Caprice, Stéphane and Shekhar, Shiva (2017) On the countervailing power of large retailers when shopping costs matter. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-771, Toulouse
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Abstract
We consider a set-up with vertical contracting between a supplier and a retail industry where a large retailer competes with smaller retailers that carry a narrower range of products. Consumers are heterogeneous in their shopping costs; they will either be multistop shoppers or one-stop shoppers. The countervailing power of the large retailer is modeled as a threat of demand-side substitution. We show that retail prices are higher, and industry surplus and social welfare fall, when the large retailer possesses countervailing power. Increasing marginal wholesale prices discourages multistop shopping behavior of consumers, making demand substitution less attractive for the large retailer.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Language: | English |
Date: | March 2017 |
Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | countervailing power, buyer power, polarization of the retail industry, shopping costs |
JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L40 - General L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade; Warehousing; e-Commerce |
Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
Site: | UT1 |
Date Deposited: | 17 Mar 2017 15:16 |
Last Modified: | 28 Jun 2021 15:00 |
OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31527 |
URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/23194 |