Lefouili, Yassine and Pinho, Joana (2018) Collusion between two-sided platforms. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-894, Toulouse

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Abstract

We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: February 2018
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Collusion, Two-sided markets, Cross-group externalities
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 24 Apr 2018 11:10
Last Modified: 17 Jun 2021 15:50
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:32485
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25859

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