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Nöldeke, Georg
and Peña, Jorge
(2020)
Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game.
IAST Working Paper, n. 18-86, Toulouse
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Abstract
We consider the private provision of a public good with non-refundable binary contributions. A fixed amount of the good is provided if and only if the number of contributors reaches an exogenous threshold. The threshold, the group size, and the identical cost of contributing to the public good are common knowledge. Our main result shows that the maximal probability of reaching the threshold (and thereby obtaining the public good) which can be supported in a symmetric equilibrium of this participation game is decreasing in group size. This generalizes a well-known result for the volunteer’s dilemma – in which the threshold is one – to arbitrary thresholds and thereby confirms a conjecture by Olson for the class of participation games under consideration. Further results characterize the limit when group size goes to infinity and provide conditions under which the expected number of contributors is decreasing or increasing in group size.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 4 February 2020 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Participation games, Private provision of public goods, Group-size effects, Olson conjecture |
| JEL Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations H41 - Public Goods |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Nov 2018 09:12 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2023 08:39 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:33125 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26531 |
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