large differences between unspecified and coethnic/copartisan targeting were substantively very important, and we included them in the main analysis. We report in the SI all the pre-registered regressions comparing coethnic and copartisan targeting.
2. **Bureaucrat’s actions.** In the survey section on clientelism by a bureaucrat, the survey software should have assigned individuals into either unspecified targeting, coethnic targeting, or copartisan targeting before presenting them with the bureaucrat’s actions to be evaluated. After these questions, respondents should have received a list of 4 additional questions on the bureaucrat’s hypothetical actions, which did not contain a group targeting element to be randomized (we call them “general” actions, for instance, “stealing money from a friend”) and were therefore identical for everyone (we do not use these questions in this paper, as our interest is in the group targeting treatment). Therefore, in the bureaucrat’s section, respondents should have been allocated into one of 3 groups
  - (a) 2 Unspecified targeting Qs, then 4 general Qs
  - (b) 2 Coethnic targeting Qs, then 4 general Qs
  - (c) 2 Copartisan targeting Qs, then 4 general Qs

During the data analysis, we discovered that, only in the rural sub-sample, the survey programmer accidentally randomly assigned half of the respondents in the coethnic or unspeci-

fied condition to receive the copartisan version of the questions instead of the general questions. Therefore, 1/3 of the respondents were asked to punish the bureaucrat's actions under two different targeting scenarios. Fortunately, these respondents saw the "correct" version of the questions, with the intended treatment, before the duplicate questions with the copartisan treatment. Therefore, their answers to the correct version were not influenced by having also seen the copartisan version. In the analysis, we use the original correct coding to code the treatment arm of these respondents. The coding was as follows:

- (a) 2 Unspecified targeting Qs, then 2 copartisan targeting Qs  $\Rightarrow$  unspecified treatment assignment
- (b) 2 Coethnic targeting Qs, then 2 copartisan targeting Qs  $\Rightarrow$  coethnic targeting treatment
- (c) 2 Coartisan targeting Qs, then 4 general questions Qs  $\Rightarrow$  copartisan targeting

3. In the outcome coding section of the PAP, there is an arithmetic mistake: we wrote that we would code the continuous punishment index to range from 0 to 11, but this should have read "0 to 10". In addition, in the main analysis of the paper we standardized the outcome variable at the mean of the control group for each hypothesis test.
4. In the planned coding of the SES index we included an occupation variable. However, component variables should be ordered in the same direction and we found that the occupation question is categorical and does not allow us to order jobs from low to high SES cleanly. Therefore, in the paper we do not use the occupation variable.
5. In the pre-registered regression models with covariates (eq. (4) and (5) in the PAP) the dummy variable for ethnopartisan group is included as non-interacted control. In the paper, we include it in the vector  $X$  of controls that are centered and interacted with the treatment variables.
6. In the pre-registered tests of HP1 and HP2, we only estimate the effect of one of the treatments every time (coethnic targeting and unshared identity respectively), ignoring the other

treatment. In the paper, when we estimate the effects of one treatment, rather than ignoring the other treatment, we include it as a centered and interacted control in the vector  $X$ . Since in each test the left-out treatment can be seen as a background variable that influences the outcome, adding it to the controls should further improve the precision of the estimates.

7. In the PAP, we said that we would drop respondents from ethnically mixed families. We found that approximately 12.7% of the respondents report being from an ethnically mixed family, but only 18 (0.91%) report having Kikuyu and Luo parents. Given the low prevalence of this group, we did not exclude it from the main analysis.
8. We reported an alternative outcome coding for the punishment variable, using 3 categories (no punishment, small fine, and more). We planned to use this variable if each category was chosen by at least 15% of the sample. In practice, we found variation in the share of respondents who fall in each category, across actions and actors, so we decided not to use this recoding.
9. We planned robustness analyses in case of missing values in the outcome variables. In practice, we found that the non-response rate for each single outcome is very low (at most 2%), so we considered missingness not to be a concern.

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## Software Appendix

Data pre-processing was done in STATA. The ICW indexes used in the analyses were computed with Bouguen and Varejkova (2020). The regression analyses were performed in R using Blair et al. (2024) and Koenker (2023). The tables were generated with Arel-Bundock (2022) and Dahl et al. (2019) and the plots with Arel-Bundock (2024) and Kassambara (2023).

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