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Bonatti, Alessandro and Hörner, Johannes
(2017)
Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation.
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 169.
pp. 234-269.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
We analyze strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully revealing, publicly observable “breakdowns.” When actions are hidden, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium that involves randomization over stopping times. With two players, this is the unique equilibrium. Randomization leads to dispersion in actions and to belief disagreement on the equilibrium path. The resulting lack of coordination has significant welfare consequences. In contrast, when actions are observable, the equilibrium is pure and welfare improves.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | May 2017 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Experimentation, free-riding, mixed strategies, monitoring, delay |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief O33 - Technological Change - Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Mar 2017 11:48 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Apr 2024 10:47 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31601 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/23336 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation. (deposited 30 Mar 2017 11:44)
- Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation. (deposited 30 Mar 2017 11:48) [Currently Displayed]
