Bouvard, Matthieu and De Motta, Adolfo (2021) Labor leverage, coordination failures, and aggregate risk. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 142 (n° 3). pp. 1229-1252.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.036

Abstract

This paper studies an economy where demand spillovers make firms’ production decisions strategic complements. Firms choose their operating leverage trading off higher fixed costs for lower variable costs. Operating leverage governs firms’ exposures to an aggregate labor productivity shock. In equilibrium, firms exhibit excessive operating leverage as they do not internalize that an economy with higher aggregate operating leverage is more likely to fall into a recession following a negative productivity shock. Welfare losses coming from firms’ failure to coordinate production are amplified by suboptimal risk-taking, which magnifies the impact of productivity shocks onto aggregate output.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: January 2021
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Amsterdam
Uncontrolled Keywords: Operating leverage, Labor leverage, Coordination failure, Global games, Aggregate risk.
JEL Classification: D24 - Production; Cost; Capital and Total Factor Productivity; Capacity
D62 - Externalities
E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 25 Mar 2021 09:43
Last Modified: 13 Jan 2022 08:45
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:125155
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/42265

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