Hörner, Johannes and Lambert, Nicolas (2020) Motivational Ratings. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1134, Toulouse

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Abstract

Performance evaluation (\rating") systems not only provide information to users but also motivate the rated worker. This paper solves for the optimal(effort-maximizing) rating within the standard career concerns framework. We prove that this rating is a linear function of past observations. The rating, however, is not a Markov process, but rather the sum of two Markov processes. We show how it combines information of different types and vintages. An increase in effort may adversely affect some (but not all) future ratings.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: August 2020
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Career Concerns, Mechanism Design, Ratings.
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 31 Aug 2020 13:47
Last Modified: 24 Aug 2022 09:45
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:124605
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41739

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