Simulating media platform mergers

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102729Get rights and content

Highlights

We simulate the outcomes of hypothetical media platform mergers when one ignores, and one accounts for multi-homing.

Abstract

The empirical analysis of media platforms economics has often neglected the multi-homing behaviour of advertisers. Assuming away the cross-substitutability and/or complementarity between the advertising slots of different platforms could damage the quality and the robustness of counterfactual analysis. To evaluate the consequence of such an abstraction, we compare the simulation results of hypothetical platform mergers when the demand on the advertising side is derived from a Translog cost model which allows for multi-homing, and when it is approximated by using a simple log-linear inverse demand model that ignores the differentiation among media platforms’ advertising slots. Ignoring the existence of substitutes or complements on the advertising side would result in overpredicting the losses of the viewers’ surplus and in underpredicting the gains in platforms’ revenues.

Keywords

Two-sided market
Platform merger
Advertising
TV market
Competition policy

JEL classification

K21
L10
L40
L82
M37

Cited by (0)

The authors are grateful to the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA) and Médiamétrie for making available the data used in this study. We are thankful to Leslie Marx and participants to the EARIE 2020 online conference in Bologna for useful comments. The opinions expressed in this article only reflect the authors’ views, and in no way represent those of the CSA, the Autorité de la concurrence, or Médiamétrie.

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