






What makes inventions become traditions?

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Abstract. Although anthropology was the first academic discipline to investigate cultural change, many other disciplines have made noteworthy contributions to understanding what influences the adoption of new behaviors. Drawing on a broad, interdisciplinary literature covering both humans and nonhumans, we examine (1) which features of behavioral traits make them more transmissible, (2) which individual characteristics of inventors promote copying of their inventions, (3) which characteristics of individuals make them more prone to adopting new behaviors, (4) which characteristics of dyadic relationships promote cultural transmission, (5) which properties of groups (e.g., network structures) promote transmission of traits, and (6) which characteristics of groups promote retention, rather than extinction, of cultural traits. One of anthropology's strengths is its readiness to adopt and improve theories and methods from other disciplines, integrating them into a more holistic approach; hence, we identify approaches that might be particularly useful to biological and cultural anthropologists, and knowledge gaps that should be filled.

Keywords: cultural change, innovation, cultural diffusion, social learning

31 Introduction

32 Anthropology was one of the first disciplines to subject the topic of culture to serious intel-
33 lectual inquiry in regards to its nature, origin, and change over time. Early anthropologists
34 such as Franz Boas (who was notable for his holistic four-fields approach) were concerned
35 with documenting the wide range of behavioral variability in humans and in attributing this
36 to cultural and historical processes rather than genetic predispositions, while acknowledging
37 that there are some basic behavioral propensities common to all humanity (Boas 1940; Lewis
38 1998). Early cultural anthropologists relied primarily on the method of participant observa-
39 tion to document particular cultures (e.g., Malinowski 1929), followed by comparative anal-
40 ysis to seek patterns of between-group similarities and differences (Ember and Ember 2009).
41 Many types of anthropologists are also interested in cultural change, i.e., in determining how
42 patterns of behavior change within a group, or how cultural traits spread geographically (or
43 die out) as a consequence of migration, local extinctions, shifts in political power, or changes
44 in the environment. They integrate genetic, archaeological, historical, ethnographic, and lin-
45 guistic data to answer these questions (Premo and Kuhn 2010; Steward 1955; Zhang and Mace
46 2021). Although anthropologists like Boas (1920) were concerned with the psychological
47 processes by which cultural elements are borrowed from other groups and assimilated, it
48 was rare for cultural anthropologists to closely examine the psychological processes involved
49 in the acquisition of cultural knowledge, or to attempt to precisely model cultural evolution.
50 With few exceptions (e.g., Durham 1991; Henrich 2017), detailed quantitative work on the
51 mechanisms and patterns of cultural processes has been more the terrain of psychologists,
52 biologists, sociologists, and linguists (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
53 man 1981; Hoppitt and Laland 2013; Labov 2010; Tomasello 2019). **This review article seeks**
54 **to highlight the most relevant work in other disciplines that informs four-fields anthro-**
55 **poloogy's long-standing quest to understand patterns of cultural change.** We attempt to
56 cite examples from both the human and nonhuman literature that represent the cutting edge
57 methodologies. As the study of social learning has progressed over the past three decades,
58 the methodological rigor has increased dramatically. For example, when dealing with live
59 subjects it is no longer acceptable to call a behavior a tradition only because it increases in
60 frequency or in number of practitioners over time. There needs to be firm evidence that the
61 behavior spreads through social rather than asocial learning; i.e. that those individuals ex-
62 posed to practitioners are more likely to adopt the behavior than are individuals that are
63 *not* exposed to practitioners. Hoppitt and Laland (2013) review in detail the wide range of
64 experimental and observational methods for demonstrating a role of social learning.

65 Cultural change involves three basic processes: invention (the creation of new behaviors),
66 social transmission (adoption of these new behaviors by other members of the population,
67 resulting in a "tradition"), and extinction (the abandonment of behaviors that were previ-
68 ously part of the behavioral repertoire). Because the topic of cultural evolution is of interest

69 to scholars from many disciplines—including anthropologists, linguists, psychologists, biol-
70 ogists, and computer scientists—a variety of terms has been used for each of these processes,
71 rendering interdisciplinary dialogue confusing. We define *invention* broadly as the creation
72 of new behaviors and *innovation* as the spread of new behaviors (Renfrew 1978), but we note
73 that both have been defined differently by fields with differing research goals, and some fields
74 use entirely different terms for these concepts. For example, anthropologists and biologists
75 frequently use the terms *innovation* to describe the creation of new behaviors (Reader and
76 Laland 2003) and *transmission* or *diffusion* to describe a behavior's spread, whereas historical
77 linguists use the terms *actuation* to be the "first appearance of change in a language" and *im-*
78 *plementation* to describe the spread of this change (Trask 2000). See Perry et al. (2021) for an
79 extended discussion of definitions (e.g., invention versus innovation).

80 Although human cultural psychology has some important differences from the psychol-
81 ogy of most nonhuman species (particularly regarding dependence on symbolic behavior, cu-
82 mulative cultural evolution, and active teaching), there are many commonalities in the ways
83 that humans and other social animals invent and transmit novel behaviors. Sometimes non-
84 human models are useful precisely because they are somewhat simpler in their psychology,
85 providing insight into possible earlier stages of human cultural evolution. Humans continue
86 to employ putatively simpler social learning mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, social en-
87 hancement, etc.) (Kendal et al. 2018) alongside more complex mechanisms (e.g., teaching),
88 so understanding the cultural dynamics created by simpler processes is still useful. Accurate,
89 comprehensive data collection is often easier to achieve in nonhuman models, either because
90 they can be studied under controlled conditions more readily than humans can, or because
91 observational studies of nonhumans allow for more complete sampling of their behavioral
92 repertoires and association patterns.

93 In this review, we summarize recent theoretical and empirical progress in identifying the
94 mechanisms that affect the dynamics of cultural transmission at the levels of the behavior,
95 the individual, the dyad, and the social group. We organize this review around the follow-
96 ing six questions (Figure 1), drawing empirical examples from diverse taxa when relevant,
97 and particularly where specific hypotheses have thus far been more rigorously tested for non-
98 humans than for humans. The first question asks what features of behaviors make them more
99 likely to spread from the inventor to other group members. The next three questions ask what
100 properties of individuals and dyads increase the probability that social learning of inventions
101 will occur. In questions 5 and 6, we scale up to investigating the demographic and network
102 properties of groups and populations, and ask how these characteristics affect the probabilit-
103 ities that behaviors will spread and be maintained, or go extinct. These questions "follow"
104 an invention as different factors affect whether it will become entrenched as a tradition. We
105 use this review to briefly summarize some trends in the literature, to point out some cur-
106 rent knowledge gaps, and to suggest ways in which borrowing of methodologies from other
107 disciplines might remedy these gaps.

108 The comparative method has long been used by cultural (Ember and Ember 2009) and
109 evolutionary anthropologists (Dean et al. 2014) to study the evolution of cultural and bio-
110 logical traits. In this review, we make liberal use of nonhuman studies where we think the
111 methods or results can be illuminating (e.g., of the range of factors that affect transmission).
112 Particularly when talking about modeling studies, unless the authors state otherwise, the
113 reader should assume that the statements made apply generally to both humans and non-
114 human species, as long as those species are social animals. When the statements made are
115 expected to apply only to a particular taxon, that will be stated in the text.

116 **Q1. What characteristics of inventions make them more transmissi-** 117 **ble?**

118 One early answer to this question—the notion of “cultural cores”—argued that traits or in-
119 ventions spread when there is a good match between the trait and the local ecology (Steward
120 1955), i.e., when the benefits outweigh the costs in context. Though it might seem obvious
121 that behaviors should diffuse only if they yield a net benefit, it is neither necessary nor suffi-
122 cient that a trait be (obviously) beneficial to spread. A disabled chimpanzee learns to scratch
123 his back with a liana, because he cannot do so with his hands; the behavior spreads to able-
124 bodied juveniles, perfectly capable of manual scratching (Hobaiter and Byrne 2010). A hu-
125 man family-member produces an amusing mispronunciation (“go do good” becomes “godo
126 gudu”); that mistake is then enshrined and repeated in a family dialect or “familect” (Gordon
127 2009).

128 We know little about what characteristics make an invention spread through a group of
129 nonhuman animals. A rigorous answer to this question requires deep, systematic, prospec-
130 tive (rather than retrospective) naturalistic study of animal invention, but prospective stud-
131 ies are notably lacking (Perry et al. 2021). The primary prospective example (Perry et al.
132 2017) documented a range of novel behaviors in capuchin monkeys, including social rituals
133 (e.g., sticking fingers deep into friends’ eye sockets), foraging techniques (e.g., use of leaves
134 to scrub irritating hairs off of *Sloanea* fruits), investigative behaviors (e.g., grooming porcu-
135 pines), and self-directed behaviors (e.g., flossing of teeth with sticks or vines). Some of these
136 behaviors spread within groups despite unclear benefits. Some of these same behaviors have
137 been independently invented in multiple groups.

138 The empirical findings from capuchins suggest a link between how easily a behavior is in-
139 vented and how easily it spreads. Tennie et al. (2009) propose that there is a “Zone of Latent
140 Solutions” (ZLS), i.e., ideas or behavioral traits that typical individuals of a species could in-
141 vent on their own; some of these are easy for any individual to invent and others are invented
142 only rarely, under ideal conditions. On the ZLS account, social learning effectively helps an
143 individual “re-invent” a behavior it could have invented on its own. Perry et al. (2017)’s find-

144 ings suggest, in turn, a hypothesis consistent with ZLS: If individual A observes individual
145 B performing a new behavior that she was *more* likely to invent herself, that behavior is more
146 transmissible than a counterfactual, hard-to-invent behavior. This idea, though straightfor-
147 ward, has never been tested.

148 Our hypothesis —that a behavior that is easier to invent is also more transmissible —is
149 a special case of an idea in the human literature called *content bias*, i.e., the claim that certain
150 aspects of an invention affect its probability of transmission. Anthropologists are most likely
151 to be familiar with the claim that folktales with "minimally counterintuitive" features are more
152 memorable and transmissible (Norenzayan et al. 2006). Note, however, that content bias is
153 not "purely" cognitive, as in ZLS. It is also cultural, resting on acquired notions (in the folktale
154 example, acquired notions of common-sense).

155 Content bias extends far beyond the notion of "minimally counterintuitive." Studies on the
156 spread of inventions—often called the "diffusion of innovations" —have identified *several* crit-
157 ical characteristics of an invention that affect transmission in humans. The most prominent
158 inventory in humans, Rogers (2003), cites an invention or behavior's complexity, observabil-
159 ity, trialability, and compatibility with existing ideas, social arrangements, or categories. Each
160 of these characteristics can be teased apart into an interplay of intrinsic, cognitive, and cultural
161 factors. A *complex* invention may have a lower probability of transmission, but complexity is
162 relative to the recipient's cultural endowment; if an invention or new behavior is easily un-
163 derstood as built out of familiar parts, it is less complex than one whose building blocks must
164 themselves be mastered (Arthur 2009; Foster 2018). How easy it is to *observe* whether others
165 in your group have adopted an invention depends on socio-cultural context; family planning
166 practices are much less observable if discussion of sex and reproduction are taboo. Similar
167 arguments hold for trialability and—most obviously—compatibility.

168 The cultural contingency of content bias is strikingly demonstrated in the case of new
169 technologies or scientific ideas (Fortunato et al. 2018). This literature reveals a robust rela-
170 tionship between the novelty of an invention and its subsequent uptake, typically discussed
171 in terms of "impact" and quantified with proxies like citation (Fleming 2001; Foster et al. 2015;
172 Uzzi et al. 2013). This relationship, too, is culturally contingent. Synchronously, whether an
173 invention is perceived as novel depends on background knowledge and beliefs, which vary
174 across scientific or technological traditions (Foster et al. 2021); this is related to the insights
175 of sociocultural anthropologist Alfred Gell (1998) about the role played by inferences about
176 generative processes in our reception of art and technology. Diachronously, the positive rela-
177 tionship between novelty and uptake is quite recent; indeed, "novelty" originally had a neg-
178 ative connotation, as it marked deviance from hallowed tradition. Contemporary scientists
179 are not purely neophilic, however; inventions that add a dash of novelty to familiar material
180 fare better, on average, than the radically new (Foster et al. 2015; Uzzi et al. 2013).

181 Studies of human content bias demonstrate that characteristics of inventions affect not
182 just how transmissible they are, but *how they spread*. Consider someone who is aware of a

183 new invention but has not yet adopted it. If their probability of adoption is constant—if it is
184 insensitive to what other members of the population have done—then the *diffusion curve* (a
185 plot showing the fraction of the population adopting over time) tends to follow an “r-shape”
186 pattern, growing quickly at first and then leveling off as the susceptible population shrinks. If
187 the probability of adoption depends on the number of prior adopters (so-called endogenous
188 hazard), then the diffusion curve follows the famous “s-shape.” Rossman (2014) has argued
189 that these patterns are related to the *legitimacy* of the invention: whether it fits into a known
190 and perhaps institutionalized category, or whether the category itself must spread alongside
191 the invention. Drawing on empirical evidence from the music industry (e.g., songs that “cross
192 over” into new radio formats or the gradual institutionalization of reggaeton music) as well
193 as elegant simulation models, Rossman (2012, 2014) suggests that inventions from unfamiliar
194 categories spread with an endogenous hazard, gradually switching over to constant hazard
195 as the category becomes legitimate.

196 Content bias even affects the interplay between network structure and the spread of new
197 behaviors (see Q5). The simplest models of behavior spread assume that if a naive indi-
198 vidual has a single network neighbor who has adopted an invention, there is some chance
199 the naive individual will adopt. This is called *simple* contagion. In a striking series of pa-
200 pers blending observation, experiment, and simulation, Centola and collaborators show that
201 many important inventions spread via *complex* contagion, in which a certain number (or, in
202 some cases, fraction) of network neighbors must adopt an invention before a naive individual
203 will (Centola 2018). The spread of complex contagions favors dense networks; whether and
204 why an invention follows a complex contagion depends on several social mechanisms related
205 to its characteristics (Centola and Macy 2007), including strategic complementarity (do ben-
206 efits grow with the number of adopters?), credibility, legitimacy, and emotional contagion
207 (Collins 1993).

208 Many of these detailed cognitive-cultural processes are unlikely to operate in nonhuman
209 animals, insofar as they depend on cumulative culture and institutionalization, which are
210 believed to be rare or absent in nonhumans, though see Kamilar and Atkinson (2014) for
211 provocative evidence of the capacity for cumulative culture in chimpanzees, i.e., nested cul-
212 tural repertoires. Nevertheless, the human literature suggests the following three strategies
213 for studying both human and nonhuman animals: First, the comparative study of many in-
214 ventions and their spread *within a single species* is essential (Rossman 2014) to understanding
215 cultural dynamics; detailed studies of single inventions give less theoretical leverage, and
216 comparative studies are less subject to sample-selection bias that misrepresents typical pat-
217 terns. Second, a combination of observational studies, formal experiments, and simulations
218 is necessary to tease apart basic processes and determine when they operate (Centola 2018).
219 Third, attending to the link between micro-processes of transmission and macro-patterns of
220 adoption (at the population or network level) is often illuminating. These three strategies
221 will help researchers clarify the extent to which human and nonhuman species differ in their

222 cultural dynamics and the underlying cognitive processes.

223 The literatures on content bias discussed above lack a comprehensive framework tying to-
224 gether cognitive and sociocultural processes. One prominent framework that attempts to do
225 so is cultural attraction theory (CAT). According to CAT-fanciers, transmission is *reconstruc-*
226 *tive* rather than *replicative*. The joint dynamics created by processes of production, attention,
227 learning, and re-production produce biased directions in the space of possible behavioral
228 traits, meaning that certain traits are more likely to emerge as stable outcomes of cultural dy-
229 namics (Claidière et al. 2014; Foster 2018). Content bias is, then, derivative of the underlying
230 dynamics. On the CAT account, some regions of trait space (i.e., the multi-dimensional space
231 of all behavioral traits possible for a particular species, given a set of defining characteristics
232 or "building blocks") are attractors of the cultural evolutionary dynamics. In other words,
233 the dynamics tend to end up in the regions that correspond to attractors. The fact that be-
234 havioral traits with particular features are widespread in a population ultimately reflects the
235 way those features interact with (or are transformed by) proximal processes of reconstruc-
236 tive transmission (Acerbi et al. 2021). Our arguments above, about the importance of cultural
237 context, reflect the fact that the dynamics for a *particular* trait are contingent on the distribu-
238 tion of other cultural traits in the relevant population (Foster 2018; Koch et al. 2020). Further
239 development of a coherent, cognitively and computationally plausible theory of content bias
240 should be a major focus in the theory of cultural evolution.

241 **What characteristics of (Q2) models, (Q3) learners and (Q4) dyads** 242 **make transmission more probable between individuals?**

243 For a long time, it was assumed that the capacity and the propensity to use social and indi-
244 vidual learning are a species-specific and not an individual characteristic. However, there is
245 much evidence that the latter is the case (see Mesoudi et al. 2016). There is surely selection
246 on individuals to have particular learning strategies that vary across the lifespan, and across
247 learning contexts in the same life-history stage. Some individuals will be more knowledge-
248 able and/or better models of certain behavioral traits than others, and it behooves learners to
249 selectively observe them.

250 **Age** Theoretical models predict that for any species, younger individuals should be more
251 open to new experiences (Sherratt and Morand-Ferron 2018). Immature individuals have
252 the most to learn and more time to benefit from what they learn, so they are expected to
253 spend more time seeking social information than adults. Empirical support for this predic-
254 tion is found in studies of foraging in wild chimpanzees (Biro 2011) and white-faced capuchin
255 monkeys (Barrett et al. 2017; Perry 2020). Age often correlates with experience, knowledge
256 and skill; thus, older models generally provide more reliable information (Amlacher and

257 Dugatkin 2005). Because age usually covaries with size, strength, and developmental stage,
258 a practice that works well for an older individual may not be suitable for a much younger
259 individual who has quite different physical and cognitive abilities. In such cases, e.g., for
260 solving difficult extractive foraging tasks, a young individual will do better to learn from a
261 slightly older juvenile instead of a much older adult; for empirical examples from capuchins
262 and great apes, see (Barrett et al. 2017; Russon 2003). In any species, there is likely to be an
263 optimal age difference between learner and model, the precise value of which may vary both
264 between and within species according to the skill being transmitted (Russon 2003) and envi-
265 ronmental stability. Adding age structure to models of social learning yields some intriguing
266 and counter-intuitive findings regarding when selection favors learning from older individ-
267 uals vs. younger individuals (Deffner and McElreath 2020). In primates, decisions about
268 whom to learn from seem to shift with age, starting with primary attachment figures (e.g.,
269 mother) as models in infancy, expanding the scope of possible models during the juvenile
270 period in ways that vary according to sex and species, and changing again in the dispers-
271 ing sex post-dispersal (Whiten and van de Waal 2018). Plausibly, younger individuals are
272 not only more likely to seek social information, but also better at social learning. In some
273 species, juveniles use different learning strategies compared to adults, and have critical de-
274 velopmental periods for learning certain types of things. For example, translocated juvenile
275 turtles follow adults' travel routes to new water sources by using ultraviolet light reflective
276 cues left by adults, rather than directly following adults; they seem to lose this learning ability
277 in adulthood (Roth and Krochmal 2015).

278 **Sex/gender** To the extent that sexes or genders differ in their social strategies and expo-
279 sures to learning opportunities, it might also be expected that members of different sexes or
280 genders will differ in their value as models and/or will exhibit different learning strategies,
281 and that these differences will be reflected in the patterning of social transmission. For ex-
282 ample, vervet monkeys pay more attention to females' solutions to novel tasks (van de Waal
283 et al. 2010), presumably because females are the non-dispersing sex, having superior knowl-
284 edge of local resources. Historical linguists and sociolinguists have found that gender and
285 age (and their interactions) are relevant to who "leads" linguistic change by rapidly adopting
286 new variants (McCulloch 2019). Labov (1990) claims that roughly 90 percent of linguistic
287 change is led by women, i.e., that women, relative to men, more readily adopt phonological
288 changes introduced by more prestigious sectors of society. Subsequent work (reviewed in
289 Sharma and Dodsworth (2020)) suggests these gender differences in propensity to lead lan-
290 guage change are due to gender-specific types of labor that cause gender-differentiation in
291 exposure to outside social influences.

292 **Skill/knowledge** In brown capuchin monkeys (Otoni et al. 2005), learners paid more at-
293 tention to the most efficient nutcrackers, suggesting a bias towards transmission from the

294 more skilled individuals, but it was unclear whether the observers actually adopted these
295 techniques. Wild white-faced capuchins appear to copy the most efficient techniques, even
296 when invented by a peripheral, low-ranking adult male (Barrett et al. 2017). Similarly, human
297 children prefer to copy the actions of knowledgeable models (e.g., Burdett et al. (2016)).

298 **Rank/prestige** Differences in dominance rank (roughly, intimidation-based deference), pres-
299 tige (respect-based deference), or social class (socioeconomic status) may influence the prob-
300 ability of social transmission, especially in the short term. Prestige-biased transmission is
301 most likely to happen in the absence of direct cues about the impact of adopting a behavior.
302 Even when rank is unlikely to be correlated with superior knowledge, learners may pref-
303 erentially copy individuals who are dominant or more prestigious (Jiménez and Mesoudi
304 2019; Labov 1972). In species characterized by steep dominance hierarchies in which rewards
305 of subordinates' efforts are likely to be taken, such as rhesus macaques, low-rankers refrain
306 from modeling useful behaviors to avoid the attention of dominants (Drea and Wallen 1999)
307 and thus make poor transmitters. However, in species such as humans, in which there are
308 potentially material advantages to copying and more effectively communicating with more
309 prestigious sectors of society, prestige-bias transmission is more probable. Linguists have in-
310 vestigated how humans adjust their speech patterns to those of the interlocutor; sometimes
311 it is not clear whether they are conforming as a way of being easier to understand, or to ad-
312 just their speech to more closely mirror a more prestigious conversation partner. In a study
313 of speech patterns in New York department stores (Labov 1972), sales people (who were
314 presumably from the same social class, which usually drops "r"s) pronounced their "r"s dis-
315 tinctly when talking to customers at upscale stores, but continued dropping them at bargain
316 stores.

317 **Personality** It has long been suggested, but rarely tested, that the propensity to learn can
318 be influenced by temperamental traits (e.g., degree of boldness or activity levels) (Dukas
319 1998) and that learners learn better from more tolerant models, who will allow learners to
320 observe them at closer range (Coussi-Korbel and Frigaszy 1995). Other personality traits
321 might also be relevant: e.g., more sociable and extroverted individuals might more readily
322 attract the attention of learners, and thus be better "transmitters". The few empirical studies
323 on the relationship between personality and social learning capacity show promising results:
324 Both bolder and more anxious baboons improved at a task after they had watched a model
325 perform the task (Carter et al. 2014), and exploratory zebra finch females were less likely to
326 copy others in mating and foraging situations (Rosa et al. 2012). Although it seems obvious
327 that personality is a likely influence on social transmission, operationalizing personality can
328 be difficult. However, observer ratings of personality traits —viewed as highly suspect in
329 the early days of animal personality research —have proven far more reliable than expected
330 and are now widely accepted alongside more direct measures of behavioral traits obtained by

331 scoring behaviors of individuals in either naturalistic or experimental contexts (Vazire et al.
332 2007).

333 **Relationship quality** The quality of the social relationship between the model and the learner
334 is often critical to transmission success (Coussi-Korbel and Frigaszy 1995), as demonstrated
335 in an experiment on brown capuchins (Dindo et al. 2008), a species previously believed to be
336 incapable of imitating. The experiment showed that reliable transmission chains for solving
337 a puzzle box could be established when using model-learner pairs with high quality rela-
338 tionships in which the model was dominant to, but tolerant of, the learner. Without a certain
339 level of trust and tolerance, individuals cannot have the relaxed social interactions that per-
340 mits learners to focus on details of model behavior during close-range observation of action
341 sequences over extended periods of time. Many components of relationship quality are po-
342 tentially relevant to facilitating social transmission, including the different personality types
343 of the model and learner and the relative dominance ranks. In species with parental care (in-
344 cluding primates), kinship is a dyadic property that is likely to influence the probability of
345 social transmission if kin spend more time together and tolerate one another better than non-
346 kin, but whenever possible, the relevant aspects of relationship quality should be measured
347 via direct observations rather than using kinship as a proxy. Which aspects are most relevant
348 could depend on the complexity of the trait to be learned: e.g., learning fine motor details
349 of a foraging technique might require extensive close-range observation, whereas learning
350 that a particular resource can be eaten might require quick observation from afar; see also
351 Q1. Perry and Smolla (2020) describe a fairly general relationship quality measure, which
352 assesses the propensity of individuals to interact affiliatively rather than agonistically; this,
353 combined with a measure of time learners spend in proximity with models, would charac-
354 terize the most relevant relationship properties in a wide range of species.

355 **Q5. What population-level characteristics affect the degree of within- 356 and between-group transmission?**

357 Cultural dynamics are affected not only by individual-level processes, but also by group-
358 level aspects like group structure and composition, which moderate how information flows
359 across a group (Derex and Mesoudi 2020). Though each individual contributes to the cul-
360 tural repertoire of the group as a whole, not all individuals have access to the entire pool
361 of knowledge (Cantor and Whitehead 2013): Who is in contact with whom shapes who can
362 learn what, from whom. Among others, environmental heterogeneity, homophily, and social
363 inheritance (Cantor and Whitehead 2013; Ilany and Akçay 2016; Leu et al. 2016), can lead to
364 nonrandom interactions among individuals (Croft et al. 2008). Social networks are a useful
365 tool to represent and study these heterogeneous interactions. Networks are made up of two

366 sets of elements: nodes (vertices), which represent individuals (or any other entities) and ties
367 (edges), which represent their relationships (for a methodological introduction see Menczer
368 et al. 2020). To describe and analyze structural features of social networks, a range of tools
369 and metrics has been developed.

370 One of these measures is *network efficiency* (or communication efficiency). It is a measure
371 of how well information can traverse a network, and is simply the inverse of the average path
372 length, i.e., the mean smallest number of edges that connect any two vertices in the network
373 (Latora and Marchiori 2001). At high efficiency (values close to 1), information and novel
374 behaviors have a higher probability of reaching all group members than in lower-efficiency
375 networks. Theory suggests that groups with efficient networks are more likely to converge
376 on a few cultural traits, whereas groups with inefficient networks retain more cultural diver-
377 sity (Smolla and Akçay 2019). Highly efficient networks can lead to cultural conservatism
378 (a.k.a. conformity), where a group retains the same cultural repertoire across generations
379 even if environmental incentives change. This is because, as shown in the agent-based mod-
380 els developed by Smolla and Akçay (2019), in tight-knit networks with low cultural diversity,
381 novel behaviors rarely find sufficient adopters to be added to the cultural repertoire or replace
382 an existing trait. Although these models are created with humans in mind, the logic should
383 apply more broadly to other social taxa as well.

384 Cultural convergence also matters in the context of group coordination and problem-
385 solving. The nature and complexity of the problem to be overcome determines whether quick
386 dissemination of partial solutions or improvements through efficient networks is most bene-
387 ficial to the group. Generally, groups solve problems more efficiently than individuals (Ma-
388 son and Watts 2012), as long as the task is complex enough to warrant organizational efforts
389 in allocating tasks and assembling results (Almaatouq et al. 2021). Well-connected groups
390 find good solutions faster than sparsely connected groups (Derex and Boyd 2016; Lazer and
391 Friedman 2007), as incremental improvements spread quickly and are adopted by most of
392 the group. The rapid convergence onto a few solutions drastically reduces cultural diversity
393 (Derex and Boyd 2016; Lazer and Friedman 2007; Smolla and Akçay 2019), prohibiting a more
394 thorough exploration of the solution landscape. Groups with inefficient social networks can
395 maintain more cultural diversity and are more likely to find globally optimal solutions, be-
396 cause the network-imposed restriction to information flow prevents premature adoption of
397 one (or a few) solutions and allows concurrent exploration of different parts of the solution
398 space (Derex and Boyd 2016; Lazer and Friedman 2007).

399 A second network measure with relevance for the transmission of cultural traits is the
400 *clustering coefficient*. At the local scale, it is the probability that two nodes that are connected
401 to a third one are also connected (i.e., the probability that a friend's friends are friends with
402 each other). These triangular relationships are important because they have a high potential
403 for social reinforcement. When subsets of a network are tightly connected, they are more
404 likely to be similar in their cultural traits, which increases the probability of being frequently

405 exposed to the same kind of information and leads to higher adoption rate of novel behaviors
406 (Centola 2010). Clustering, like network efficiency, can lead to reduced cultural diversity
407 (Smolla and Akçay 2019). Future research should attempt to more clearly separate the effects
408 of the two metrics on cultural diversity.

409 Complex behaviors almost always build upon simpler forms that need to be acquired and
410 mastered first. This is why acquiring complex traits often requires extended periods of learn-
411 ing or apprenticeship, involving extensive practice and social learning (e.g. Demps et al. 2012;
412 Lew-Levy et al. 2017; Roux et al. 1995). Due to the sequential acquisition of traits, not every
413 neighbor in a social network can spread traits from the group's cultural repertoire. A study
414 by Demps et al. (2012) details information about the acquisition timing, information source,
415 and skill level of Jenu Kuruba honey collectors: only one of the 4 skills required for honey
416 collection could be learned in childhood, as physical maturity was required to participate in
417 and closely observe all aspects of the process early in life. Thus, group age structure shapes
418 learning opportunities differently for different behavior types.

419 While the above-mentioned characteristics similarly apply to between-group interactions,
420 migration is specific to the between-group context (see Figure 1). Both rate of migration and
421 the strength of conformity determine whether groups will maintain distinct cultural reper-
422 toires (Mesoudi 2018). When migrating individuals introduce novel technology that can be
423 usefully recombined with local technology, migration can result in the production of several
424 novel technological traits (Creanza et al. 2017). Migration can increase the number of indi-
425 viduals who invent and learn socially (Derex and Mesoudi 2020), and individuals in larger
426 groups are more likely to observe and select an adaptive trait (Enquist et al. 2010; Richerson
427 and Boyd 2020). For example, while Ache and Hadza live in small camps, they frequently
428 migrate between camps, giving them the opportunity to observe several hundred other men
429 making tools throughout their lifetime (Hill et al. 2014).

430 As the field progresses, increasingly powerful statistical techniques are developed, useful
431 for investigating how various individual and dyadic traits are associated with the distribu-
432 tion of behavioral traits (Silk et al. 2018). Techniques such as network based diffusion analy-
433 sis (NBDA, Hoppitt and Laland 2013) and stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOMs, Fisher
434 et al. 2017) make it possible to model changes in networks between different points in time,
435 using multiple co-variates. These models allow the inclusion of effects and covariates (either
436 constant attributes such as sex or variable ones such as relationship quality) for individuals,
437 dyads, and groups. Some problems remain with these analytical approaches: e.g., SAOMs
438 model relationships as binary rather than continuous (i.e., either the pair has a relationship,
439 or it does not; there is no distinction between strong and weak ties). NBDA approaches have
440 trouble coping with a common problem in naturalistic data sets: observation gaps or under-
441 sampled periods lead to uncertainty about when individuals acquire traits, making it hard
442 to reliably decide whether social networks are predictive of the speed with which traits are
443 acquired.

444 **Q6. What properties of groups make it more likely that innovations**
445 **will eventually be dropped from group repertoires?**

446 Cultural extinction (or, at least, the loss of particular cultural elements) has long fascinated
447 historians, archaeologists, cultural anthropologists and linguists, all of whom have contributed
448 interesting methods and theories regarding the loss of cultural diversity. Unlike the previous
449 topics, very little is known about these processes in nonhumans. An analogy is often made
450 between cultural transmission and genetic drift (Neiman 1995; Shennan 2001): cultural vari-
451 ants are lost by chance when their practitioners are not imitated before they die or leave the
452 population. The following factors are all believed to play major roles in cultural change in
453 humans (reviewed in Zhang and Mace 2021): dispersal, replacement of entire populations
454 (e.g., due to conquest, epidemics, or competitive displacement), diffusion, and assimilation
455 of one group into another. When women are captured and assimilated during warfare, cul-
456 ture change may be rapid, but when women engage in hypergynous marriages (as sometimes
457 happens when ethnic groups with different subsistence types live alongside one another), the
458 change may be slower. Frequent contact between groups enhances exchange of technologies
459 and social innovations, leading to assimilation rather than replacement of groups.

460 Even in the absence of dramatic demographic change, important technological traits can
461 be lost if the older, more knowledgeable individuals die before younger members of the so-
462 ciety are sufficiently educated in the skills necessary to produce survival-relevant tools (see
463 Henrich (2017) for ethnographic examples, e.g., from a Polar Inuit population). The rate
464 of loss due to cultural drift will be higher in small populations than in larger ones, where
465 the absolute number of experts is greater. Cross-cultural studies of fishing technologies in
466 Oceanic populations (Kline and Boyd 2010) and nonindustrialized farming and herding so-
467 cieties (Collard et al. 2013) have both found that larger populations are associated with more
468 tool types and more complex technologies (but see also Collard et al. 2005). But the connect-
469 edness of the population, and its reliance on social learning are also likely to be important:
470 if younger members of the population are not prone to acquiring the cultural knowledge of
471 older individuals, the products of complex cumulative culture will be lost. The importance
472 of social learning for retention of cultural diversity was predicted in a “social learning strate-
473 gies tournament”, a computer-based competition that required entrants to submit a behav-
474 ioral strategy that would instruct agents in a simulated world to optimally learn and exploit
475 their environment (Rendell et al. 2011). One of the insights from the tournament was that
476 the learning strategies that relied heavily on social learning were those most likely (by several
477 orders of magnitude) to retain cultural variants over the long term, and to maintain a high
478 diversity of cultural traits.

479 Both the number of practitioners and the frequency with which behaviors are performed
480 are likely relevant to the maintenance of cultural traits. Social learning mechanisms such as
481 conformity promote the maintenance of the more common behavioral traits (Mesoudi and

482 Lycett 2009). There is, for example, some evidence that for rare languages to survive, there
483 needs to be a critical number of speakers of the language (Amano et al. 2014).

484 Between-group contact is also important for maintenance of cultural variation, allow-
485 ing reintroduction of locally extinct cultural traits: contact between populations replenishes
486 adaptive variants lost by chance, leading to higher levels of standing variation, and thus more
487 adaptive traits (Powell et al. 2009). Between-group contact can also lead to the loss of be-
488 havioral variation. For example, eastern Australian humpback whales *Megaptera novaeangliae*
489 adopt the songs of Western Australian populations every few years in song dialect 'revolu-
490 tions,' resulting in reduced song complexity (Allen et al. 2018).

491 Most learners will not attain the level of expertise of their role models; these errors in
492 social learning sometimes lead to loss of the meaning of a behavior or correct functioning
493 of a technology, resulting in loss of the trait. This process is counteracted by the ability of
494 individuals to learn selectively from expert practitioners: in humans, cumulative cultural
495 adaptation occurs when unusually talented pupils surpass their teachers (Aoki et al. 2012;
496 Henrich 2004). In larger populations, learners have access to a larger pool of experts, making
497 such improvements more likely; thus, the equilibrium levels of cultural complexity should
498 increase as population size increases (Mesoudi 2011).

499 In humans, fashion plays a special role in the study of cultural extinctions due to the
500 rapidity with which inventions spread and go extinct. This allows researchers to observe
501 cultural traditions from start to finish and gain insight into the psychological mechanisms
502 involved. Both the expectation and the fact of continuous change are key elements of fashion
503 (Cannon 1998; Davis 2013). Often new fashions appear first in the upper class and then (due
504 to prestige bias) are copied by the middle class, only to have the elite quickly switch to new
505 fashions as a way of differentiating themselves from the middle class (Lesure 2015).

506 Glossary of terms

507 **Complex contagion:** Acquisition of a novel behavior requires exposure to multiple demon-
508 strators.

509 **Simple contagion:** Exposure to a single demonstrator suffices for the acquisition of a novel
510 behavior.

511 **Content bias:** Aspects of an invention's 'content' that affect the probability of its transmis-
512 sion.

513 **Culture:** Information or behavior acquired via social learning rather than genetic transmis-
514 sion, that is shared by multiple members of a group.

515 **Cultural core:** The cluster of cultural traits most relevant to subsistence and economic ar-
516 rangements.

517 **Cumulative cultural evolution:** Inventions are built upon over multiple social learning events,
518 resulting in products no individual could have invented from scratch.

519 **Diffusion:** The spread of a behavior throughout a population via social learning.

520 **Familect:** A set of invented words or phrases used and understood only within a family or
521 a similarly intimate group.

522 **Invention:** (Creation of) a behavior that is novel to an individual and their group

523 **Innovation:** Transmission of an invention to multiple individuals.

524 **Social learning:** Learning based on interaction with, or observation of, others or their prod-
525 ucts.

526 **Social learning strategies:** Context-dependent use of social or individual learning (e.g.,
527 selective observation of demonstrators with particular characteristics).

528 **Tradition:** Enduring patterns of behavior shared among members of a group that are ac-
529 quired in part through social learning.

530 **Box 1. Development and relevance of formal approaches to culture**

531 Twentieth century evolutionary biology has seen major advances through the adoption and
532 development of mathematically grounded theory. A similar advancement of empirical and
533 theoretical work occurred when mathematical frameworks were adopted from population
534 genetics and applied to cultural dynamics (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
535 man 1981). Nevertheless, there remains a deeply rooted resistance against formal theoretical
536 approaches, often due to misunderstandings of mathematical notation or distrust of the over-
537 simplified nature of models (McElreath and Boyd 2007). There are several good reasons why
538 so many disciplines (e.g., philosophy, economy, and physics) rely on formal theories for their
539 deductions. Formal models replace verbal ambiguity with mathematical precision, enforc-
540 ing explicitly stating assumptions. Applying these models to a range of parameters, we can
541 test our intuition about real-world scenarios. Moreover, models can also produce unexpected
542 emergent behaviors or counter-intuitive results that question existing understanding and pro-
543 vide new hypotheses for future empirical work (for examples see Servedio et al. 2014).

544 Recently, there have been calls to extend cultural evolution models with insights ranging
545 from developmental psychology to cognitive neuroscience (Singh et al. 2021; Smolla et al.
546 2021). The aim of carefully adding complexity to existing frameworks is to better under-
547 stand how previously neglected aspects of the real-world might (or might not) affect cultural
548 dynamics. For example, effective population size—the number of individuals actually par-
549 ticipating in knowledge transmission—can affect the number of cultural traits a group can
550 generate and maintain (Derex and Mesoudi 2020). Commonly, theoretical models assume
551 that any individual can acquire any cultural trait; thus, effective population size equals pop-
552 ulation size. However, from a developmental perspective, individuals may (not) be able to
553 acquire a specific trait during particular developmental stages. This might occur when com-
554 plex behaviors (e.g., mental arithmetic) build upon simpler traits that need to be acquired
555 first, or when tasks are physically beyond an individual’s abilities (e.g., tree climbing Demps
556 et al. (2012)). For example, the theory of the zone of proximal development (Vygotsky 1978)
557 differentiates between what an individual can learn unaided, learn with help from others,
558 and what is currently impossible to learn. Taking this into account, effective population size
559 would be larger for simple/easy, and smaller for complex/demanding traits. Such concepts
560 might inspire future modeling efforts to better understand whether and how individual de-
561 velopmental processes impact long-term cultural dynamics.

562 **Conclusions and Future Directions**

563 The study of culture has expanded theoretically and methodologically. Models (both for-
564 mal and simulation based) help us understand the range of what is possible, given certain
565 assumptions, when it is impossible to collect data with the necessary time depth. Psycho-
566 logical studies explore the cognitive aspects of learning strategies necessary to invent and
567 transmit behaviors. Historical and archaeological approaches, while they inevitably lack the
568 nuance of studies on the living, provide critical insights into the past that extend the time
569 depth of our knowledge. Studies of cultural processes in nonhuman species help us to un-
570 derstand which aspects of human behavioral biology are responsible for the unique form of
571 human culture, and also permit the collection of more comprehensive naturalistic data sets
572 than are feasible for humans; more broadly, they help us understand cultural change as an
573 adaptive process. We are currently experiencing an explosion of new statistical methodolo-
574 gies that improve our ability to conduct multivariate analyses of the complex multi-level,
575 time-varying data sets needed to see whether real-world cultural phenomena match theoret-
576 ical expectations. As always, the insights of careful ethnography—the signature contribution
577 of anthropologists—are helpful both for designing new studies and for interpreting incoming
578 data.

579 Although much research has been done on how inventions become innovations and spread
580 in populations, there are still many unanswered questions. Human inventions and inventors

581 have been studied extensively, but little is known about what characteristics cause an inven-
582 tion to spread in a group of nonhuman animals. In-depth, systematic, prospective, naturalis-
583 tic studies of inventions in animals are needed to answer this question thoroughly. We would
584 greatly welcome further studies such as the one by Perry et al. (2017) in other animal species
585 to capture the full range of animal creativity. Another important question concerns the poten-
586 tial relationship between the ease with which a behavior is invented and the ease with which
587 it spreads. Comparative studies of many inventions and their diffusion are essential. This is
588 best done with a combination of observational studies, formal experiments, and simulations
589 or formal models; these combined approaches can decipher the underlying processes and de-
590 termine when they occur. In addition to what is invented, it would also be good to know what
591 personality traits in humans and non-humans promote invention and innovation. Particular
592 attention should be paid to which personality traits have a positive impact on creativity and
593 willingness to learn. Personality traits of the model should also be examined more closely,
594 as they are crucial in determining what can be observed and to what intensity. The link be-
595 tween micro-processes of transmission and macro-patterns of adoption (at the population or
596 network level) is likely to be important and worthy of investigation. At the network level, the
597 impact of both network efficiency and clustering on cultural diversity should be explored. In
598 modeling the networks, there are still some problems to be solved, such as how relationships
599 are represented, how observation gaps or insufficiently captured time periods are handled,
600 and how the spread of cultural traits affects the structure of the network. All this, of course,
601 makes the models more complex and thus more difficult to compute and interpret. Finally, a
602 framework linking cognitive and sociocultural processes is still lacking. The development of
603 a coherent, cognitively and computationally plausible theory would represent an important
604 step in the theory of cultural evolution.

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


Figure 1. The creation and transmission of inventions are affected by variation at multiple levels. We review what is known about the transmission of inventions around six key questions. Some inventions, depicted here as a light bulb, are more likely to arise and spread than others (Q1). To become established as an innovation, an invention must transmit through a social group. In this figure, we depict two social groups in two social networks. Individuals in the network are depicted (arbitrarily) by cartoon baboons that can be either models or learners. Social links between individuals are depicted by thin gray lines. These links could reflect any or multiple forms of social connection, such as grooming, aggression, etc. and indicate possible paths of transmission of an invention between pairs of individuals. The transmission of an invention is indicated by the filled gray arrows with a light bulb. Graded arrows indicate the process occurring over multiple individuals within groups. The transmission between linked individuals can be affected by characteristics of the model (Q2), learner (Q3), and their relationship as a dyad (Q4). At the group level, characteristics such as group structure (depicted here by gray lines) and immigration patterns between groups (depicted by the dashed gray line), determine within- and between-group invention transmission (Q5). Finally, characteristics of some innovations result in their loss or extinction from a group or population (Q6). *Image credit: light bulb: Savio Ferreira; baboon cartoons: Ben Kawam.*