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Carvalho, José-Raimundo, Magnac, Thierry
and Xiong, Qizhou
(2019)
College Entry and Allocation Mechanisms.
Quantitative Economics, vol. 10.
pp. 1233-1277.
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Abstract
We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry
to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through
exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities
and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam
grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider
balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students.
Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to
increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all
counterfactual experiments.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2019 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Education, two-sided matching, school allocation mechanism, policy evaluation |
| JEL Classification: | I21 - Analysis of Education |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Nov 2018 11:40 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Jan 2022 08:44 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:33051 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26394 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
College Choice Allocation Mechanisms: Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:46)
- College Entry and Allocation Mechanisms. (deposited 12 Nov 2018 11:40) [Currently Displayed]
