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Attar, Andrea, Campioni, Eloisa and Piaser, Gwenaël (2015) On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition. TSE Working Paper, n. 15-609, Toulouse
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Abstract
We study games in which several principals design incentive schemes in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each agent can participate with at most one principal, and principal-agents corporations are isolated. We analyze the role of standard incentive compatible mechanisms in these contexts. First, we provide a clarifying example showing how incentive compatible mechanisms fail to completely characterize equilibrium outcomes even if we restrict to pure strategy equilibria. Second, we show that truth-telling equilibria are robust against unilateral deviations toward arbitrary mechanisms. We then consider the single agent case and exhibit sufficient conditions for the validity of the revelation principle.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | November 2015 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Competition, Incomplete Information |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse), TSM Research (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 14 Jun 2016 14:49 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Jul 2018 14:52 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:29906 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/18724 |
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