Polo, Michele and Rey, Patrick (2022) Unilateral Practices, Antitrust Enforcement and Commitments. TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1316, Toulouse

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Abstract

This paper analyses the impact of commitments on antitrust enforcement. These tools, introduced in Europe by the Modernization reform of 2003, are now used intensively by the European Commission and by National Competition Agencies. We consider a setting where a firm can adopt a practice that is either pro- or anti-competitive; the firm knows the nature of the practice whereas the enforcer has only prior beliefs about it. If the firm adopts the practice, the enforcer then decides whether to open a case. When commitments are available, the firm can offer a commitment whenever a case is opened; the enforcer then decides whether to accept it or run a costly investigation that may or may not bring supporting evidence. We show that introducing commitments weakens enforcement when the practice is likely to be anti-competitive. The impact of commitments is however more nuanced when the practice is less likely to be anti-competitive.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 10 March 2022
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Antitrust enforcement, Commitment, Remedies, Deterrence
JEL Classification: K21 - Antitrust Law
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
L40 - General
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 15 Mar 2022 10:44
Last Modified: 18 Jul 2023 09:48
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:126713
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/44885
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