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Martimort, David
, Poudou, Jean-Christophe and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried
(2009)
Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process.
TSE Working Paper, n. 09-053, Toulouse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/21957
Abstract
We analyze the contract between an innovator and a developer, when the former has private information on his idea and the latter must exert efforts but may also quit the relationship after having been informed. We show that the equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives but in different ways according to the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR). For example, with intermediate IPR, only pooling contracts arise with a limited amount of information revealed.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | June 2009 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 06:00 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:36 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:21957 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3229 |
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- Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 06:00) [Currently Displayed]
